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Årets sidste nummer af Militært Tidsskrift står i de strategiske studiers tegn. Takket være Forsvarsakademiets Institut for Strategi er det lykkedes at identificere en skare af skribenter, hvis bidrag såvel teoretisk som emnemæssigt er ganske bredspektret. De af instituttet genererede artikler er beskrevet nærmere i den introducerende artikel af oberst Jens Garly og lektor Liselotte Odgaard, begge Forsvarsakademiets Fakultet for Strategi og Militære Operationer. For en nærmere præsentation af artiklerne henvises derfor til denne artikel, idet redaktionen dog ikke her vil undlade at takke alle bidragsydere – og i særdeleshed temaredaktørerne – for deres bidrag.

En enkelt artikel er indkommet ad andre veje. Det drejer sig om et bidrag af cand. Mag. Niels Vistisen, rådgiver for udenrigsministeriet i Helmand. Vistisen videregiver en række af de erfaringer og overvejelser, han under en tidligere udstationering i Afghanistan gjorde sig som Chief Governance Planner i Regional Command South.

Sidst i nummeret følger anmeldelsessektionen – som altid – redigeret af kommandør Poul Grooss. Afslutningsvis vil redaktionen ønske læserne en rigtig god jul og et godt 2012.

Niels Bo Poulsen, chefredaktør

Strategic studies at the Royal Danish Defence College

Jens H. Garly, Colonel, Director of the Faculty of Strategy and Military Operations, Royal Danish Defence College, and Liselotte Odgaard, Associate Professor, Institute for Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College.

This issue of *Militært Tidsskrift* [Military Journal], the quarterly journal published by the Society for War Science in Denmark, is dedicated to presenting the MA-level teaching and research in strategy that takes place at the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC). Strategy in the contemporary context of national defence is not merely a term that encompasses traditional military strategy which articulates military objectives, concepts and resources within the domain of military conflict. Strategy is a multi-layered instrument encompassing political-administrative, military and diplomatic practices of translating political visions into plans for how to pursue security interests. Strategy in general is based on political visions such as that of transforming Danish defence from a mobilization force to an expeditionary force. This involves changing focus from defending national territory from invasion to the defence of Western values against aggressors that use violence to undermine their impact. Similarly, strategy concerns initiatives such as the plans for reorienting the Danish armed forces from concentrating on integration into NATO defence structures on the basis of geostrategic interests towards focusing on integration into NATO, UN and EU security structures on the basis of political-normative worldviews. Strategies do not belong to the realm of academic ivory towers or to the detailed series of battles entailed in a campaign plan. Instead, our theoretical starting point is that they belong to the realm of feasible paths to enhanced state security.

The teaching and research that takes place at the Royal Danish Defence College aim at contributing to conceptual development and practical applicability. A close relationship exists between our research projects and the Senior Joint Staff Course for officers that are trained to occupy top management positions in the armed forces. The Research Group on Strategy involves staff from across the RDDC, including the Institute for Strategy, the Institute for Military Operations, the Institute for Management and Organization and the Center for Advanced Land Operations. The work of the group is based on ideas developed in the courses offered to our students and on debates between researchers at the college and discussions with guests from other institutions. Similarly, seminars, teaching and discussions on military strategy at the college have resulted in research products and in revisions to our curriculum on strategy, which constitutes one third of the compulsory elements of the Senior Joint Staff Course. Some of our ideas on strategy have also been presented in external forums such as the US Pacific Command in Honolulu and the Academy of Military Science in Beijing. The close interplay between students, staff and external institutions and partners on strategic studies increases the level at which strategy is taught at the college and it enhances the usefulness of research for all groups involved in strategic studies. The articles in this issue reflect some of these efforts.

Conceptual development of strategy is carried out with a view to the needs of national defence and the usefulness for teaching officers how to formulate and implement strategies. In other words, strategic thinking at RDDC focuses on practical applicability. These objectives entail a critical and constructive approach to conventional approaches to strategy with a view to developing strategic concepts that are suitable in a Danish security context. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the military and its plan-

ning processes tend to take over the ends, ways and means adopted in theatres. Sometimes, this is an inherent part of the strategic planning process from the start. At other times, the military gradually comes to dominate processes of strategic planning because implementation is mostly left to military personnel. As a consequence, the contributions of civilian agencies such as diplomatic missions, non-governmental organizations and private companies tend to be crowded out. In addition, the link between the political visions agreed at the governmental and alliance level on the one hand and implementation in theatres on the other hand could be broken.

The risk of decoupling political guidance from on-the-ground strategic planning invests operations with a life of their own. This is the case in terms of utilizing capabilities and finding sources of legitimacy that are often unrelated to the mandate originally given to operations by governments and international society. The upside to these characteristics of post-Cold War operations is the inherent flexibility that comes with leaving greater authority in the hands of those operating at theatre level. At this level, swift adjustments to changes in the local context of operations are much easier to make than at higher levels where divergent political commitments often result in objectives that originate from political compromises rather than rational means-ends calculations. The downside could be the lack of popular consent to alterations in the objectives and instruments of operations. Equally problematic is the tendency for the detailed planning processes of the military to dominate processes of strategy formulation and implementation in practice. The consequence could be that strategic planners lose sight of the main objectives and the realities on the ground and devise strategies that do not take into account the political guidance and the conditions that apply at the operational level.

Strategy can be defined as a process that translates political visions into attainable objectives, applying the available instruments by feasible methods.¹ Strategy is not simply the result of specific meetings and processes that are presented in key documents accessible to those responsible for their implementation. States contain large bureaucracies that are rarely sufficiently united in their views on objectives of the state that a coherent process of strategy formulation is feasible.² Instead, strategy formulation and implementation is a complex process involving numerous actors and variables. These include politicians with different visions, civil servants with vested interests in promoting the institutions they work for and which secure their promotion, and implementing agencies whose objectives and available means may be affected by concerns to satisfy the interests of local and regional managers with immediate concerns about individual welfare, rather than general visions of the state at large.

Strategy can be seen to operate on three different levels: grand strategy, security strategy and theatre strategy. Grand strategy we define as a state's vision concerning its future relative position on the basis of national interests and values. It represents the most general level of strategy and lies at the intersection between policy making and bureaucracy, focusing on the core interests and values pursued by the state. Security strategy can be defined as the development, application and allocation of methods and instruments to achieve national security objectives.

¹ The definitions of strategy are based on William Krüger-Klausen and Liselotte Odgaard, "Strategy formulation – issues of legitimacy, coordination and feedback", *Paper*, 11 February 2010, presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention 2010, New Orleans, USA, 17-20 February 2010.

² On the complexity of the process of strategic planning, see Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2008, pp. 27-37.

Security strategy is functionally specific in the sense that states can have strategies of economic development, foreign policy, defense, energy and foreign aid. These translate the general visions into sector-specific programs for the implementation of these visions. Compared to grand strategy, security strategy is more practical. It concerns what is possible in the real world of conflicts of interests and demands. It is the preserve of those tasked with amending the visions to the behavior of other states with their own interests and values, to a reality characterized by limited resources for realizing visions, and to issue areas where individuals and agencies with sector-specific views may affect processes of strategic planning and implementation. The classical concept of military strategy predominantly belongs to the realm of security strategy since it entails using military forces as the primary instrument to outline the planned course of wars.

Theatre strategy involves the coordinated and synchronized application of methods and instruments within a defined area. It has a geographical focus and is located below the instrumental level. Compared to security strategy, strategy at this level is very action-oriented and tailors the available tools to the specific situation. Theatre strategy is where the rubber meets the road. These realities may include unforeseen crises resulting from unexpected behavior from opponents or partners, developments on the ground such as changes in the physical terrain, or new regional organizations that jeopardize the utility of existing instruments for meeting strategic objectives. It also includes inter-agency disputes that divert the focus of implementing personnel from the strategic objectives to rivalry with other actors competing for scarce resources and influence. Such problems occur in alliance as well as national contexts.

Below the three strategic levels of grand strategy, security strategy and theatre strategy we find campaigns and operations. This level encompasses tactical doctrines in the form of standard sets of maneuvers, types of troops and weapons to be employed in the event of a particular kind of operation.

This issue of Military Journal [Militært Tidsskrift] aims to assess the qualities and the problematic aspects of contemporary processes of strategy formulation and implementation. To this end, the articles focus on the interplay between political, civilian and military agencies in strategic planning processes in states and alliances at grand strategy, security strategy and theatre strategy level. In addition, the issue looks at how developments at the operational level impact on strategic planning at higher levels.

Robert R. Dorff's contribution, "Understanding and Teaching Strategy at the U.S. Army War College", demonstrates the complexity of devising strategies with feasible objectives in a context of numerous actors with different vested interests in the ends, ways and means that make up strategies. Strategies are works in progress requiring that top-level personnel focusing on the core national security interests at grand strategy level adjust the strategies to changes in political priorities and to theatre level developments that have moved implementation away from the initial ends, ways and means.

Peter H. Sølling's contribution, "Military Strategy Is not just Military Strategy? [Militærstrategi er ikke bare militærstrategi?]", shows that military strategy is a functionally specific field of expertise which operates at the junction between power struggles at grand strategy level about the appropriate definition of state interests on the one hand and the ends-ways-means processes at security strategy level that ensures that political visions are translated into attainable defence planning that gives guidance to the use of armed forces in campaigns.

Thomas Elkjer Nissen and Steen Kjærgaard's contribution, "The Role of Strategic Communication in Strategies and Strategy Formulation" [Strategisk kommunikations rolle i strategier og strategiformulering], argues that strategic communication, which aims to influence target audiences of importance for strategic objectives, must be a determining

factor when formulating ends, ways and means. Furthermore, the article posits that strategic communication must be a purposeful and integrated effort at grand, security as well as theater strategy level. Used in this way, strategic communication can both support the use of capacities for specific objectives and be a capacity in itself which promotes for instance the legitimacy of specific strategies in the general public.

James R. Stark's contribution, "U.S. National Security Strategy: A Global Outlook in Transition", argues that the interplay between political visions and the grand strategy definition of core U.S. national objectives and the ways and means of realizing those objectives is characterized by incremental processes of adjustment that result in considerable continuity between the national security strategies of Republican and Democratic administrations.

Nicolai Meulengracht's contribution, "Nationalism in China's Security Strategies", posits that processes of strategic planning in China are heavily influenced by nationalist dynamics centering on the protection of China's cultural unity from internal and external threats such as Uyghur separatism in the northwestern Xinjiang province and overlapping claims to territory and maritime space in the East China Sea. The perceived need to address nationalist concerns at grand strategy level to preserve Chinese Communist Party rule heavily influences the definition of threats and the ways and means of addressing them in the top-echelons of China's political system.

Mark F. Laity's contribution, "NATO's Strategy for Afghanistan", demonstrates that in NATO, commanders are not merely key figures at theatre strategic level, but also end up defining the ways and means used to pursue core national interests at grand strategy level. A contributing factor to the key role of the commander in NATO operations is the relative ineffectiveness of the comprehensive approach. This approach has introduced a plethora of actors at theatre level which have added to the complexity and detracted from the efficiency of grand strategic guidance of implementation of strategies. The comparative effectiveness of military commanders in planning processes has allowed successive commanders in NATO's operations in Afghanistan to dominate strategy formulation from bottom to top.

Ole Kværnø's contribution, "Governance in Southern Afghanistan – Managerial and Strategic Challenges", describes the difficulties in implementing the objectives of the comprehensive approach at the regional level in the Afghan theatre. Legitimacy in the Afghan population and legality in terms of liberal definitions of the rule of law have been defined as key objectives for the indigenous Afghan political, military and civilian institutions that NATO have been tasked to assist in establishing. The numerous actors engaged in these nation-building processes at theatre level have led to the establishment of numerous overlapping institutions and the emergence of a plethora of divergent interests that have decoupled regional governance processes from the objectives devised at security strategy level, where specialists have devised the core institutions to be established and the ways and means by which they are invested with popular legitimacy and are ruled by law.

Carsten Fugleholm's contribution, "Strategy for Cyber Defence in Denmark" [Strategi for cyberdefence i Danmark], shows that strategies are not necessarily coherent official documents, but may be *de facto* practices that have developed as a result of the need of functionally specialized agencies for defining ends, ways and means to meet political demands for addressing the proliferation in threats from cyber space. The specialized knowledge at security strategy level therefore comes to play a relatively large role in strategic planning in cyber defence compared to the general core state interests defined at grand strategy level. As a consequence, sector-specific interests play a large role in addressing threats in this field in the Danish context.

As a whole, the contributions to this special issue on strategic studies reveal that problems of coordination, adjustment and efficiency pervade the field of strategic planning across functional and geographical issue areas. In particular, it would appear that the complexity of actors and institutions involved in implementing strategies at security and theatre strategy levels detract from the ability of the grand strategy level to translate core national interests into central ends, ways and means that guide strategic planning at the two other levels.

Understanding and Teaching Strategy at the U.S. Army War College¹

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DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily express the official policy or position of the U.S. Army War College, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

For nearly three decades now, students at the U.S. Army War College have studied strategy using the basic conceptual model first introduced by COL (Ret) Arthur F. Lykke, Jr.³ While Lykke's initial formulation focused on military strategy, it soon evolved into a framework for understanding strategy in general, and at all levels and in a variety of different applications. The model, presented again in this article with some modifications, provides a clear and simple way of *thinking* about strategy. It does not, however, imply that *doing* strategy—its actual formulation and implementation in practice—is either simple or easy. In fact, the very nature of strategy leads to quite a different conclusion: Strategy is extraordinarily difficult.⁴ Whether studied in the Hegelian-like style of the German author Clausewitz or the almost “bumper sticker” style of the Asian Sun Tzu, strategy emerges as a complex process, whose many enduring and key characteristics include the persistent operation of forces nearly impossible to influence let alone control such as uncertainty and chance.⁵ All that said, there are still many reasons why a basic understanding of a rather simple model of strategy better prepares us to engage in strategic thinking, strategy formulation and implementation, and strategic leadership in highly complex and uncertain situations. Per-

¹ This article grew out of presentations made and discussions held by the author while he participated in a program held at the Royal Danish Defence College on April 12-13, 2010. It draws heavily on the author's experience as a faculty member, course director, and Chair of the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, as well as his current research conducted under the auspices of the Strategic Studies Institute of the USAWC.

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³ See Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” reproduced in Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (eds.), *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001, pp. 179-85.

⁴ Literally volumes have been written on this one aspect of strategy, but one very useful overview can also be found in the just-referenced edited volume. See David Jablonsky, “Why is Strategy Difficult?” in Cerami and Holcomb, *Guide to Strategy*, pp. 143-55.

⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and translated Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.

haps the most important reason is the value of a common language (terms, concepts, etc.) and a shared understanding of it in the otherwise quite complex and often confusing world of formulating and implementing strategy. And that is why it is increasingly important today to ensure that the education and development of our future leaders occur both for civilian and military members of the strategy community, and that it also take place jointly and in a shared environment.

The purpose of this article is twofold. The first is to present the basic foundation used at the U.S. Army War College (and elsewhere) for the discussion of strategic issues such as the key characteristics of the contemporary international security environment, the challenges and opportunities that environment presents to all actors (national and international, state and non-state, governmental and non-governmental), and possible strategic responses to those challenges and opportunities. The second purpose is to lay out some of the inherent challenges of formulating and implementing strategy not only in the face of an increasingly complex security environment but also in contemporary democracies. Democratic institutions, processes, and relationships frequently confound the already complicated challenges of formulating and implementing effective strategy. To accomplish this twofold purpose the article will once again lay out the basic conceptual model of strategy and present another conceptual framework for the formulation of strategy. It will then focus on the critical relationship between policy and strategy, and in turn the special *problematic* of that relationship in democratic societies today. Finally, the article concludes with some observations about what these challenges of strategy formulation and implementation mean for leadership and especially leadership development in both the military and civilian communities, and the role of the U.S. Army War College in that leadership development process.

Strategy: What Is It?

Strategy is several things. The definition of strategy employed at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) is the “relationship among ends, ways, and means.” This is a self-described “conceptual definition,” emphasizing that by design it simplifies a complex process into a framework for clearer understanding. **Ends** are the objectives or goals sought. **Means** are the resources available to pursue the objectives. And **ways** or concepts are how one organizes and applies the resources in pursuit of the objectives. Each of these components suggests a related question. What do we want to pursue (ends)? With what (means)? How (ways)? Often we add an important modifier to this definition: The **calculated** relationship among ends, ways and means. The point is to emphasize that the relationship is not pre-existing or a given; it is the result of choices made by individuals or institutions who ostensibly make decisions based on what they think or believe that relationship should be. These choices may or may not be conscious and deliberate. So in answering the question – what is strategy? – it is first a calculated relationship among these three basic components.⁶

But an understanding of what strategy is must also recognize that it is intrinsically dynamic. And it is dynamic in two ways. First, the outcomes of strategic engagement –

⁶ Some argue this definition overstates the rationality of strategy formulation, and presumes a kind of linearity to strategy that does not conform to reality. See, for example, arguments presented in Gabriel Marcella (ed.), *Teaching Strategy: Challenge and Response*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2010. While time and space limitations preclude an in-depth exploration of these issues here, some of the subsequent discussion will argue that this definition does not assume such levels of rationality or linearity. However, in this author’s opinion, some scholars and teachers have overstated both of those dimensions to the detriment of a sound understanding of what strategy is.

whether in politics, business, sports, wars or myriad other applications of strategy — are determined not by the choices made by one of the actors but by the interaction of the choices made by two or more participants or players. One cannot know the actual result of a strategic choice — a course of action, for example — until that choice meets its counterpart (a choice by another actor). So in this first sense, strategy is dynamic because the results emerge from the interaction of choices made by two or more players. And precisely because of this dynamic, strategy is dynamic in a second sense: It is a process not an outcome. Strategy is never truly a *product*. Although we often hear the term *strategic plan*, it is much more accurate to observe that true strategy is an ongoing process of making choices, seeing how those choices play out in the field, assessing those intermediate results, and adjusting as necessary to stay on track toward the achievement of the objective(s). While planning and plans may be important components of *doing strategy*, strategy itself should not be confused with a plan, if by the latter ones means something of a fixed blueprint to be followed. One can build a house according to a blueprint because rarely is someone or something trying to obstruct the construction of that house while it is being built. Someone may want to change the blueprint along the way, but it is generally done within the framework of a shared desire to build the house. But in all things strategic someone or something is in effect trying to prevent your strategy from succeeding, and therefore the dynamic process of planning, acting, assessing, reassessing, and adjusting is in fact not just necessary; it is part of the very essence of strategy. It is, to return to the phrase in the introduction, part of what makes *doing strategy* so difficult. The strategy must be sound in and of itself AND it must survive the dynamic process of interacting with choices made by others, shifts in the nature and character of the environment in which it is occurring, and the curveballs thrown up by the indomitable forces of chance and the unknown.

This complex, dynamic character of strategy also highlights the importance of some very important principles of strategy which we cover briefly here.⁷ The first is the principle of balance. A sound strategy must have internal balance. If the objectives are too ambitious, the resources too limited, or the concepts for employing them too inefficient, the strategy will almost certainly fail. So in formulating and adjusting the strategy, the strategist must constantly work to ensure that the appropriate balance is maintained. And since resources are always limited, this means that risk is inherent in any strategy; when one allocates certain resources in certain ways to pursue certain objectives, risk emerges somewhere because fewer resources are allocated to those other areas. Managing that risk is key, making conscious choices about where and how to bear it.

The second key principle is that ends are the most important component of strategy. This does not mean the other two are unimportant. But if the strategic ends are wrong, no amount of adjustment of ways and means will fix the strategy. In short, if you are going to the wrong place you can get there faster and you can get there more efficiently, but neither will correct for the very serious flaw that the objective of the strategy has been misidentified.⁸

A third key principle of strategy is that the objectives must be pursued with the appropriate means applied in effective, carefully considered ways. Not all means are appropriate

⁷ There are many important principles of strategy one can glean from the very rich and broad literature, ranging perhaps from the ancients like Thucydides to some outstanding modern analyses, many of which will be touched on elsewhere in this special edition.

⁸ Of course, this cannot be done if one has not properly identified the nature of the strategic challenge in the first place. To use a medical analogy, a doctor probably cannot prescribe a course of treatment that will succeed without first correctly identifying what ails the patient.

for the pursuit of all objectives. In the past two decades this was evident in the many efforts to find the right balance of military and non-military instruments in peace operations.⁹ It lies at the heart of the debate about the three D's (defense, diplomacy, and development) and the appropriate strategic mix necessary to address effectively the challenges of complex international stabilization and reconstruction operations in conflict-riven and post-conflict environments. For even if one has properly identified the strategic objectives, the application of the wrong tools will generally lead to strategic failure.¹⁰ Moreover, the right tools but in the wrong combination (the ways in which one applies the means) can also result in strategic failure. It is necessary but not sufficient to identify and define the ends properly; finding the appropriate mix of ways and means is crucial, too.

To summarize, then, strategy is all of these things together: Setting the proper objectives, identifying and employing the appropriate resources in the most effective and efficient ways possible given various and multiple constraints and limitations, and assessing and adapting as situations change, other actors make their choices, and previously unknown or largely uncontrollable factors come into play. Small wonder, then, that strategy is a concept relatively simple in theory and yet extraordinarily complex in practice.

Grand Strategy: What Is It?

As Garly and Odgaard observe in the introductory article to this special edition, strategy also operates at different levels, and they identify three: grand strategy, security strategy, and theatre strategy.¹¹ For our purposes we concentrate here on grand strategy which we define as the over-arching strategy of a state as it pursues its interests through the application of the instruments of power derived from all the elements of power. Although there are numerous lists (with accompanying acronyms) of the elements of power, it suffices here to identify one of the most common and perhaps also simplest, DIME: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic. Within each of these elements, there are multiple instruments, i.e., specific tools that can be applied depending on what means a state has available to use and the ways in which those means can be organized and employed.¹² Typically states vary greatly in terms of what and how much of each element of power they have and can bring to bear in the pursuit of their objectives, and they also vary greatly in

⁹ See just one example from this author's work: Robert H. Dorff, "The Future of Peace Support Operations". *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 160-178.

¹⁰ The oft-quoted old maxim is useful here to illustrate the point: If all you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. Wikipedia identifies this as "[T]he concept known as **the law of the instrument, Maslow's hammer, or a golden hammer....**" and cites the source as Abraham Maslow with this quote: "It is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail." Abraham H. Maslow, *The Psychology of Science*. Chapel Hill, NC: Maurice Bassett Publishing, 2002, p. 15. Wikipedia source available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_the_instrument; accessed most recently 27 Aug 2011.

¹¹ Jens Garly and Liselotte Odgaard, "Strategic Studies at the Royal Danish Defence College". *Militært Tidsskrift*, nr. 4, 2011 p. 3. To be clear there is often disagreement on this terminology. Some use grand strategy, national security strategy, and security strategy synonymously while others draw carefully and finely nuanced distinctions among them. For the purposes of this article we do not need to enter this debate. We use the distinction drawn by Garly and Odgaard which is more than appropriate for the arguments presented here.

¹² Some other acronyms and lists of the elements of power include DIMEFIL (adding finance, intelligence and law enforcement) and MIDLIFE (adding legal, intelligence, finance). For the DIMEFIL chart showing both the elements and some of the tools of each element, see Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2008, p. 72.

terms of the variety and effectiveness of the many possible instruments that translate those elements into useful, practical applications of that power. But in all cases a sound grand strategy integrates the elements of power through the coordinated and synchronized application of specific instruments or tools of power in the pursuit of identified strategic objectives. At the level of grand strategy this integration of the elements of power is arguably the most important because the goals or objectives are quite broad, and there can be a vast array of choices and decisions to make about how best to pursue those broad goals and the most appropriate and feasible mix of the elements of power with their related tools or instruments. A grand strategy also has the other key characteristics of strategy generally: It is dynamic, involving an ongoing assessment of and adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in the strategic environment and to strategic choices made by other actors in the international system, and it is a process, not a singular outcome.

Grand Strategy and Policy

Earlier we noted that the relationship between the ends pursued and the means and ways chosen to pursue those ends is an essential component of “getting strategy right.” But there is another critical relationship in strategy and it also leads us into the process of strategy formulation: the relationship between policy and strategy. Simply stated, policy is what should and indeed must guide strategy, not only at the level of grand strategy but at all levels. This is the basic yet fundamental point of the oft-quoted phrase from Clausewitz, paraphrased here, that war is the extension of politics by other means—it is in fact the extension of “policy by other means”, meaning that the use of the military must be guided by the strategic objectives and apply the military instruments of power in ways that are consistent with the policy that underlies and therefore must guide it. Policy in this context is the broad goal-setting function of strategy, but not simply in the sense of setting strategic objectives, which it clearly does, but also in the guidance it provides about what elements of state power should be employed and in what ways. In some cases the policy constraints will also substantially narrow the range of tools that can be used within any one or more of those elements. In democracies the responsibility for formulating the policy that in turn guides strategy remains in the domain of the public, i.e., it is a public policy function. This does not mean that all public institutions and officials, including the public itself, play equally in the process of formulating policy and policy guidance; rather, it means only that the ultimate *authority* for determining that policy is the constituted public policy process. One example of that as applied to military strategy is embodied in the democratic principle of civilian control. We will explore several other aspects of the policy-strategy relationship in the subsequent section on the formulation of strategy in practice. But first we consider how all of this is supposed to come together *theoretically* in the formulation of strategy.

Formulation and Implementation of Strategy in Theory

To illustrate the formulation of strategy *in theory* we have reproduced a variation of a diagram frequently used at the US Army War College in its professional military education (PME) curriculum for senior-level military officers and including international officers and some US security-sector civilians.¹³

¹³ For additional information on the US Army War College specifically and PME generally, see Linda P. Brady, Robert H. Dorff, Daniel J. Kaufman, and James M. Smith, *Educating International Security Practitioners: Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Century International Security Environ-*

The Building Blocks for Strategy Formulation



Figure 1

Figure 1 presents in flow-chart form a suggested process for formulating national or grand strategy. We will not walk through each step of the process as presented; instead we use this diagram to make some observations that bear on the remainder of our arguments in this article. First, strategy formulation should begin with a careful consideration of the national values of the country, and those core values must be reflected in the policy and its resulting guidance for strategy lest the resulting strategy be at odds with those same values. When that happens, strategy is almost certain to fail. Those same values underlie the national interests of the country and its citizens, and those interests become the focal point of what the grand strategy is designed to protect and promote. The next step in this process—the strategic appraisal—involves a number of critical tasks such as the identification of potential threats and challenges to those interests, as well as opportunities for their promotion and advancement. It entails an assessment of the strategic environment, including both its external and internal dimensions. The external environment consists of other actors in the international system (e.g., state and non-state, governmental and non-governmental, international organizations, etc.), important characteristics such as the distribution of power and resources, including people, and overall trends and forces at work. There may be elements of continuity from the past co-existing with elements of

ment. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. Available online at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=280>.

strong and rapid change in the present and future, making the challenge of accurate assessment all the more difficult. The internal environment consists of those things within the country that bear on identifying the proper objectives for the strategy as well as its formulation and implementation. They include, for example, the institutions of government, the economic climate, the mood and preferences of the public, proclivities of individual leaders, and so on.¹⁴ This is a highly complex and complicated component of strategy formulation, and often presents the strategist with a confounding array of variables, frequently very difficult to measure, and including unknowns and even unknowable's.¹⁵ And there is usually a large number of domestic participants in the strategic appraisal process.

Once the overall strategic appraisal is complete, the next step is the formulation of broad policy and the accompanying policy guidance. This consists first and foremost of identifying and articulating the core strategic objectives, and any additional policy guidelines concerning how, with what, and at what level of intensity they will be pursued. From that the national strategy is formulated, and in the diagram we show only the formulation of the military strategy to support that national strategy, but in reality there will be several supporting (sometimes called subordinate) strategies that should be aligned in pursuit of the overall national objectives. Creating and maintaining that alignment is yet another challenge we will identify in the next section on strategy formulation in practice. Finally, the emerging strategy is evaluated in terms of risk and risk management, and reassessed and adjusted as necessary—all the way back up to the identification and statement of national interests if need be. And this is the critical point: The strategy formulation process, even when presented in this flow-chart format, should not be viewed as a linear, step-by-step, purely rational exercise. It will loop back on itself as contradictions and stresses on resources force a reexamination of objectives as well as the ways and means to pursue them. Some objectives may even be in competition with each other, creating an internal tension in the strategy that must be addressed and mitigated if not resolved. In this much-abbreviated treatment of strategy formulation in theory, we should see there is nothing simple about it. But we should also see that the three component parts of strategy and their relationship to each other, and the various steps of the strategy formulation process and their relationship to each other and to the resultant strategy, are useful in helping the strategist ask the right questions. They do not comprise a tight, rational, linear formula for getting to the correct answers to those questions. In fact, as taught at the US Army War College and elsewhere, the strategy and strategy formulation models provide a framework for thinking and analysis, not a formula for successfully *doing strategy*. Creativity and critical thinking play heavily in the final product; in the end, nearly all strategy is a combination of both art and science, and often more art than science.

Similarly, once formulated the strategy requires effective implementation in order to achieve success. Effective implementation includes many of the same principles of, and is closely related to, strategy formulation. For one thing, the various tools identified in formulation must be organized and activated. They must also be coordinated and focused so as not to be in conflict with one another or impede the progress of other key components of the strategy. Just as the strategy needs continual assessment and adjustment as required, so too does its implementation. And just as the strategy requires balance, there are critical issues of balance and timing in implementation, too. And for grand strategy especially, the time frame for implementation will be quite long, requiring patience and sustainability. In theory, one can identify these and other discrete parts of strategy implementation and line

¹⁴ For a more detailed discussion of the strategic environment, see Yarger, *op.cit.*, pp. 27-37.

¹⁵ At the US Army War College we refer to this as the VUCA environment which stands for volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous.

them up in a logical array for execution. But as with its formulation the implementation of strategy almost always requires an artful application of adjustments and *fixes* to problems as they arise. It, too, is anything but simple.¹⁶

Formulation and Implementation of Strategy in Practice

At the end of the last section we highlighted some of the factors that already point to the myriad challenges of turning the theory of strategy formulation and implementation into practice. They include the complexity and uncertainty of the many dimensions of the strategic appraisal, and the fact that important strategic objectives may be in conflict with one another. No less important is the nature of the process that flows directly from the policy-strategy relationship discussed in the section preceding the last: The process of strategy formulation is inherently *political*. Although some students are frequently put off by this notion, it is not a negative editorial comment; it is both a statement of fact and a reality about what strategy is. There is no single correct answer for what is a good strategy in almost all situations we would confront under this heading of grand strategy; there may be some strategic alternatives that are better than others, but there is no such thing as **the** right answer. Because policy must ultimately guide strategy, the process of formulating that strategy must be political. But that also means that the policy itself is subject to the give and take of all things political. So more importantly, the issue is not that it is political; the issue is whether the underlying politics of the process are, for lack of a better word, *healthy* in terms of strategy formulation and implementation. That is why Clausewitz, for example, devotes so much thought and space to concepts like the “trinity” (the relationship between the government, the people, and the military) and qualities of leadership.¹⁷ The move from theory to practice in strategy formulation and implementation is a hugely complicated and very difficult step because of the uncertain and often vague nature of the core concepts, the dynamic underlying all strategy, and the fact that the dynamic is magnified by the internal dynamics of the political process.

Consider a second diagram which has also been used at the US Army War College to help illustrate this important aspect of strategy formulation and implementation in practice. In this diagram the focus is on “national security policy and strategy” but it applies equally to grand strategy since in the terminology adopted in this special issue, security strategy is a subset of grand strategy.

The Interlocking Structure of National Security



Figure 2

¹⁶ We are reminded of the loosely translated, slightly reinterpreted, and oft-quoted statement of von Moltke's that “no battle plan survives the first encounter with the enemy”.

¹⁷ We will return to these points in the next section.

As this figure illustrates, the definition, formulation, and of course implementation of broad national strategy occur at the nexus of the international and domestic systems, that is, where the two systems overlap. And that means that both the understanding of the international system (the external dimension of the strategic appraisal) and the formulation of a grand strategy based on that understanding will be forged as a matter of domestic political processes. The implementation of grand strategy will also be subject to those same domestic political processes. At this level of strategy, successful implementation almost always requires sustained effort over a long period of time, frequently without immediately observable results.

Strategy Formulation and Implementation in a Democracy: The Need for Leadership

Democracies pose specific challenges to these key components of *doing strategy*.¹⁸ And while time and space constraints do not allow for a consideration of them here, what we can highlight is the critical role of leadership in strategy formulation and implementation. In all open political systems, successful grand strategy typically results when political leaders rise to the challenge of their roles in strategy. Simply stated, leaders must do the following: 1) devise the strategy based on a strong vision for the country and consistent with its core values; 2) articulate the strategy effectively to others; 3) induce and inspire others to follow; 4) assess, reassess and adjust as necessary; and 5) maintain a laser-like focus on the strategic objectives. There is insufficient authority in most democratic political systems to achieve these things by dint of political power alone; ultimately the power of persuasion and the effective use of leadership skills determine these outcomes.

The Role of the U.S. Army War College: Developing Strategic Leaders

We have argued that grand strategy formulation and implementation, while relatively easy to grasp in theory, are in fact quite difficult in practice; that difficulty is a function both of what strategy is and the political context within which it is formulated and implemented. Both because of its inherent complexity and the additional complexity of the contemporary international system, the kind of strategic coherence and constancy we need are often lacking. This frequently results in 1) strategic lurches from one so-called “strategy” to another or 2) strategic ambiguity and vagueness, or 3) some combination of the two. Given the different levels of strategy, this uncertainty at the top often leads to the kind of theater-level strategy adaptation by implementers identified by Garly and Odgaard.¹⁹ And while recent U.S. experience with “on-the-ground strategy development” has shown that good things can result from it, the problem is that in the absence of strategic coherence in Washington, the strategy in the field is not sustainable: Neither the political leadership nor the public will provide the long-term support that strategic success requires.²⁰ Democratic

¹⁸ Entire books have been written on this topic, and we do not purport to offer anything like a full treatment here. The brief excursion is intended to return us to the teaching and research that occurs at institutions such as the Royal Danish Defence College and the US Army War College, and how that contributes to challenges we face in *doing strategy*. For one example of the practice of security strategy in the U.S., see Harvey M. Sapolsky, Eugene Gholz, and Caitlin Talmadge, *US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy*. New York: Routledge, 2009.

¹⁹ Garly and Odgaard, op. cit., p. 2.

²⁰ We mention here the way in which U.S. military and civilian implementers essentially “invented” Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s) in response to a rapidly changing security environment on the ground and the lack of appropriate resources (reconstruction and stabilization tools) immediately

institutions and processes often stress divided and shared powers. This in turn frequently leads to intended inefficiencies and slow-to-develop outcomes. And when these combine, as they often do in the U.S. with a public that frequently wants immediate results, the challenges for successful strategy formulation and implementation are huge. And this *democratic problematic*, at least in the U.S. but almost certainly elsewhere, means that in the absence of senior-level leadership and the attendant public support over time, strategy formulation and implementation will either continue to occur on the ground or will break down. In either case, effective strategic-level success is highly unlikely.

And so we conclude this article with some observations about the role of the USAWC, and specifically its mission in regard to the difficulties of formulating and implementing strategy as identified in the preceding sections.²¹ The two primary functions that the USAWC performs are teaching and research. Obviously, we teach a broad and comprehensive curriculum, but it is clearly focused on two key elements described in this article. The first is the framework for understanding what strategy is and how it might be formulated and implemented in theory. As we observed earlier, having a common language and a shared understanding of it for thinking and talking about strategy is a necessary first-step in making it work in practice. But we also teach and work with our students to develop their skills and equip them to understand and deal with the VUCA world, where complexity and uncertainty reign, and the realm of real strategy where the application of theory meets the reality of practice. That in turn means they must develop and hone their leadership skills for an arena in which traditional military or civilian rank is likely to mean little or nothing at all, and the ability to discuss, debate and persuade will mean a great deal. So leadership development is the second key component of what we teach. But it is leadership in the broadest sense, to include not just the responsibility to make decisions but to provide effective, high quality advice, to interact effectively with both military and civilian counterparts in the U.S. and globally, and to be effective participants in and contributors to the policy and strategy formulation processes. To do all of this these future leaders must learn more about themselves, about others, and about strategy. Our curriculum strives to help them learn and grow in these areas.

Our research, not surprisingly, typically serves to support the teaching mission although the audience is often broader than just our own students. Among all faculty but especially those working in our Institutes, such as the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and the Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations Institute (PKSOI), and the Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL), we strive to probe the VUCA environment to increase awareness of issues, trends, and challenges not only among our leaders but among senior military and civilian leaders and the attentive public generally, in the U.S. and abroad. We scrutinize existing policy and strategy, and we examine the qualities and skills of effective leaders, seeking to identify those that adaptive strategic leaders will need to help a country chart a course and steer through the challenging times that lie ahead. It is not that all of our graduates will be strategic leaders at the highest levels of either the military or civilian communities in the U.S. or their home countries, because we know that is not true. It is because we need individuals at all levels in all of the organizations who can think, act and

available to address it. While PRT's have subsequently become part of the common lexicon in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have yet to achieve the kind of sustained strategic commitment such as joint (military and civilian) doctrine, training and deployment that a national-level strategy would entail.

²¹ We always hesitate to over-generalize, but this is a shared mission of all the Senior Service Colleges in the U.S. and probably quite similar to those of institutions such as the Royal Danish Defence College.

lead strategically. As the example of adaptive strategy “on the ground” demonstrates, we need high quality strategic ideas at all levels and those ideas come from people.

The need for educating and developing strategic leaders—military and civilian—has never been greater than it is today. The nature of the international security environment calls for a more nuanced and incisive understanding in order to identify more accurately the strategic imperatives of the 21st century. It calls for more flexible and adaptive strategies for addressing those imperatives and shaping the future security environment rather than constantly being forced to react to it. We need more effective and efficient strategy formulation and implementation, both within the U.S. and internationally in concert with others. And increasingly, our strategies must be capable of integrating multi-tool, cross-agency, and cross-national approaches. It has become *de rigueur* lately to call for Whole of Government (WOG) approaches as we seek better strategy, but that may not be how we should think about the problem.²² After all, WOG is a strategic way or concept; and it is only one way in which we might employ the possible tools in our strategic attempts to address the challenges and make the most of opportunities. What we need in order to achieve desired strategic outcomes or objectives are appropriately placed individuals with the ability to think, act, and lead strategically whether in WOG or more traditional approaches. The goal is not to use a new approach; the goal is to get the strategic ends as close to “right” as we can, build a sound strategy around the achievement of those ends (which should include the most appropriate ways to employ the means), and design and lead the implementation to achieve strategic success. Toward that “end” I am confident that the USAWC and the RDDC are making key contributions. We need more.

²² This point surfaced clearly in a recent Symposium conducted under the SSI Academic Engagement Program and run by Kennesaw State University, February 25, 2001. See Mackenzie Duelge and Volker Franke, “Conflict Management: A Tool for U.S. National Security Strategy”. *Colloquium Brief*, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2011. Available at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Colloquium-Brief-Conflict-Management-A-Tool-for-US-National-Security-Strategy/2011/7/6>.

Militærstrategi er ikke bare militærstrategi

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Nærværende artikel søger at kvalificere forståelsen af begrebet militærstrategi; hvad forstår vi i dag ved begrebet og hvorledes kommer det til udtryk rent funktionelt? Udover en række generelle betragtninger, præsenteres to aktuelle definitioner af militærstrategi. Konklusionen er, at der til militærstrategi knytter sig forskellige facetter/fænomener, som samlet set tjener dels bestemte politiske formål, dels udgør grundlaget for den overordnede styring og anvendelse af militære virkemidler. Det er netop spændingsforholdet mellem disse to hensyn, der gør militærstrategi til et vedkommende begreb at studere for den professionelle soldat.

Indledning

Hvad forstås der ved begrebet militærstrategi, og hvilke fænomener knytter sig dertil? Umiddelbart et simpelt og overkommeligt spørgsmål, vil de fleste fagfolk formentlig mene. Ikke desto mindre gøres spørgsmålet ofte til genstand for drøftelse blandt sikkerhedspolitiske iagttagere og militærekspertter. Debatten repræsenterer i sig selv ikke et historisk nybrud, men har af gode grunde fået fornyet aktualitet som følge af de seneste årtiers internationale omvæltninger og informationsteknologiske fremskridt. Hensigten med nærværende artikel er gennem en dekonstruktiv metode² at kvalificere forståelsen af militærstrategi som fænomen og funktionelt begreb.

Artiklen arbejder med den grundlæggende antagelse, at fortolkning af ord/begreber varierer over tid og afhænger af kontekstuelle faktorer (etymologi). Sagt på en anden og mere simpel måde: Hvad vi forstår ved demokrati i dag, adskiller sig fra måden, hvorpå f.eks. oldtidens grækere opfattede demokrati, om end de to tidsforskudte anskuelser deler visse fællestræk (tidsperspektivet). På tilsvarende vis – det skal i hvert fald være påstanden – bygger de skandinaviske samfund i dag på en anderledes demokratisk tradition end den, som man bl.a. finder i Italien. Det vel at mærke til trods for, at de pågældende samfund alle betragter sig som moderne europæiske demokratier (kontekstperspektivet). Pointen er, at menneskers perception af bestemte ord/begreber formes af de eksplicitte konditioner/karakteristika, som kendetegner deres kultur og omgivende miljø.

Indledningsvis foretages en afklaring af strategi som teoretisk og funktionelt begreb; hvordan kan man gøre brug af begrebet? Hermed tilvejebringes rammen for den efterfølgende undersøgelse af det militærstrategiske genstandsfelt. Til det formål analyseres to definitioner af militærstrategi, der anses for autoritative (NATO & Colin Gray). NATO har i mere end et halvt århundrede udgjort krumtappen i det transatlantiske sikkerhedssamarbejde og følgelig været dimensionerende for dansk forsvarspolitik i nyere tid. Organisatio-

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² Dekonstruktivismen blev formuleret af Jacques Derrida i 1967. Repræsenterer kritisk stillingtagen til fremtrædende tradition i vestlig tankegang i form af logocentrismen og strukturalismen. Læs eventuelt Derridas værk "Om Grammatologi" udgivet af forlaget Arena, 1970.

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nen danner i dag grundlag for sikkerhedspolitisk samarbejde mellem 28 stater i den vestlige verden, hvorfor Alliancens forståelse af militærstrategi anses for at have en vis vægt internationalt. Professor Colin Gray³ har gennem det meste af sin professionelle forskerkarriere beskæftiget sig med emnet strategi. Han har udgivet talrige artikler om emnet og er desuden forfatter til en række bøger, der specifikt omhandler sikkerheds- og militærstrategi og som har høstet international anerkendelse. I lyset heraf er Colin Grays definition af militærstrategi valgt m.h.p. at kvalificere problembehandlingen.⁴ Som led i analysen af Colin Grays definition introduceres en mindre case (ændring af USAs strategi for Afghanistan i 2009), der medvirker til at underbygge en række centrale pointer. Afslutningsvis fortages en sammenfatning af de væsentligste konklusioner.

Strategi – teori kontra funktion

Militærstrategi knytter sig overordnet til studiet af strategi. Strategi(er) kan i udgangspunktet anskues og applikeres på forskellig vis. Det er imidlertid i udgangspunktet vigtigt at skelne mellem på den ene side strategi, som generel teori (universelle maksimer), og på den anden side deciderede strategier, der er et resultat af bestemte politiske præferencer (afhængig af kontekst). I forskningsøjemed foretager man sondringen mellem betegnelserne "the nature of strategy" og "the character of strategy". Førstnævnte relaterer sig til de elementer ved strategi, der er almengyldige og som billedligt talt konstituerer begrebets fundament (hvorfor strategi?). Begrebet "strategi" har på det generelle teoretiske plan en iboende logik/rationalitet, som er uafhængig af konkrete omstændigheder (strategi er udtryk for en instrumentel funktion, der sigter på at bygge bro mellem målsætninger og ibrugtagning af forskelligartede virkemidler; "ends – ways – means").⁵

Den anden side af strategibegrebet "the character of" bygger omvendt på en række variable, der er dynamiske og som antager form/betydning alt efter hvilken kontekst, der er tale om (hvordan strategi). Af variable kan eksempelvis nævnes kultur, perception, magtrelationer, normer, værdier, trusler, strukturer, tid, love, geografi, teknologi og doktriner. Her er der altså tale om konditioner/faktorer, som er udslagsgivende i forbindelse med selve operationaliseringen af begrebet (studiet af konkrete strategier, herunder formulering/udformning, udmøntning samt følgevirkninger). Strategier er følgelig funktionelle i den forstand at de udgør et produkt af en konstant vekselvirkning mellem strategens dannelsesperspektiv og dennes perception af konkrete hændelser/begivenheder.

Den ovenfor skitserede distinktion mellem strategi og strategier vurderes at være af signifikant betydning for kernen i nærværende udredning. Et er, hvad man ud fra en teoretisk synsvinkel forstår ved begrebet militærstrategi, herunder dets funktion i relation til f.eks. "grand strategy", "national strategy" og "theatre strategy" (etablering af paradigme, der medvirker til at ordne og kategorisere strategiens makro-, meso- og mikro-niveau). Noget andet er forståelsen af strategi som funktionelt instrument i forhold til en bestemt kontekst – de særlige vilkår, omstændigheder og betingelser, som måtte være kendetegnende for en given situation.

³ Colin S. Gray (født i 1943) er professor i Internationale Relationer & Strategiske Studier og er p.t. leder af Center for Strategiske Studier ved "University of Reading", Storbritannien. Colin Gray har i tillæg til sit akademiske virke fungeret som rådgiver for skiftende regeringer i både USA og Storbritannien.

⁴ Af andre forskere kan bl.a. nævnes Basil H. Liddell Hart, Eliot A. Cohen & Edward N. Luttwak.

⁵ Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 15-53.

Genstandsfelt – diskussion af to autoritative definitioner

I fortsættelse af ovenstående drøftes to definitioner af militærstrategi m.h.p. at adressere spørgsmålet: Hvilken betydning tillægges strategibegrebet aktuelt?

NATOs definition af militærstrategi

I kraft af Danmarks internationale aktørstatus, herunder særligt de seneste års profilering af dansk forsvar i NATO, vil det være nærliggende at indlede med at se på, hvorledes militærstrategi defineres indenfor alliancen. Følgende definition udgør p.t. grundlaget for NATOs indsats: "Military strategy is that component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations"⁶

NATOs formulering af militærstrategi indbefatter derfor tre centrale elementer: Først og fremmest slås det fast, at militærstrategi er underordnet det nationalstrategiske niveau; subsidiært multinationale. Hermed cementeres den klassiske opfattelse af de væbnede styrker som ét af flere magtinstrumenter, som en stat eller gruppe af stater kan gøre brug af i forhold til at fremme egen-/fællesinteresser.

Dernæst fremhæves militærstrategi som det overordnede grundlag, hvorpå beslutninger om udvikling og anvendelse af militærmagt træffes. Til netop dette aspekt synes umiddelbart at knytte sig to væsensforskellige perspektiver. Dels et langsigtet perspektiv, der sigter på at alliancen til stadighed er på forkant med den generelle udvikling (henviser til ordet "develop"). In casu er forventninger til karakteren af fremtidens konflikter af afgørende betydning, idet disse vil være dimensionerende for kapacitetsudvikling og materielanskaffelser på lang sigt (balancen mellem organisation, teknologi, doktrin og uddannelse). Det kan ikke afvises, at ordet "develop" rettelig burde tilskrives en anden betydning end den netop beskrevne. Ordet kunne eksempelvis rette sig mod den løbende tilpasning og dimensionering af militærstyrker, som finder sted i løbet af enhver kampagne. Fortolkningen, der indledningsvis blev drøftet, skønnes imidlertid mest sandsynlig, hvorfor den vil danne forudsætning for den videre emnebehandling.

Til det anførte skal tilføjes det andet perspektiv, der drejer sig om den egentlige anvendelse af militærmagt (henviser til ordet "applied"). NATOs definition af militærstrategi omfatter ikke en forklaring på, hvad der præcist menes med anvendelse af militærmagt. I medfør af NATOs samlede doktrinkompleks samt alliancens nye Strategiske Koncept⁷ vil det imidlertid være rimeligt at forudsætte, at anvendelse af militærmagt skal ses i en større sammenhæng end blot den fysiske indsættelse af væbnede styrker i en given konflikt. De væbnede styrker, som NATO råder over, spiller ved deres blotte eksistens en overordnet og afgørende rolle (fredstid). NATOs profilering, herunder opbygning og udvikling af militærkapaciteter, bør derfor betragtes som anvendelse af militærmagt på linje med gennemførelse af egentlige militæroperationer ("the element of deterrence").

Det tredje element, som er indbygget i NATOs definition, vedrører formålet med militærstrategi. Det understreges, at militærstrategi skal tjene til opnåelse af nationale/multinationale målsætninger, som fastlægges på politisk niveau. Præmissen er uløseligt forbundet med den indledende pointe.

NATOs definition af militærstrategi peger på en række grundlæggende parametre, der er væsentlige i relation til vurderingen af begrebets genstandsfelt. Med baggrund i oven-

⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Allied Joint Publications O1 (D)*. October 2010 version 2, p. 4-1.

⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: NATO New Strategic Concept*. NATO: November 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68172.htm

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stående afvejning/fortolkning af NATOs doktrinære grundlag kan følgende tre perspektiver på militærstrategi opstilles:

1. Præcisering af de væbnede styrkers overordnede formål (ét blandt en række af nationale magtinstrumenter – indvirkning på kontinuummet fred/konflikt/krise/krig).
2. Plan/koncept for den langsigtede udvikling af en given militærorganisation (anticiperet trusselsbillede vs. det militære instruments rolle/formåen; fra koncept til kapacitet).
3. Overordnede principper for disponering og anvendelse af militære virkemidler til støtte for opnåelse af på forhånd fastlagt strategisk målsætning (politisk fastlagt "end-state").

De tre opstillede perspektiver vil i artiklens afsluttende del blive sammenholdt med de observationer, som udledes i efterfølgende afsnit.

Colin Grays definition af militærstrategi

I sin seneste bog definerer Colin Gray militærstrategi på følgende vis:⁸ "Military strategy is the direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purpose of policy as decided by politics."

Colin Grays definition adskiller sig ikke væsentligt fra måden, hvorpå militærstrategi opfattes i NATO. Ved nærmere iagttagelse synes enkelte nuanceforskelle imidlertid at fremstå. Disse vil blive anskueliggjort nedenfor.

Definitionen understreger, at militærstrategi hviler på to grundlæggende søjler. På den ene side indebærer militærstrategi den dynamik, som søges opnået i form af egentlig magtanvendelse (fysisk vold). Militærstrategi tjener imidlertid også som grundlag for, hvorledes det militære instrument forestilles anvendt som led i forsøget på – enten gennem direkte trusler eller i form af sin eksistens/tilstedeværelse – at påtvinge en modstander en bestemt adfærd. F.s.v.a. sidstnævnte er det værd at bemærke, at forholdet har en dobbeltsidig funktion, idet trusseldimensionen kan være af såvel implicit som eksplicit karakter. Heraf må udledes at der til militærstrategi knytter sig attributter, som influerer på samtlige tilstande i konfliktkontinuummet (fred/konflikt/krise/krig)

Den uden tvivl mest vedkommende del af Colin Grays definition af militærstrategi vedrører ordvalget "for the purpose of policy as decided by politics". Formuleringen rammer durk ned i en historisk diskurs blandt forskere i militærstrategi; en debat der har sit udspring i Carl von Clausewitz' navnkundige aforisme "War is a mere continuation of policy by other means".⁹ Det spørgsmål, som har vakt flest kontroverser blandt forskere kyndige i Clausewitz' forfatterskab, knytter sig til forståelsen af ordet "policy". For hvad mente den preussiske general egentlig? Kilden til den gordiske knude findes først og fremmest i forskellene mellem forskellige sprogstammer. I den angelsaksiske tradition har man f.eks. historisk benyttet ordene "politics" og "policy". Ordet "politics" indgår ligeledes i den germanske vokabularium, men tillægges en betydning, der ret beset er anderledes end den angelsaksiske. I germansk sammenhæng, i øvrigt ligesom på dansk, opererer man ikke med et særskilt udtryk for "policy", men anvender derimod "politik" som udtryk for summen af det angelsaksiske "politics" og "policy".¹⁰

Men hvad er da det interessante ved al denne polemik om nogle få ord, og hvorfor finder Colin Gray det formålstjenstlig at præcisere adskillelsen mellem de to begreber? Det

⁸ Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 29.

⁹ Charles Keller, "On War". Project Gutenberg; oversat fra tysk til engelsk af Colonel J.J. Graham, Book I, Chapter I, article 24.

¹⁰ Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 48 (23).

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er der en ganske fornuftig årsag til, idet betoning af begreberne fortæller en hel del om militærstrategiens overordnede funktion samt dens snitfalder/afgrænsning i forhold til det politisk-strategiske niveau. I modsætning til "politics", der er udtryk for kampen om magt og indflydelse mellem toneangivende eliter, manifesterer "policy" den enighed (politisk), der danner forudsætning for strategiens tilblivelse i form af "ends-ways-means". "Policy"-delen er i så henseende et produkt af en universel rivalisering om magt/indflydelse (politics) og udgør – ifølge logikken – således et forhandlingsobjekt, der løbende indgår i det politiske samkvem. "Policy" orienterer sig omvendt mod det rent processuelle, der fører frem til identificering af "ends-ways-means". Hermed opstår en latent indre systemisk spænding (divergerende incitamenter), der i større eller mindre omfang kan indvirke på militærstrategiske overvejelser. At lade "policy" være den eneste målestok for forståelsen af militærstrategi vil derfor være et eklatant fejlskud. Militærhistorien leverer utallige eksempler på, hvor fatale konsekvenser det kan få, når militærstrategi har et ensidigt fokus på "policy" eller er helt eller delvist løsrevet for den politiske virkelighed. "Politics" og "policy" er som siamesiske tvillinger: Den ene lader sig ikke forklare uden den anden. I den forstand er det bydende nødvendigt at militærstrategi betragtes som en funktion af spændingsfeltet mellem "politics" og "policy". Kort sagt: militærstrategi er nært forbundet med både "politics" og "policy".¹¹

USA's engagement i Vietnam-krigen (1954 - 1973) er et klassisk eksempel på, hvor galt det kan gå, når militærstrategien (policy-delen) ikke i tilstrækkelig omfang er afstemt i forhold til "politics". Skiftende amerikanske regeringer – fra John F. Kennedy over Lyndon B. Johnson til Richard Nixon – valgte beviseligt i større og mindre grad at fortie kontroversielle oplysninger om udviklingen i Vietnam for både Kongressen og den amerikanske befolkning. USAs indblanding i Vietnam-krigen endte med at blive et langstrakt og omkostningsfuldt militært engagement, der skortede på politisk legitimitet og folkelig opbakning. Omstændighederne affødte stigende social polarisering, svigtende opbakning til de politiske magthavere, kuldsejling af nationale reformprogrammer, tab af international prestige og ikke mindst et desillusioneret amerikansk militært system. Et nationalt traume, der fortsat præger amerikansk selvbevidsthed og politisk kultur i dag.¹²

Et mere aktuelt eksempel på dilemmaet mellem "politics" og "policy" er udformningen af en ny strategi for Afghanistan i 2009. Umiddelbart efter sin tiltræden som præsident iværksatte Barack Obama en større analyse af den internationale indsats i Afghanistan. Der var blandt Obamas toprådgivere enighed om, at den eksisterende strategi havde spillet fallit. Noget måtte gøres for at bringe den sikkerhedspolitiske udvikling i Afghanistan på ret kurs. At opnå enighed om en ny strategi internt i den amerikanske regering viste sig imidlertid at være behæftet med betydelige vanskeligheder. De militære rådgivere plæderede for en langt mere robust indsats, der i højere grad fokuserede på at beskytte den afghanske civilbefolkning. Til det formål havde de brug for en markant større militærstyrke. Præsident Obama var imidlertid skeptisk over for ideen. En øget militær tilstedeværelse ville rigtignok medvirke til at forbedre den generelle sikkerhedssituation på kort sigt, men det kunne på ingen måde garantere en langsigtet løsning. Opnåelse af succes afhang i høj grad af en række ikke-militære aspekter, herunder bl.a. den afghanske befolknings tilid/opbakning til regeringen i Kabul (legitimitet), bekæmpelse af magtmisbrug og korrupsion (lov & orden), kapacitetsopbygning (civilsamfund & statslige institutioner) samt ikke mindst Pakistans rolle. Fremskridt indenfor disse områder var imidlertid meget sparsom-

¹¹ Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 107-114.

¹² David Maraniss, *They Marched into Sunlight: War & Peace Vietnam and America October 1967*. Washington: Simon & Schuster Ltd, 2004.

me, i nogle tilfælde helt fraværende. Præsidenten stillede følgelig spørgsmål ved selve ambitionsniveauet for den NATO-ledede operation, ISAF (International Security Assistance Force).¹³

Forløbet forud for den endelige beslutning om en ny strategi for Afghanistan tegnede billedet af en amerikansk præsident, der nøje afvejede den militærfaglige rådgivning, han modtog, i forhold til de politiske vilkår, som udgjorde hans politiske manøvrerum. Den folkelige opbakning bag USA's engagement i Afghanistan var stærkt faldende. USA's involvering i Irak havde kostet enorme ressourcer og medvirket til at polarisere det amerikanske samfund. Den internationale finansielle krise havde ramt den amerikanske økonomi hårdt. Obama-regeringen havde investeret megen prestige og politisk kapital i forsøget på at få kongressen til at godkende en kontroversiel reform af det amerikanske sundhedssystem. USA stod samtidig overfor et midtvejsvalg, hvor Demokraterne efter alt at dømme ville få svært ved at fastholde deres flertal i begge kongreskamre; Senatet & Repræsentanternes Hus. Dertil kom muligheden for at blive genvalgt til præsident i november 2012. Set fra præsidentens position, talte meget således for at USA skulle træde varsomt i forhold til engagementet i Afghanistan. At godkende en tidsbegrænset militær oprustning, der sigtede på at indfri den bestående målsætning, ville alt taget i betragtning være politisk uklogt. En sådan fremgangsmåde indebar betydelig risiko for, at præsidenten indenfor blot et år eller to ville stå med et endnu større problem i Afghanistan og delvist handlingslammet som følge af indenrigspolitiske trakasserier.¹⁴

Den 1. december 2009 fremlagde Obama i en tale på militærakademiet West Point USA's fremadrettede strategi for Afghanistan. Budskabet var ikke til at tage fejl af. USA var indstillet på at gøre et sidste forsøg på at vende den negative udvikling i Afghanistan. På den militære front ville USA kortvarigt øge sit bidrag med ca. 30.000 soldater. Initiativet havde til formål dels at yde civilbefolkningen en bedre beskyttelse, dels at accelerere opbygningen af Afghanistans sikkerhedsstyrker for derved at muliggøre en fremrykning af tidspunktet for gradvis reduktion af den internationale militære tilstedeværelse. Præsidenten fastslog i talen, at han agtede at iværksætte en tilbagetræning af USA's kamptropper fra juli 2011, tidspunktet hvor ISAF efter planen skulle påbegynde overdragelsen af ansvaret for sikkerheden til de afghanske myndigheder. Med talen fik Obama sendt et utvetydigt politisk signal til de afghanske magthavere; USA's tålmodighed var ved at være opbrugt. Samtidig forsikrede han Kongressen og den amerikanske befolkning om, at USA's engagement i Afghanistan ikke ville blive en gentagelse af fejltagelserne fra Vietnam-krigen.¹⁵

Det regeringsmemorandum, som Obama lod udarbejde med baggrund i sin beslutning, vidner om en klar prioritering i forhold til USA's nationale interesser i Afghanistan. Formålet var bekæmpelse af al Qaeda og opbygning af de afghanske sikkerhedsstyrker. Væk var al snak om f.eks. demokrati, frihedsrettigheder og udvikling af et moderne kvindesyn. Dokumentet slår fast, at strategien ikke levner mulighed for oprørsbekæmpelse og statsopbygning i fuld skala. Ambitionsniveauet var nedjusteret og den militære indsats måtte følgelig tilpasses i overensstemmelse dermed. Forløbet, der her er fremstillet en del forenklet, illustrerer imidlertid på udmærket vis en amerikansk præsident, der i forvaltningen af sit embede først og fremmest er optaget af at tilsikre sammenhængen mellem, hvad der er

¹³ Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars: The Inside Story*. Washington: Simon & Schuster Ltd, 2010.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Barack Obama, *Speech on the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan*: 1 December 2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan>

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politisk farbart ("politics"), og den ramme, som udgør fundamentet for anvendelsen af forskelligartede virkemidler ("policy").¹⁶

Behandlingen af Colin Gray's definition afstedkommer en række supplerende vinkler, der anses for væsentlige at inddrage i forståelsen af militærstrategi. Følgende perspektiver opstilles:

1. Militærstrategi fungerer som overordnet pejlemærke i relation til den aktive indsættelse af væbnede styrker til støtte for bestemte kampagne-/operationsmålsætninger.
2. Militærstrategi er udtryk for en given aktørs intentioner og/eller valg f.s.v.a. funktionen af de væbnede styrker i relation til overordnede sikkerhedspolitiske præferencer.
3. Militærstrategi er et produkt af spændingsfeltet mellem "politics" og "policy", hvorfor det ikke giver mening at betragte funktionen af militærstrategi udelukkende med baggrund i en logik centreret omkring "ends-ways-means". Det militære instrument, underforstået militærstrategi, indgår i lighed med andre sektorer indenfor staten, som forhandlingsobjekt i den uafvendelige politiske rivalisering om magt og indflydelse. Militærstrategien er følgelig underkastet et styrende parameter ("politics"), som qua sin natur er omskiftelig.

Hvad indbefatter militærstrategi?

Formålet med de forudgående afsnit har været at kvalificere forståelsen af, hvad militærstrategi er, herunder hvilke centrale fænomener, som knytter sig hertil. Dette er søgt opfyldt ved indledningsvis at foretage en generel og principiel drøftelse af begrebet strategi (etablering af overordnet teoretisk ramme). I fortsættelse heraf er to relevante definitioner af militærstrategi (NATO & Colin Gray) gjort til genstand for behandling m.h.p. identificering af styrende variable. Det behandlede genstandsfelt giver samlet set mulighed for at opstille følgende målepunkter:

- Militærstrategi som organisatorisk begreb.
- Militærstrategi som teoretisk fænomen: Hvad er formålet med strategi og hvilke centrale elementer relaterer sig hertil ("nature of strategy")?
- Militærstrategi som funktionel mekanisme i relation til disponering og anvendelse af væbnede styrker i spændet mellem fred og krig ("character of strategy").
- Militærstrategi som funktion af både "politics" og "policy", herunder forståelsen af væsentlige dilemmaer, som kan være forbundet hermed.
- Militærstrategier i historisk perspektiv, herunder sammenhæng mellem planlægning, gennemførelse og afledte følgevirkninger.
- Militærstrategi som fundament for den langsigtede udvikling af militære organisationer (karakteren af fremtidens konflikter & den teknologiske udvikling).

Behandlingen af genstandsfeltet viser, at der til militærstrategi knytter sig en række forskellige fænomener, og at den indbyrdes vægtning af disse er udslagsgivende for, hvorledes begrebet opfattes og anvendes. Begrebet er dynamisk i den forstand at det antager form og betydning alt afhængig af perspektiv og hensigt. For udøveren af den militærstrategiske disciplin er ingen af de ovenfor opstillede betragtningsmåder derfor principielt uvæsentlige.

Den opstillede forståelsesramme for militærstrategi skal ingenlunde opfattes som et "fait accompli". Tanken med denne artikel har været at foretage en delvis undersøgelse

¹⁶ Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars: The Inside Story*. Washington: Simon & Schuster Ltd, 2010, pp. 385-390.

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for derved at give et bud på en overordnet begrebsforståelse. Udkommet af undersøgelsen foranlediger forhåbentlig læseren til at opsøge supplerende litteratur og gøre sine egne overvejelser om emnet. Set fra forfatterens synspunkt er der på baggrund af det seneste årtis internationale udvikling al mulig grund til, at man specielt i sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitiske kredse forholder sig skeptisk til hævdundne strategiopfattelser. Hvis for eksempel præmissen om, at fremtidens konflikter vil være forbundet med en langt højere grad af kompleksitet, holder stik, hvad vil det i så fald komme til at betyde for måden, hvorpå strategier udformes og operationaliseres? Dertil kommer spørgsmålet om konsekvenserne ved en delvis sammenblanding af statens forskellige magtinstrumenter i forbindelse med krise- og konflikthåndtering: Hvilken indvirkning vurderes det at få i forhold til det etablerede begrebsapparat, der knytter sig til strategi generelt? To elementære spørgsmål, der uvægerligt bør påkalde sig opmærksomhed fra enhver, der på den ene eller anden måde beskæftiger sig med strategi ud fra et sikkerhedspolitisk perspektiv.

Dette temanummer af Militært Tidsskrift indledes med en artikel, hvor forfatterne redegør for en bestemt måde at anskue strategi på ud fra et statsligt perspektiv.¹⁷ Den opstillede analyseramme giver et ganske udmærket afsæt for et nærmere studie af strategi. Hvad der imidlertid ikke fremgår tydeligt af det beskrevne paradigme, er graden af kompleksitet forbundet med de iboende begrebers indbyrdes relationer og afhængighed. Det er i studiet af netop disse forhold, at vi kan begynde at vurdere validiteten af forskellige teorier om strategi. Om ikke andet har denne artikel forhåbentlig bidraget blot en smule til bemeldte fordring.

¹⁷ Jens Garly & Liselotte Odgaard, *Strategic studies at the Royal Danish Defense College*.

Strategisk kommunikations rolle i strategier og strategiformulering

Thomas Elkjer Nissen, MA, Forsvarsakademiet og major Steen Kjærgaard, Hærens Officersskole¹

Introduktion

Denne artikel skal ses som et partsindlæg til nærværende publikations behandling af emnet strategi generelt. Artiklen belyser begrebet strategisk kommunikation der såvel i Danmark, som internationalt, er et begreb i rivende udvikling såvel konceptuelt som operationelt. Artiklen vil behandle emnet strategisk kommunikations rolle i strategier og strategiformulering på baggrund af Odgaard og Krüger-Klausens fem strategiske variabler: kapacitet, tid, legitimitet, position og implementeringsstruktur.² Det er artiklens formål at identificere hvilke hovedfaktorer, der henholdsvis skal påvirke og udledes fra strategiformuleringsprocessen for at danne forudsætningerne for effektiv strategisk kommunikation.

Grundlaget for artiklen er henholdsvis forfatterens studie og udviklingsarbejde nationalt i rammen af Forsvarsakademiet og internationalt i rammen af bl.a. NATO. Hertil en række publikationer og udgivelser om emnet.

Baggrund

"Der er ubekræftede rygter om massegrave", "Vi har FN sikkerhedsråds mandat til at....", "Internationale journalister nægtet adgang", "Taliban propaganda undergraver NATO sammenhængskraft", "NATO dræber civile", "Medierne fokuserer ensidigt på krigen og udelader genopbygningsarbejdet".....

Disse overskrifter og "citater" illustrerer ændrede grundbetingelser for væbnede konflikter igennem de sidste 20 år! De strategiske udfordringer i det 21. århundrede er, som citaterne illustrerer, ofte baseret på komplekse årsagssammenhænge frem for konkrete trusler. "Nye krige"³ handler ikke om staters overlevelse, men om politisk vilje og globale værdier. Tidligere skulle man sejre, nu skal nye krige forhindre brud på folkeretten, sikre menneskerettigheder, frihedsrettigheder og fastholde en global retfærdighed og orden. I denne krigskontekst kommer legitimiteten af krigen ikke automatisk. Borgernes sikkerhedsopfattelse ligger oftest fjernt fra konfliktområderne. Krigenes rationaler skal kæmpe om opmærksomhed og ressourcer i konkurrence med en lang række andre samfundsproblematikker, som ligger nærmere for befolkningen. Legitimiteten for den førte sikkerhedspolitik må derfor vindes, fastholdes og udbygges! - Og her spiller brugen af kommunikation en afgørende rolle.

Det er ikke noget nyt at formulere strategier for, hvordan man ønsker at takle sikkerhedspolitiske udfordringer. Ej heller er det nyt at anvende information som en del af de magtmidler, som man bruger til at føre strategier ud i livet. Der hvor det nye opstår og information og strategiformulering møder hinanden er, når information, eller rettere kom-

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² Villiam Krüger-Klausen, and Liselotte Odgaard (2011): Preparing for the Imperfect World: A Proposal for How to Carry Out Strategic Planning. Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen (ej publiceret endnu). Side. 3.

³ Bertel Heurlin (2010), Krig og fred I det 21. århundrede, Samfundslitteratur.

munikation, bliver så toneangivende i konflikterne, og dermed del af strategien, at den ikke længere bare er et delelement, men en styrende parameter.

Strategiformulering er en opregning af målsætninger, tilgange og magtmidler, inden for en acceptabel risiko, som fremmer egne strategiske målsætninger. Strategisk kommunikation er et spørgsmål om at opnå indflydelse på målgrupper, der har betydning for de strategiske målsætninger.⁴

Det er som teoretiske teser godt nok! Men hvordan kommer man fra at betragte kommunikation som et tilbehør til strategien som talsmanden tager sig af, til at kommunikation bliver strategisk og dimensionerende for formuleringen af strategien?

Strategi og strategiformulering

Strategibegrebet bruges i dag i flæng. I en sikkerhedspolitisk kontekst kan det ifølge professor Harry Yarger, US Army War College, defineres således: *"Strategy is the employment of the instruments of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state [..]"*⁵

Yarger anfører, at strategi er antitesen til krisestyring, fordi krisestyring indebærer, at der ikke er en strategi eller, at den er slået fejl. For at kunne opstille sin teori om strategi, anfører Yarger en grundlæggende forudsætning:

*"an underlying assumption of strategy from a national perspective is that all nation-states and non-state actors have interests that they will pursue to the best of their abilities.[through the use of instruments of power]."*⁶

Udgangspunktet for strategi og strategiformuleringer er altså statens politiske vision(er), handlemuligheder og opfattelse af truslen. Bag disse faktorer ligger et værdigrundlag som de strategiske handlinger styres af. I denne kontekst er det strategiens rolle at virke som en proces, der kan omsætte disse politiske visioner til strategiske målsætninger (Ends), koncepter for opnåelse af disse (Ways) samt udmåle resurser, hvormed disse kan effektueres (Means), herunder strategisk kommunikation.

En ting er dog teorien, en anden den virkelige verden. Den konstante dynamik i de strategiske miljøer betyder, at strategier bliver mere komplekse, samtidig med at det politiske miljø ikke altid vil tillade, at strategier bliver formuleret så præcist og hurtigt, som man måske kunne ønske sig.⁷ Dette hænger blandt andet sammen med det politiske niveau behov for "strategisk flertydighed". Det betyder at skiftende politiske prioriteringer kan medføre et behov for både at kunne samarbejde og konkurrere med flere aktører i det strategiske miljø enten samtidigt eller forskudt i tid.

Som chefen for NATOs strategiske kommunikation har formuleret det: *"Iraq and Afghanistan points to the need for strategic planning focusing on a few key variables before political commitments and horse trading takes over"*.⁸ Der er med hans ord altså et behov

⁴ Steen Kjærgaard (2010): Strategisk Kommunikation og Dansk Strategiudvikling. Speciale på Stabskursus 2009 - 2010. Forsvarsakademiet. http://forskningsdatabasen.fak.dk/insight_fak/app.

⁵ Harry R. Yarger (2006): Strategic Theory for the 21st Century - The Little Big Book on Strategy. February 2006. Side 10. <https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=641> (Downloaded 22. maj 11)

⁶ Ibid

⁷ JDN (2011): Strategic Communication - The Defence Contribution. Joint Doctrine Note 1/11. The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, UK Defence Academy, Shrivenham. Side 2-1. <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/OurPublications/JDNP/Jdn1111StrategicCommunicationTheDefenceContribution.htm>.

⁸ Mr. Mark Laity, Chef for NATO StratCom, på et seminar om Afghanistan afholdt på Kastellet, København den 6. december 2010.

for nogle simple strategiske variabler, som kan danne grundlaget for strategiformuleringen, inden "realpolitikken" slår til.

Krüger-Klausen og Odgaards strategiske variabler: kapaciteter, legitimitet, tid, position og implementeringsstrukturer, er til stede på alle niveauer af strategisk planlægning. De definerer det rum for handling som en aktør har, og hvilken strategi denne aktør skal vælge for at adressere sin problemstilling.⁹

- 1) **Kapaciteter:** Er de ressourcer (fx Militære, Politiske (diplomatiske), Økonomiske og Civile), og kommunikation, som en aktør har til rådighed for at opnå dens strategiske målsætninger.
- 2) **Legitimitet:** Refererer til legitimiteten i de opstillede strategiske målsætninger (Ends) samt tilgangene til at nå dem (Ways). Dette gælder såvel selve målsætningernes legitimitet, som omverdenens perception af deres legitimitet.
- 3) **Tid:** Hvor meget tid er der til rådighed til at opnå de strategiske målsætninger, eller bare til strategiformuleringen. Det kan også være tidshorisonter for strategier, som kan variere meget alt efter niveauet. Ligesom det kan være et spørgsmål om, hvornår man kan måle effekten på det strategiske miljø.
- 4) **Position:** Statens interesser, identitet og værdier og deres indflydelse på de strategiske valg der bliver truffet i forbindelse med strategiformuleringen. Specielt for så vidt angår hvordan stater ønsker at være positioneret i det internationale system.
- 5) **Implementeringsstrukturer:** Hvilke interne strukturer skal formulere og implementere strategien, men også hvilke eksterne strukturer skal hele eller dele af strategien implementeres igennem, fx internationale organisationer eller mediestrukturer.

Strategi tjener altså som en fælles ramme eller referencepunkt for udviklingen af egentlige planer på lavere niveauer (det operative og taktiske niveau), hvor strategien implementeres i form af indsættelsen af ressourcer for at opnå de fastsatte politiske målsætninger, ofte nedbrudt til operationaliserbare delmål. Dette omfatter også strategisk kommunikation. Strategier sætter ligeledes rammerne for, hvornår i tid og rum ressourcerne skal indsættes enten i samarbejde med- eller i konkurrence med andre aktører. Altså et spørgsmål om koordinering og synkronisering.

Traditionelt har man opereret med tre niveauer (strategisk, operativt og taktisk), Et af karakteristikaene i nutidens strategiske miljø illustreres af det man kalder "Time - Space Compression"¹⁰. Dette karakteristika har stor indflydelse på den traditionelle måde at betragte niveauopdelingen på, idet det operative niveau ofte springes over, da hastigheden hvorved informationer formidles ikke efterlader tid til fx sagsbehandling på dette niveau. Emner og hændelser fra det taktiske niveau bliver ofte forelagt det strategiske niveau direkte, og omvendt. Dette karakteristika favnes ofte af begrebet "Strategic Corporal".¹¹

Udgangspunktet for strategiformulering, også kaldet strategisk planlægning, er en analyse af den situation, som strategien skal bidrage til at ændre eller fastholde, samt det strategiske miljø hvori indsættelsen af ressourcerne forventes gennemført.

⁹ Krüger-Klausen and Odgaard (2011) Side. 3.

¹⁰ Som konsekvens af den rivende teknologiske udvikling betyder afstanden mindre og mindre i forhold til kommunikationsspredning. I dag går breaking news verden rundt på få timer. Der er intet der i dag ikke observeres, registreres og transmitteres på et eller andet medie. (David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990)

¹¹ Begrebet blev første gang brugt af Charles C. Krulak (1999) i *Marines Magazine*. Begrebet betyder, at en mening soldats tilsyneladende rent taktisk handling, kan få strategiske konsekvenser.

I en sådan analyse ses der på svage og stærke sider hos såvel en selv, allierede, modstandere, som andre aktører, ligesom der ses på ressourcer og interne forhold. Antagelsen er, at man ved at observere og vurdere det strategiske miljø og sammenholde det med aktørers tidligere handlinger, kan gøre sig nogle relativt valide iagttagelser som strategiformuleringen kan baseres på.¹²

Som det fremgår af det ovenstående, er strategi altså et spørgsmål om at opstille politisk styrede rammer for fremadrettede aktiviteter med henblik på at forme og øve indflydelse på det fremtidige strategiske miljø.

Strategisk kommunikation

Strategisk kommunikation er opstået i dens nuværende form som en reaktion på den eksplosive teknologiske udvikling og stigende medieindflydelse på sikkerhedspolitikken. En verden, der er præget af komplekse sikkerhedspolitiske udfordringer og behovet for politisk flertydighed, såvel som i forhold til svarene på disse udfordringer.¹³ Et af disse svar er strategisk kommunikation, der sigter på at håndtere denne kompleksitet som en integreret del af strategiuudviklingen. Netop at kommunikationen på strategisk niveau er blevet en fast integreret del af strategier er relativt nyt, og en del af svaret på den oplevede kompleksitet.

Hvordan skal "strategisk" forstås?

Der er flere opfattelser af, eller skoler inden for, hvordan det "strategiske" i strategisk kommunikation skal forstås. På den ene side står det synspunkt, at det strategiske refererer til aktivitetens niveaumæssige forankring, altså at det er kommunikative handlinger udført på det strategiske eller øverste politiske ledelsesmæssige niveau.¹⁴ På den anden side står det synspunkt, at der er tale om kommunikation, der understøtter opnåelsen af strategiske målsætninger og derfor principielt kan udføres på alle niveauer, såvel strategisk, operativt som taktisk. Altså en centraliseret planlægning og en decentral implementering. Den udvikling som man p.t. ser i forhold til strategisk kommunikation i både i organisationer som NATO og i enkeltstater som fx USA og Storbritannien er, at begge syn indrages i definitioner og koncepter. Der tales således om strategisk kommunikation som en funktionalitet og en proces på strategisk niveau, der tilsikrer kommunikationens integration i strategiformuleringen såvel som udviklingen af kommunikationsstrategier til støtte for disse strategier. Men der er også en erkendelse af, at den egentlige implementering foregår på alle niveauer, ikke mindst på det taktiske niveau. Dette sker bl.a. som en konsekvens af informationsmiljøet og de karakteristika, som kendetegner dette, som beskrevet ovenfor.

Hvordan skal "kommunikation" forstås?

Kommunikation som begreb er ligesom ordet "strategisk" omdiskuteret. Ordet "kommunikation" kan henlede ens tanker på rene og skære mediekapaciteter, og ikke en mere holistisk forståelse af kommunikationsbegrebet. En forståelse hvor begrebet dækker alle udtrykte ord og perceptioner efterladt af handlinger og dialog.¹⁵ Socialkonstruktivisme

¹² Yarger(2006) Side 10.

¹³ Joint Doctrinal Note 1/11 (2011)Side 1-1.

¹⁴ Anäis, Reding, Kristin Weed, og Jeremy J. Ghes (2011): NATO's Strategic Communications concept and its relevance for France. RAND Europe. Side 11. https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR855z2.html

¹⁵ Reding, Weed og Ghes (2011) Side ix og 11.

udgør en væsentlig del af det teoretiske fundament for artiklens kommunikationsforståelse.

Socialkonstruktivisme beskrives som havende den filosofiske og videnskabsteoretiske grundopfattelse, at al menneskelig erkendelse er socialt konstrueret. Herved forstås, at alle former for erkendelse sker via en optik eller en forståelsesramme, der ikke er medfødt, men er resultat af den kultur og den historiske fortid, som det enkelte menneske er en del af. Hertil kommer, at alle mennesker reproducerer viden og fortolkning af verden i daglig interaktion med hinanden, hvorigennem visse handlinger og meninger får karakter af naturlighed, mens andre fx opfattes som socialt uacceptable.¹⁶

En af grundantagelserne er, at vores måder at tale på ikke afspejler vores omverden, vores identiteter og sociale relationer neutralt, men spiller en aktiv rolle i at skabe og forandre dem. Socialkonstruktivismen hævder, at vores adgang til virkeligheden altid går gennem sproget. Ved hjælp af sproget skaber vi repræsentationer af virkeligheden, som aldrig bare er spejlinger af en allerede eksisterende virkelighed. Repræsentationerne er med til at skabe den. Det betyder ikke, at virkeligheden ikke findes. Betydninger og repræsentationer er nok så virkelige. Den fysiske verden findes også, men den får kun betydning gennem diskurs.¹⁷

Et andet teoretisk perspektiv er, at enhver form for adfærd er en slags kommunikation. Den østrigsk-amerikanske filosof Paul Watzlawick formulerede fem grundsætninger vedr. effektiv kommunikation. En af disse grundsætninger er "One Cannot Not Communicate".¹⁸

Dermed beskrives umuligheden af ikke at kommunikere som en afgørende menneskelig faktor. Dette er særligt vigtigt i en sikkerhedspolitisk kontekst, hvor hele verden er med som tilskuere. Ved fx uproportional og indiskriminant fremfærd,¹⁹ eller omvendt, kommunikerer militære styrker et budskab til en vifte af målgrupper uden at bruge ord.

Kommunikation er derfor ikke bare en transmission mellem A og B, hvor B gør som A's budskab opfordrer til, som det er fremført i den gamle "stimuli - medie - respons" model.²⁰ Kommunikation skal forstås i rammen af et meget mere komplekst system, hvor der er en interaktion mellem A og B, og hvor såvel A og B påvirker og er påvirket af det eksterne miljø. I denne mere komplekse forståelsesramme er succesen af A's budskab afhængig af ikke bare budskaber, men også af hvad B's perception af A er. B's perception af A er påvirket af A's handlinger og B's forventninger (bias), forståelse og hvilke værdier m.m. som B tillægger A.²¹

Der er altså en forforståelse til kommunikationsbegrebet, når man taler om strategisk kommunikation, som indbefatter en holistisk og diskursiv tilgang til kommunikation, hvor A

¹⁶ Gyldendal. (2010, januar 10). www.denstoredanske.dk. Retrieved from Den Store Danske Encyklopædi: http://www.denstoredanske.dk/Livsstil,_sport_og_fritid/Filosofi/Filosofi_i_1800-_og_1900-t./socialkonstruktivisme?highlight=socialkonstruktivisme

¹⁷ L. P. Jørgensen (1999). Diskursanalyse - som teori og metode. Roskilde Universitetsforlag.

¹⁸ Paul Watzlawick (1967). Pragmatics of Human Communication - a study of interactional patterns, pathologies, and paradoxes. New York: Norton.

¹⁹ **Diskriminationsprincippet** fastslår, at der er pligt til at skelne mellem civile og militære mål. Det vil sige, at man kun må angribe fjendens potentiale.

Proportionalitetsprincippet fastslår, at fordelene ved en militær operation altid skal afvejes overfor skadevirkningen på civilbefolkningen. Forventes skaderne på de civile at blive større end den militære gevinst, så skal angrebet standes.

²⁰ Forsvarskommandoen (1998): Grundbog i Ledelse og Uddannelse, side 215.

²¹ Steve Tatham (2008): Strategic Communication - A primer. Sepcial Series 08/28, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, December 2008. Side 6-7. <http://www.da.mod.uk/publications/sf-publications..>

og B er gensidigt afhængige. A er derfor nødt til at basere sin kommunikation delvist på B's præmisser, hvorfor en analyse af B og dennes perceptioner er nødvendig.

At definere begrebet

Nogle definitioner fokuserer på, hvad strategisk kommunikation skal gøre og opnå, hvorimod andre definitioner fokuserer mere på, hvilke kommunikative aktiviteter strategisk kommunikation indeholder og dermed skal koordinere og synkronisere. Specielt det forhold, at strategisk kommunikation mere er en koordinerende funktion snarere end en egentlig kapacitet, er et område, som skiller vandene når det kommer til definitioner. Selv om det er anerkendt, at elementer af strategisk kommunikation udføres på alle niveauer, er der langt fra enighed om, hvorvidt man rent faktisk kan tale om strategisk kommunikation på operativt og taktisk niveau, selv om aktiviteter på disse niveauer understøtter de strategiske målsætninger.

Strategisk kommunikation udgør meget mere end bare pressehåndtering. Strategisk kommunikation er en tværministeriel og tværfaglig tilgang til kommunikation i et moderne informationsmiljø med henblik på at fremme strategier. Strategisk kommunikation har derfor relationer til, og skal være integreret i, alle aktiviteter og ressourcer i rammen af den overordnede strategi. Overordnet kan det siges, at "strategisk kommunikation handler om at opnå indflydelse på målgrupper, der har betydning for de strategiske målsætninger".²²

En definition på strategisk kommunikation kan man finde hos Kommandørkaptajn Steve Tatham fra UK Defence Academy, som anvender definitionen: "A systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables understanding of target audiences, identifies effective conduits, and develops and promotes ideas and opinions through those conduits to promote and sustain particular types of behaviour".²³

Denne definition lægger vægt på, at strategisk kommunikation er systematisk gennemført over tid og udført på alle niveauer. Definitionen ligger desuden vægt på målgrupper, forståelser af disse og den adfærd, som man ønsker, at disse skal udvise. Eksplicit fremgår det således, at der er tale om en adfærd, som understøtter de strategiske målsætninger.

En anden definition på strategisk kommunikation finder man hos Reding, Weed og Ghez i en RAND rapport omkring NATO strategisk kommunikations betydning og relevans for Frankrig: "Strategic Communication is a process designed to coordinate and communications (words and deeds) between inter-ministerial actors and to reinforce their strategic effect. To achieve this, Strategic Communications exploits all existing expertise, to be found in the various information and communication departments. The aim of Strategic Communications is to promote behavior in target audiences that is favorable to the actors' objectives and, thereby, to shape the operational environment".²⁴

Denne definition lægger modsat Tathams definition vægt på den *koordinerede* anvendelse af ord og handlinger. Definitionen er dog langt mere eksplicit fokuseret på processen og ikke mindst på interne implementeringsstrukturer end Tathams. Derudover beskriver definitionen den forstærkende effekt som strategisk kommunikation kan have i forhold til de strategiske ressourcer. Definitionen antyder dermed, at kommunikation kan bidrage til

²² Kjærgaard (2010) Side 4.

²³ Lee Rowland and Steve Tatham (2010): Strategic Communication and Influence Operations: Do We Really Get It?. Special Series 10/08, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, September 2010. side 6. <http://www.da.mod.uk/publications/sf-publications>

²⁴ Reding, Weed og Ghes (2011) Side xix.

at akkumulere effekter og dermed tilføje "merværdi" til effekten af ressourcernes individuelle handlinger.

Selv om de to definitioner på strategisk kommunikation fokuserer på forskellige aspekter af funktionaliteten, er fællesnævnerne dog, at der er tale om påvirkningen af målgrupper eller miljøer gennem koordinerede kommunikative aktiviteter (budskaber såvel som handlinger), der understøtter opnåelsen af strategiske målsætninger, som de måtte være formuleret i strategier.

Netop det, at strategisk kommunikation direkte understøtter implementeringen af strategier, er en af de primære pointer, og det der gør strategisk kommunikation til en integreret del af strategiformuleringen. I forlængelse deraf ligger også, at strategisk kommunikation ikke er en enkeltstående aktivitet men en ressource (kapacitet, eller "Mean"), som i samspil med andre af statens eller alliancens ressourcer bringes i spil for at opnå de fastsatte strategiske målsætninger. Men som omvendt også kan øve indflydelse på selve strategiformuleringen.

Strategisk kommunikation i lyset af de fem strategiske variabler

De fem variabler anvendes til at analysere strategisk kommunikation, og de faktorer som er relevante for integrationen af strategisk kommunikation i strategiformuleringsprocessen.

Kapacitet

Yarger anførte begrebet "instruments of power". Derved menes de instrumenter, eller means, som man bruger for at udføre de strategiske handlinger for at opnå de opsatte mål. USA definerer "instruments of power" således: "(DOD) All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, *informational* and military (DIME).²⁵ Storbritannien definerer disse som diplomatiske, økonomiske og militære. Storbritannien tilføjer, at disse anvendes sammen med "[...] an independant package of developmental and humanitarian activity and a customised, agile and sensitive influence and information effort"²⁶ Således kan man sige at information i disse strategiske kontekster er en kapacitet i sig selv og det at anvende information strategisk bliver dermed en del af opgaveløsningen.

Hvert af de strategiske magtinstrumenter rummer en informationskapacitet i sig selv. Således gennemføres der bl.a. politisk kommunikation, Public Diplomacy, militære informationsoperationer samt Public Affairs ved de forskellige strategiske magtinstrumenter i varierende omfang. Ydermere er der iboende det at foretage sig en strategisk handling, som fx at sejle et flådefartøj tæt på en konfliktzone eller foretage en manøvre med tungt artilleri, en non-verbal kommunikationsdimension som man ligeledes skal ihukomme i den strategiske planlægning. Disse ressourcer kommunikerer selvstændigt i form af deres handlinger og ord, såvel som i samspil med de øvrige ressourcer i relation til hele strategien.

Såvel ord og handlinger vil blive opfattet af en række målgrupper og aktører i det internationale system og vil blive genstand for vurdering (perception). Dette afleder et behov for at analysere og vurdere disse målgrupper og aktørers forventede perception af strategien og de valgte Ends, Ways og Means, herunder deres perception af legitimiteten i disse valg og deres accept deraf. Resultatet af denne analyse og vurdering kan på den ene side påvirke de valg, der bliver truffet i strategiformuleringen, og må på den anden side integreres i planlagt kommunikation til støtte for strategien.

²⁵ US Joint Publication 1-02, 2009

²⁶ *Joint Doctrinal Note (JDN) 4/05*. Shrivenham, UK: Doctrin and Concept Development Center.

Den planlagte kommunikation udføres på baggrund af en "rammesættende kommunikationsstrategi" og igennem en række kommunikative discipliner og kapaciteter, både i forhold til de enkelte ressourcer og som støtte til den overordnede strategi. Dette afleder et behov for at have et overordnet narrativ²⁷, som en del af denne rammesættende kommunikationsstrategi, der kan virke som ramme for ord og handlinger udført af fx Public Affairs og Public Diplomacy.

Legitimitet

Artiklen opfatter begrebet legitimitet som knyttet til stater og disses ageren i det internationale system. Ifølge Barry Buzan besidder stater legitimitet, som dannes som følge af perceptionen af staten og statens handlemåder i det internationale system.²⁸

Legitimitet er i artiklens optik en væsentlig parameter for at kunne agere i det internationale system.

Rent kommunikationsmæssigt handler strategisk kommunikation om at forklare og forsvare legitimiteten i strategien over for omverdenen, men også at tilsikre, at der er overensstemmelse mellem ord og handlinger, idet troværdighed understøtter legitimiteten. Der er ikke nødvendigvis overensstemmelse mellem det juridiske grundlag og opfattelsen af legitimitet. NATOs strategi og anvendelse af ressourcer, herunder (bombninger) i forbindelse med Kosovo konflikten i 1999 blev fx opfattet som legitim i størstedelen af det internationale system på trods af, at der ikke var et FN mandat og dermed ikke et folkeretsligt mandat. Opfattelsen af legitimiteten var derimod baseret på en moralsk – politisk vurdering i forhold til overgrebene på Kosovo albanerne og serbernes handlinger (800.000 flygtninge fra Kosovo, indgående dækket af internationale medier). Ligeledes findes eksempler på folkeretsligt legale konflikter, som i brede målgrupper er blevet opfattet som illegitime, fx indsatsen i Libyen. Der eksisterer i kampen om legitimitet en opgave i afdækning af for hvem strategien skal være legitim og hvad det begreb så betyder i forhold til de identificerede målgrupper.²⁹

En væsentlig opgave for strategisk kommunikation bliver dermed at påvirke opfattelsen af strategiens legitimitet hos en bred vifte af målgrupper.

Tid

Strategisk kommunikation som funktion og proces skal kunne forenes med behovet for at agere i et omskifteligt strategisk miljø, hvori hastighed, timing og fleksibilitet meget ofte er afgørende for at opnå de ønskede effekter hos målgrupperne. Dermed kan strategisk kommunikation ikke udelukkende være en rationel, lineær planlagt aktivitet, men må ligeledes være en iterativ og adaptiv proces.³⁰

Nyere amerikanske teoridannelse beskriver den strategiske proces som en iterativ proces, der gennemløbes kontinuerligt. Processen består af følgende sammenhængende delelementer³¹

²⁷ A narrative is a system of stories that share common themes, forms, events, and participants, and create expectations for how those elements can be assembled to satisfy a desire that is rooted on conflict. As such a narrative forms "a thematic and sequences account that conveys meaning from authors to participants about specific events". Narratives are the organising framework for conveying a specific strategy or policy when events or decisions are to be argued and described. (Halverson, Jeffrey R., Goodall, H. L., and Corman, Steven R. (2011). *Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. and Tatham, 2008, page 9)

²⁸ Barry Buzan, 2007, *Peoples, States and Fear*, ECPR press, p.269 -271

²⁹ Charles J. Dunlap (2007): "Lawfare". In *Yale Journal of international Affairs*.

³⁰ Kjærgaard (2010) Side 67.

³¹US Defence Science Board (Jan. 2008). Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication. DTIC - Information for the Defense Community: <http://www.dtic-mil/srch/doc?collection=t3&id=ADA476331>, pp 11-12.

Strategisk kommunikations rolle i strategier og strategiformulering •

- Etablering af forståelse af dynamik i informationsmiljøet.
- Rådgivning omkring muligheder og implikationer.
- Etablering af fælles fodslag imellem interessenter.
- Påvirkningsaktiviteter igennem informationsstrategi i samvirke med andre aktiviteter.
- Effektmåling.
- Tilpasning og justering

Hvilken type strategi der er tale om spiller ligeledes en rolle. Er det adfærd eller kontekst som strategien skal ændre, og hvordan måles effekten af den strategiske kommunikation over tid? er faktorer som bør medtages i overvejelserne. Ligeledes er tiden til rådighed til strategiformuleringen og til at implementere strategien væsentlig. Endeligt er overvejelser vedrørende hvor lang tid det tager at opnå den ønskede effekt nødvendige og dermed rammedannende. I forhold til effektopnåelse og tid er det endvidere et spørgsmål om, hvornår effekter kan måles. Dette betyder, at strategiformuleringen fra starten af må indeholde måleparametre, både i forhold til hvordan den ønskede adfærds- eller kontekstændring rent faktisk kan observeres, og i forhold til mellemløbet "milepæle" i tid og rum. Endeligt er tidsaspektet også en vigtig del af kommunikationen omkring hele strategien, idet mange af målgruppernes vilje til at støtte op om strategien også kan hænge sammen med deres opfattelse af realiteten i, og ikke mindst tidshorisonten for, opnåelsen af de strategiske målsætninger. Der skal med andre ord kommunikeres om tidsaspektet for blandt andet at håndtere forventninger hos målgrupperne (expectation management). Forventninger som for at skabe opbakning nogle gange er vokset til proportioner, som ikke kan indfries.

I forbindelse med implementeringen af strategien bliver tidsaspektet ligeledes afgørende. Situationen kan medføre, at en aktør kan blive presset i forhold til på den ene side at holde sig til de konsistente strategiske budskaber og på den anden side at håndtere dag til dag opståede budskaber, rygter og pressehenvendelser m.m., som kræver hastighed og fleksibilitet. Kommunikationen skal under alle omstændigheder være inden for det fastsatte narrativ. Erfaringer viser, at når narrativet forlades, mistes legitimiteten hurtigt. Et eksempel herpå var da det amerikanske forsvar for at operative betingelser for indtagelsen af Fallujah i Irak i 2004 fandt det nødvendigt at vildlede verdenspressen og dermed også oprørerne i byen vedrørende angrebstidspunkter og operative mål mv. Under den såkaldte "Tegningesag" i 2005 – 2006 så man til gengæld en presset dansk regering vedholdende holde sig til det strategiske narrativ vedrørende adskillelsen imellem pressen (Jyllands Posten) og den danske regering og dermed dens manglende mulighed for at kontrollere pressen.

Tidsdimensionen giver ikke rum til tidskrævende sagsbehandlings- og godkendelsesprocesser. Det peger på et behov for centraliseret planlægning og decentral udførelse af kommunikationsaktiviteter til støtte for strategien. Dette medfører et behov for at give personer på lavere niveauer bemyndigelse (empowerment)³² til at handle inden for en "rammesættende kommunikationsstrategi" for at kunne håndtere udfordringen.

Når en aktør i det strategiske system reagerer på en hændelse, kan det forekomme, at aktøren bliver nødt til at indsætte kapaciteter (ressourcer) før strategien er færdigformuleret. Det skete i forbindelse med konflikten i Libyen i løbet af foråret 2011. Dette kan fx forekomme fordi, der er et akut behov for at handle for at imødegå en trussel, eller fordi

³² Empowerment; Ifølge Reding, Weed og Ghez (2011, side ix) betyder det i denne kontekst: "In an institutional context, the act of mandating persons to communicate without their having to seek authorisation".

der er et politisk ønske om hurtig og synlig handling for at sende et signal. Sidstnævnte er i sig selv en form for strategisk kommunikation.

Positionering

I forhold til variabelen positionering handler strategisk kommunikation om, hvordan aktøren ønsker at blive opfattet efterfølgende, eller hvordan det "efterladte indtryk" skal være. Dette omfatter, hvordan aktøren ønsker at være positioneret i forhold til andre aktører i det internationale system på baggrund af aktørens interesser, værdier og politiske visioner. I forlængelse heraf ligger der derfor et behov for at tilsløre, at handlinger og ord opfattes som værende i overensstemmelse med de strategiske målsætninger og ikke i uoverensstemmelse med aktørens værdigrundlag. Under tegningsagen var det fx den danske regerings ønske at være positioneret i det internationale system som en stat, der fastholdt retten til ytringsfrihed og dermed uafhængige medier, på trods af betydeligt internationalt pres for at undskylde at de satiriske tegninger af profeten Muhammed blev offentliggjort. I relation til strategisk kommunikation er det derfor et spørgsmål om, hvordan handlinger italesættes.

Implementeringsstrukturer

Udfordringen ligger i at komme fra formuleringen af en strategi til implementeringen af den. Selv om det kan argumenteres, at strategisk kommunikation er en proces i strategiformuleringen og den efterfølgende implementering, er der stadigvæk behov for strukturer, som har ansvaret for operationalisering, koordination, synkronisering og monitorering. Disse strukturer står altså for omsætning af grundværdier, politiske visioner og målsætninger til en rammesættende kommunikationsstrategi, inklusive et narrativ, der kan danne grundlag for planlægning på lavere niveauer.

Når politiske visioner eller krisestyring fører til udviklingen af strategier, der involverer flere aktører, enten internationalt eller nationalt, kan implementeringen af strategierne blive mere udfordrende på grund af øget kompleksitet. Dette gælder også for strategisk kommunikation. Dette skyldes ofte, at kompetencer, opgaver og ansvar internationalt mellem stater, eller nationalt mellem ministerier, direktorater og styrelser m.m., ikke er entydigt fordelt og finansieret.³³ Erfaringer viser, at hvor der er ikke er defineret et klart lederskab for implementeringsprocessen, og hvor enkelte aktørers forskellige opgaver inden for rammen af den samlede strategi skal finansieres inden for eget budget, er der risiko for, at udførelsen drukner i interne konkurrenceforhold og prioriteringer, frem for at føre til øget samarbejde og koordinering og dermed effektiv implementering. Dette illustrerer en implementeringsproblematik, der ofte ikke er taget højde for i selve strategiformuleringen.

Formuleringen af nationale strategier, der både integrerer internationale og nationale politiske målsætninger, som for eksempel Afghanistanstrategien, involverer derfor både formuleringen af realistiske strategier og en institutionel ramme, hvorigennem strategien kan implementeres. Denne institutionelle struktur skal både være i stand til som en del af processen at levere rådgivning i forbindelse med selve strategiidviklingen og kunne koordinere og synkronisere kommunikationsaktiviteter horisontalt og vertikalt.

Udover de interne aspekter af implementeringsstrukturer i forhold til strategisk kommunikation omhandler det også, hvordan kommunikation skal implementeres igennem eksterne strukturer, herunder medieorganisationer og digitale "Nye Medier", som fx sociale netværksmedier.

I forhold til variabelen implementeringsstrukturer er der tale om både interne og eksterne strukturer. I forbindelse med de interne strukturer er organisatoriske forhold som fx

³³ R. V. V. Vidal og L. Sørensen (1999): Introduktion + SWOT – analysen. Strategi og planlægning som læringsprocess. Seks bløde fremgangsmåder. Handelshøjskolens Forlag. Side 41.

planlægningsstrukturer og processer interessante, idet de danner forudsætningen for, at strategisk kommunikation har muligheden for at påvirke strategiformuleringsprocessen, og dermed tilsikre, at faktorerne udledt fra de øvrige fire variabler integreres i strategiformuleringen. Derudover, at faktorer som narrativ, målgrupper og strategiske budskaber udledes fra strategiformuleringsprocessen. Eksternt handler det om at forholde sig til, igennem hvilke strukturer kommunikationen skal implementeres. Eksempelvis er der fokus på, hvilke kommunikative kapaciteter (Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs ect.), hvilke overordnede eksterne mediestrukturer og – organisationer, samt evt. særlige medieforhold som fx New Media, som strategien skal implementeres igennem.

Ovenstående analyse af implementeringsstrukturer peger på en række grundlæggende forudsætninger, som skal være opfyldt for, at kunne arbejde med strategi og strategiformuleringsprocessen, herunder strategisk kommunikation. Disse er:

- Strategisk kommunikations "planlæggere", og fastlagte processer, skal være en integreret del af implementeringsstrukturen, så planlægning, koordinering og synkronisering varetages som led i strategiformuleringsprocessen.
- Strategisk kommunikation skal have eget budget, ansvar og ledelsesautoritet.
- Implementeringsstrukturen på alle niveauer (strategisk, operativt og taktisk) skal kunne håndtere "Empowerment".

Udledte hovedfaktorer

På baggrund af analysen ovenfor af alle de fem strategiske variabler kan der udledes en række hovedfaktorer, som henholdsvis påvirker strategiformuleringen, og udledt fra strategiformuleringsprocessen danner grundlag for den strategiske kommunikation:

Hovedfaktorer der kan påvirke strategiformuleringen

- Der skal udvikles en "rammesættende kommunikationsstrategi" som en del af selve strategien, inklusive bl.a. narrativ, strategiske budskaber, målgrupper og særlige medieforhold, som kan give rammen for de underliggende niveaues egentlige kommunikationsplanlægning.
- Strategisk kommunikation skal imødekomme, hvordan indsættelsen af de strategiske ressourcer, herunder militær, økonomi osv., opfattes af det internationale miljø, og rådgive om, hvordan det påvirker strategiformuleringen?
- Strategisk kommunikation skal bidrage til at "designe" strategien og anvendelsen af kapaciteter, således at den bliver opfattet som legitim af de strategiske interessenter, og sådan at man stadigvæk evner at opnå de strategiske målsætninger.
- Strategisk kommunikation skal afveje sammenhæng mellem ord og handlinger, så strategien fremstår troværdig? Dette kræver koordinering og synkronisering, hvilket implementeringsstrukturen skal kunne håndtere.
- Strategisk kommunikation skal "rammesætte"³⁴ strategiens handlinger som værende i overensstemmelse med værdigrundlag, vision og strategiske målsætninger og derigennem opnåelse af legitimitet
- Strategisk Kommunikation kan være en egentlig "Line of Operation" i strategien (en "Way").
- Strategisk kommunikation skal samtænke og integrere kommunikationsdiscipliner (Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Militære Informations Operationer m.fl.) som kapaciteter

³⁴ Rammesætte, på engelsk "framing", er et kommunikationsbegreb, der betyder at sætte budskaberne ind i en særlig kontekst og betydning. Bruges ofte sammen med begreber som branding, spinning og priming.

Strategisk kommunikations rolle i strategier og strategiformulering •

teter (ressourcer eller Means) i selve strategien med henblik på horisontal og vertikal sammenhæng samt for at opnå synergieffekter.

Hovedfaktorer for kommunikation udledt fra strategiformuleringen

- Det strategiske Narrativ formuleres på baggrund af de strategiske målsætninger, det indtryk man ønsker at give og de strategiske variable Tid, Legitimering og Positionering. Det strategiske narrativ trækker desuden indirekte på dybere forhold som henholdsvis værdier og politiske visioner. Derudover udledes også målgrupper og strategiske budskaber.

Konklusion

Strategisk kommunikation er såvel en proces som en egentlig strategisk handling. Strategisk kommunikation handler om at opnå indflydelse på målgrupper, der har betydning for de strategiske målsætninger. Strategisk kommunikation hænger dermed også uløseligt sammen med strategi og strategiformulering. Anvendelsen af de fem strategiske variable i udviklingen af strategisk kommunikation tilsikrer en systematisk integration af strategisk kommunikation i såvel strategiformulering såvel som selve strategien.

Strategisk kommunikation som proces tilsikrer, at de ressourcer der bringes i spil i strategien er koordinerede i ord og handlinger. Kun gennem en sådan tilgang kan strategisk kommunikation understøtte og forstærke effekten af samtlige handlinger som strategien indeholder.

Strategisk kommunikation som en strategisk handling er en aktivitet i tråd med indsættelsen af andre kapaciteter. Strategisk kommunikation understøtter kapaciteterne ved at kommunikere om deres aktiviteter, men forstærker også effekten af dem gennem kommunikation. En selvstændig og meget væsentlig opgave for strategisk kommunikation er at forklare og forsvare strategien og *legitimiteten* i anvendelsen af de valgte kapaciteter, fremgangsmåder og strategiske målsætninger. Denne kommunikation skal på en og samme *tid* kunne håndtere det tidsmæssige pres, som det moderne strategiske miljø præsenterer og på den anden side kunne koordinere og synkronisere den langsigtede strategiske budskabsformidling. Strategisk kommunikation skal dermed medvirke til at opnå den positionering i det internationale system, som strategien sigter imod. *Implementeringsstrukturene*, der er nødvendige for at implementere den strategiske kommunikation, omfatter både interne og eksterne strukturer. De interne er et spørgsmål om organisation og repræsentation, der tilsikrer kommunikationens integration i strategiformuleringen og muligheden for at påvirke denne. De eksterne er et spørgsmål om identifikation af målgrupper, der skal påvirkes, samt udvælgelse af medier, metoder og andre strukturer hvor igennem det strategiske narrativ med tilhørende budskaber skal kommunikeres.

U.S. National Security Strategy: A Global Outlook in Transition

Rear Admiral James R. Stark, U.S. Navy. (Retired)¹

When first considering how to describe U.S. national security strategy, it appeared to be a rather straightforward task. Despite the always multifaceted and often contradictory array of media articles, academic conferences, and think tank papers concerning foreign policy and national strategy, the U.S. Government takes a fairly disciplined approach to the subject. In fact, this official approach is embodied in a document entitled “The National Security of the United States” and I rather naively assumed I could simply review and explain America’s grand strategy through just this single overarching publication. No one should be surprised that events did not turn out that way. As most of us in the military have experienced, nothing is ever as simple as it first appears.

This study examines a series of recent U.S. strategy documents, evaluating their separate description of national interests, objectives and and policies. These include the National Security Strategies of both the Bush and Obama administrations, published in 2006 and 2010 respectively, the 2008 National Defense Strategy and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. The purpose of the analysis is to determine both the constants and the changing face of U.S. strategy over the past several years as it reflects movement in the political landscape. It concludes that, while shifting political tides bring marginal changes to stated American goals and strategy, and in particular to the way those policies are publicly used, the basic tenets of U.S. national security strategy have remained essentially unchanged.

What is Strategy?

Before getting into the strategy itself, it is important to consider the definition of strategy and how it ought to be developed. Over the centuries, military strategists seem to generally agree that strategy consists of three elements—ends, ways and means.² “Ends” are the goals a nation seeks to achieve, usually defined over a specific span of time. “Ways” are the path it takes or the policies employed that allow it to attain those goals. Finally, “means” are the resources that are required to reach those goals, whether in terms of funding, forces, programs, or technology. Without all three of these elements, one does not have a complete strategy. Goals and plans without resources are simply useful concepts, unrelated to the reality of limited resources and unlikely to be effectively implemented. Along the same lines, resources without objective or direction are equally as likely to waste one’s efforts. It should be noted that a frequent criticism of high level U.S. strategy docu-

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² B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, Second Revised Edition, New York: Meridian, 1991, pp. 319-321; Colin S. Gray, *Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict*, Carlisle PA: U.S. Army War College, November 2009, pp. 4-8; Peng Quangqian and Yao Youshi, ed., *The Science of Military Strategy*, Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005, pp. 2324-235.

ments is that they concentrate on the front end (goals and concepts) without tackling the more difficult—and real world—problem of resources. That task is left to planning and budget deliberations later in the strategy development process.

As a nation goes about crafting its strategy, there are several important considerations to keep in mind. First, strategy involves more than just one participant—it is not a game of solitaire. Other nations—especially potential adversaries—will be observing both stated intentions and actions, drawing conclusions and altering their own plans accordingly. Consequently, a nation's leaders must think ahead, anticipate how other nations or groups may react, plan their own responses, closely monitor the direction of actual events, and then redirect their actions as necessary. In other words, strategy formulation and execution is an iterative, dynamic process.

Next, one must consider the identity of the strategy's intended audience, their requirements and their interests. At its highest level, a national grand strategy serves as a guidance document for leaders and multiple levels of government officials. For example, the strategy can set forth broad global and regional objectives that are critical to the formulation of specific theater operations and contingency plans. A strategy can also be a useful tool in justifying funding to the legislature. Far too often, military programs are examined and evaluated solely on their technical and war fighting capabilities. However, their justification becomes immediately far stronger and more convincing when force structure elements or specific weapons systems are explained based on their importance as integrated elements of a coherent military or national strategy. Third, a strategy can be a device for generating domestic public support. One recalls the insights of Clausewitz on the key strategic trilogy of government, the military and the populace. Being able to communicate national objectives in understandable terms and explain how the strategy works to achieve them is an important element in gaining public support. As the United States has seen in conflicts from Vietnam to Afghanistan, we usually have broad initial public support for military operations. But that support lasts only as long as we are operationally successful and can provide a credible strategic explanation for both our basic policies and the actions we are taking to implement them. Finally, those same public arguments in support of our strategy are equally useful in the international arena and are very useful tools for global public diplomacy. In the case of the United States, we use our strategy documents to fulfill all these roles.

A final consideration is the importance of basing the strategy on a realistic appreciation for what the future will look like. Clearly, no one has a crystal ball. But there are numerous methods ranging from interactive war games to academic studies, from predictions of specific scenarios and alternate futures to analysis of key trends that are useful. The U.S. employs all of these methods. Personally, I have found that two relatively recent documents provide excellent analysis that helps bound the limits of the likely futures. The first, *Global Trends 2025*, was published in 2008 by the National Intelligence Council, which is comprised of some of the top analysts in the U.S. intelligence community. The second, *Joint Operating Environment 2010*, is published by the U.S. Joint Forces Command and identifies key trends out through 2035.³ Both are unclassified and available on the Internet.

³ *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, Washington DC: National Intelligence Council, 2008; and *The Joint Operating Environment 2010: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force*, Suffolk VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2010.

U.S. Grand Strategy

The first step in the strategy development process is the identification of national interests and primary objectives. In particular, this means breaking them down according to strict priority—which interests are vital, which are important but not quite at the same level, and which are secondary.

But what does “vital interest” actually mean? A recent study by a U.S. government commission defined vital interests as those conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance the survival and well-being of the American people in a free and secure nation. My own, much simpler, definition is that vital interests are those things a nation would absolutely fight to defend. Consequently, it is important to place clear limits on this category. Recently, another high level group of former government officials published a list of over 100 “vital” U.S. interests⁴. While each of these may seem important, in my view, that type of approach is singularly unhelpful. When everything is important, then nothing is important. A true list of vital interests must be general enough to encompass the broad needs of a nation, while also being short enough to allow policymakers to focus on the handful of requirements that are absolutely critical to national security.

2006 National Security Strategy

The U.S. National Security Strategy is the official document setting out America’s overall strategy. It is drafted by the National Security Council staff, which is part of the Executive Office of the President, with participation from agencies across the government.

The last strategy in the previous Republican administration was signed out in March 2006 by President George W. Bush. It was followed by a new National Military Strategy in 2008 which saw some important changes, and then by a full revised National Security Strategy in May 2010. This was the first opportunity for the Obama Presidency to articulate its official vision for the nation in international affairs. What was most interesting was the gradual change in both tone and substance that can be seen in the evolution of stated U.S. strategy over this four year period.

When examining the 2006 National Security Strategy, one immediately notices some important differences in tone from earlier planning documents. The most obvious change was stylistic. The 2006 strategy appeared to have been written by a political speechwriter rather than by a policy analyst or strategist. Several of the national objectives were highly idealistic and their discussion evidenced an almost religious faith in democracy as a cure for much that is wrong in the world. This was particularly evident in the identification of America’s strategic objectives, which made support for spreading democracy everywhere and under almost all circumstances a cornerstone of America’s foreign policy.

It is important to realize that the National Security Strategy does not exist in a vacuum. It is augmented by several supporting layers of departmental documents. So, for example, there is a National Defense Strategy signed by the Secretary of Defense (2008), a National Military Strategy issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2004, 2005, 2010, 2011), a National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002, 2007), a National Intelligence Strategy (2009), a National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2003, 2006, 2011), and so on. Moreover, Congress has now required the issuance of quadrennial reviews in several areas of national security. These too add to the growing library of guidance documents. Finally, a number of very specialized policy pronouncements and Presidential Directives

⁴ Lecture by Dr. Graham T. Allison, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, “Rethinking the Foundations of the National Security Strategy and the QDR” Seminar Series, February 18, 2010.

help define strategy in specific areas. Each of these contributes to an interwoven mosaic that aims to cover the broad spectrum of America's international interests and activities.

While it may at first appear excessive to have so many documents reissued on such a frequent basis, there are actually strong justifications for this. First, the evolution of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has resulted in changes to both strategy and tactics that need to be reflected in everything from military operations to counterterrorism and diplomacy. Second, major economic and political developments such as the Arab Spring revolts across the Middle East, the weakening of U.S. and European economic power, and the increasing assertiveness of newly powerful Asian states all require reevaluation of prior strategies. Thus, it can be logically argued that the periodic reissue of these strategic documents accurately reflects the dynamism of the global political and military landscape and the necessity to constantly update one's thinking. Nevertheless, repetitive issuance of new strategic documents after only a short period indicates that earlier strategies fell short of the mark in evaluating the future global landscape and its security challenges. As a consequence, one is left with the impression of agencies running in circles, constantly revising and publishing new strategies instead of actually implementing them. Somewhere in all this there is a balance between responding to changing conditions and substituting bureaucratic activity for clear thinking. Apparently, several U.S. government agencies are still searching for it.

2008 National Defense Strategy

While it could be argued that, as a product of the Bush presidency, the 2008 National Defense Strategy is now politically outdated, the document actually seems to reflect some evolution of thought and refocusing of emphasis from the 2006 National Security Strategy. In fact, it represents a return to the more traditional expositions of national strategy that characterized previous presidencies. There are several possible explanations which might account for these changes. First, Vice President Cheney, who had earlier exerted a significant influence on foreign policy, was no longer as powerful after the Republicans suffered major losses in the November 2006 Congressional elections. Second, immediately after that defeat, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, whose views were central to the earlier strategy, was replaced by Robert Gates, a career official with a reputation for moderate practicality. Finally, by 2008 several of the more important neoconservative members of the Bush Administration had also left the government and no longer influenced the process. The result was a document that reflected the more apolitical approach of Secretary Gates, whose views also happened to align closely with those of President Obama, who was elected just a few months after publication of the Defense Strategy.

The 2008 Defense Strategy noted just three vital interests for the United States. While these are admittedly broad, they also serve as useful guideposts. They are:

- Protect the nation and our allies from attack or coercion.
- Promote international security to reduce conflict and foster economic growth.
- Secure the global commons and, with them, access to world markets and resources.⁵

The "global commons" is a relatively new term—one which is receiving increasing attention in Washington. It refers specifically to areas outside national sovereign control which are open to access by all nations and even non-state actors, including individuals. The global commons include the traditional areas of the maritime and air commons—that is, international waters and air space—as well as the much more recent domains of space

⁵ Ibid. p. 6.

and cyberspace. This emphasis on global commons might seem peripheral until one remembers that, in its relatively short history, the United States has gone to war four separate times to protect the principle of free and unfettered access to the seas.⁶

To support U.S. vital interests, the National Defense Strategy enumerates five “key objectives”—defend the homeland, win the long war (the latest term for the war against terrorism), promote security, deter conflict and win the nation’s wars. These are discussed at some length, going into detail as to their impact on U.S. forces and operations.

The strategy goes on to discuss in general terms how to achieve these objectives, and then concludes with a discussion of managing risk. It notes that the United States cannot possibly do everything it would like and must therefore make choices. Further, the strategy must hedge against possible changes to the future environment that would alter the strategy’s basic assumptions. The contributions of America’s partners and allies are key among these assumptions—their capabilities as well as their commitment to shared goals. Any changes to these assumptions would then require a reappraisal of the strategy.

Quadrennial Defense Review

Among the more important guidance documents below the level of the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy are a series of congressionally mandated quadrennial reviews which are undertaken every four years soon after Presidential elections. While these reviews are drafted within their respective government departments—defense, foreign affairs, homeland security and intelligence—each is coordinated throughout the government and checked to ensure consistency with higher strategy. All were issued either in 2009 or 2010.

Because of its currency, the Quadrennial Defense Review, known informally throughout Washington as the QDR, provides an extremely accurate and comprehensive look at U.S. national strategy. It was the result of over a year’s work under the direction of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with the active participation of all the military services and other governmental departments. It stresses a “whole of government” approach and, though it does not go into detail, it certainly refers to the importance and even the preference for non-military solutions. Although the QDR was classified while it was in the process of being drafted, it was published as an unclassified public document. In addition to the QDR, three other major defense studies provide insights into current U.S. strategy and should be considered as augmenting documents further defining strategy in specific subject areas. These are the Nuclear Posture Review, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and the Space Posture Review interim report, all of which were released in early 2010.

The QDR begins by examining the current environment and noting the important trends that govern U.S. security. These include such key developments as the diffusion of global political, economic and military power, leading to a more multipolar world. It also notes the unprecedented shift of wealth from West to East. Globalization will allow a wider range of actors to acquire advanced technology. Particularly worrisome is the possible spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially to non-state actors who will be less amenable to traditional norms of state behavior or considerations of deterrence. Additionally, the almost instantaneous flow of information around the world means that weaker nations or groups can now have greater influence on world opinion. That same widespread

⁶ These instances were the undeclared naval “quasi-war” with France from 1795-1798, the campaign against the Barbary pirates in the first decade of the 19th century, the War of 1812 with Great Britain, and the First World War, in which the U.S. declaration of war was precipitated by Germany’s initiation of a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare in early 1917.

access to global events can also bring more public pressure on democratic governments to become involved in distant crises. Global climate change could cause drought and water shortages, impact food supplies, and increase the likelihood of major weather events and natural disasters. Global warming is also bringing additional attention to the Arctic and its resources, an area of major concern to Denmark. Population shifts and demographic trends will have profound effects on the social and economic health of key nations. This is a major issue for Europe, Russia and Japan because of their declining populations and could have significant social as well as economic and security consequences. Rapid urbanization in coastal regions, especially in the less developed world, the possible effects of new diseases and pandemics, and increasing tensions over resources will all place enormous stress on the weakest, most fragile nations—precisely those societies least capable of dealing with these challenges.

The QDR lays out four priority objectives for the United States, very similar to those set forth in previous strategy documents. First, the U.S. must prevail in today's wars—Iraq and Afghanistan—as well as in its efforts to combat global terrorism. Second, the U.S. must seek to prevent and deter conflict. This requires an integrated approach using all levers of government—diplomacy, foreign assistance, economics and trade, defense, law enforcement and intelligence. Third, the U.S. must be able to defeat any adversary and succeed in a wide variety of contingencies, from disaster relief and support for failing states all the way up to major war against a highly capable regional power. And, finally, the Department of Defense must take care of its people. America's armed forces have been involved in high-tempo combat operations for over eight years and the stresses are having a growing impact on our personnel and their families.

One of the major thrusts of the new strategy is the need to rebalance forces. In essence, the U.S. military is shifting its emphasis from high technology future conflicts to the demands of fighting today's wars. Secretary Gates has stated that the U.S. military is devoting too much attention and spending too many resources on advanced fighters and \$5 billion ships designed for possible conflict 20 years in the future. Consequently, we are not providing nearly enough resources to responding to the needs of our troops fighting unconventional wars right now. We need to bring back a sense of wartime urgency. As a result, the U.S. will give additional emphasis to counterinsurgency and counter-terror operations, expand its ability to assist and train partner nations, prevent the spread of WMD, and ensure its forces can fight successfully even against robust anti-access capabilities. Despite this shift in emphasis, rebalancing still aims to selectively support a number of advanced capabilities. The U.S. is now investing more in long range strike, strengthening undersea warfare, increasing ISR, and putting special emphasis on cyber warfare.

Unlike many other higher level strategy documents, the QDR goes on to specify the size and composition of U.S. military force structure for the next five years, listing everything from how many brigades and regiments of exactly which type will make up the Army and Marine Corps, to specifying the numbers of varying classes of ships for the Navy and aircraft squadrons for the Air Force.

One of the most difficult tasks in any strategy is the identification of where to take cuts to free up additional funds to support higher priority programs. In this case, the QDR reflects decisions made during the 2009 budget deliberations that ended production of the F-22 fighter, completely restructured and downsized the Army's Future Combat System and the Navy's DDG-1000 destroyer, cancelled a new class of missile cruisers and terminated a major command and control system. It also includes decisions to reduce numbers of older Air Force fighters and stop production of the C-17 cargo aircraft. A total of 31 ma-

for programs were cancelled which, had they been pursued to completion, would have cost the U.S. more than \$300 billion.⁷

2010 National Security Strategy

The latest of the U.S. grand strategy documents is the National Security Strategy released in May 2010. Its singular importance lies in the fact that it is the first strategy document of the Obama administration. As such, it already shows elements of a continuing evolution in strategic thought and policy emphasis. Once again, we find that the strategy identifies essentially the same vital interests, threats and national objectives as its predecessors. Yet it also reflects altered internal and external conditions—the global financial crisis, the scheduled withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan—as well as the areas of particular focus of the new President. As a consequence, there is more emphasis on “living our values”—setting an example at home and supporting human rights abroad. The description of vital interests shifts slightly from the Bush 2008 National Defense Strategy, though the change is more a matter of specific wording than actual substance. The Obama strategy identifies four “enduring national interests” rather than the earlier three of the Bush era. These are:

- The security of the United States, its citizens, and allies.
- A strong, growing U.S. economy in an open international system.
- Respect for human values at home and abroad.
- An international order supported by U.S. leadership that provides security, peace, and opportunity through stronger cooperation.

In each of the above areas, the strategy identifies and describes supporting policies and sub-elements that give scope and substance to its direction. So, for example, the implementation of respect for human values entails strengthening the power of America’s democratic society as an example to the world, supporting democracy and human rights abroad, and promoting dignity by meeting basic needs. Similarly, sustaining international order is carried out by ensuring strong alliances, building cooperation with other major powers and emerging centers of influence, strengthening international institutions and mechanisms, and facilitating broad cooperation on key global issues. Each one of these threads is then supported by several specific strategies. The net result is a wide-ranging, comprehensive set of policy guidelines. They provide an excellent overview of U.S. policy goals without delving into the specifics of tactics or resources.

Conclusion

The long-term significance of 9/11 for U.S. foreign policy, therefore, should not be overestimated. The attacks that day were a terrible tragedy, an unwarranted assault on innocent civilians, and a provocation of monumental proportions. But they did not change the world or transform the long-term trajectory of U.S. grand strategy. The United States’ quest for primacy, its desire to lead the world, its preference for an open door and free markets, its concern with military supremacy, its readiness to act unilaterally when deemed necessary, its eclectic merger of interests and values, its sense of indispensability — all these remained, and remain, unchanged.⁸

⁷ Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speech delivered at the retirement ceremony for Lieutenant General Emerson N. Gardner, Jr. USMC, 15 March 2010.

⁸ Melvyn P. Leffler, “9/11 In Retrospect: George Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered”, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2011.

Looking at the current status of official U.S. national security strategy, one comes away with two somewhat contrasting conclusions. First, there is an enormous amount of information available to provide insight into strategic thinking in Washington. After the 2008 Presidential elections, the U.S. moved its emphasis away from exporting democracy, predominant reliance on military forces, and a heavy focus on major conflict, cancelling several extremely expensive advanced technology military programs. Today, the emphasis has shifted toward putting more resources into the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, expanding the campaign against terrorism, and supporting the prevention of conflict through multinational, multi-agency stability operations around the world. Interestingly, the recent U.S. support for the multinational campaign to undermine the government of Libya's Muammar Qaddafi by America "leading from behind" can be seen as an explicit example of this new approach that seeks to combine continued international involvement with a somewhat lower profile—and with a lower price tag.

The second conclusion is that, despite the different approaches of the various agencies publishing official strategy documents, the substance of America's national strategy has remained surprisingly consistent. The emphasis is on defending the United States and supporting its interests through forward engagement by diplomatic, developmental and military assets in time of peace; working closely with allies and partners around the world to create a community of stable nations and an international system capable of ensuring that change is both gradual and controlled; deterring conflict and controlling crises; and, finally, maintaining the forces required to win conflict at any level. Within that strategy, there are many nuances and choices, some of them potentially inconsistent with one another. For example, the U.S. needs to balance its commitment to human rights—a very worthwhile goal—with the importance of maintaining cooperative and constructive relations with other states. And we see those conflicting interests reflected every day in relations with states such as China, Russia and Iran. Such competing goals are simply a reflection of the breadth and depth of America's global interests.

Yet, in looking at the strategy, which clearly emphasizes the primary role of diplomacy and economic development over military force, and cooperation with allies over a unilateral foreign policy, one might ask why the U.S. is so frequently criticized for not doing enough in precisely these areas? I believe the answer is very clear. Strategies and policy statements carry one only so far; actual results depend on real world execution. In some cases, policy is ineffective because of competing voices and views in Washington or because of honest debates over the best course of action. Equally as important, the world is an uncertain place. Other nations have their own priorities and problems, and they may not always agree with us despite good faith negotiations on both sides. Instability, criminal and terrorist activity, social, religious and ethnic stresses do not always respond to outside intervention. In the end, the strategy, good or bad as it may be, is only the start of the journey, not the end.

Nationalism in China's security strategies

Nicolai Meulengracht¹

Political instability in China is challenging regime security. The Chinese Communist Party uses nationalism as an instrument for unifying the people around a common identity from which the regime can draw its legitimacy for preserving communism and the authoritative state. But nationalism is a double-edged sword. While political nationalism provides the regime with opportunities for strengthening its authority, it also fuels popular nationalism that in return constrains the leaders to pursue their nationalist agenda or risk undermining their own legitimacy. This article examines how nationalism acts as an intervening variable in China's security strategies by analysing the interaction between China's strategic situation at the system-level and the elements of nationalism at the domestic level. It then examines China's security strategies in two different case-studies to demonstrate how nationalism can constrain ends, ways or means.² The first case-study examines the regime's response to political instability in the Xinjiang region and argues that nationalism causes the regime to apply particularly heavy-handed, if not counterproductive, ways and means in its domestic security strategies. The second case-study examines China's policies in its territorial dispute with Japan over the Daioyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and argues that nationalism prevents the regime from pursuing mutually beneficial ends in the dispute.

China's relative capabilities and position in the international system

The anarchic nature of the international system compels the state to be concerned with its own survival. The distribution of power and the developments which the state perceives as threats and opportunities thereby shape its security strategies. The state seeks to enhance its competitive advantage and probability of survival and does this both by influencing and by adapting to the system.³ The ways to achieve this can be through behaviour changing strategies, such as balancing or deterrence, and by achieving a position from where it can influence the norms of the international system. The principal means by which the state pursues these strategies are diplomatic, economic, and military.

In diplomacy, China has been an increasingly active player in the international system since the 1990s. It has taken a less confrontational, more sophisticated approach toward regional and global affairs, embracing international institutions and norms to promote its own interests.⁴ In 1998, China introduced a new security doctrine that has shaped its diplomacy. The 'New Security Concept' emphasises Peaceful Coexistence⁵ based on 'mu-

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² This article uses *ends*, *ways* and *means* to describe *strategy*. *Ends* are the objectives or desired outcomes, *ways* are the methods used to achieve the ends, and *means* are the resources and processes applied to the execution.

³ These assumptions about the international system are based on neoclassical realism as defined by Gideon Rose, 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', *World Politics* no. 51 (1998), pp. 144-172.

⁴ M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, 'China's New Diplomacy', *Foreign Affairs* (Nov/Dec 2003), p. 22.

⁵ The *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence* originate from an agreement between China and India over Tibet back in 1954. The principles were: Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and

tually beneficial cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual respect, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and resolution of conflicts through dialogue'.⁶ China's active involvement in global and regional institutions has increased its influence on agenda-setting in the international system, which helps it balance against other great powers. However, China has also actively watered down several UN Security Resolutions aimed at, for example, Iran, Sudan and North Korea, often under the clause that it goes against the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. While these principles are also the basis of the UN Charter, it can be argued that China does this in order to hedge against outside criticism of its own regime. China's authoritative regime and repression of human rights are continually criticised and it weakens its prestige and legitimacy. Additionally, China has no allies and it cannot present an alliance system in its region as an alternative to that of the US. Nor does it have a state-model that is attractive to most other states. In affairs where it does not have economic or military leverage, China will therefore have difficulties influencing other states to support its interests.

In economics, China's high growth rates and integration into the world economy gives it a significant source of power in the international system. For example, being a key player in both G20 and the World Trade Organisation gives it significant leverage to influence the international system. But integration into the world economy has also made China dependent upon foreign direct investments, and it depends heavily upon the US market for exports, and Japan, the US, South Korea, Germany and even Taiwan for imports.⁷ Another increasingly significant aspect of China's economy is its dependency on energy. China is the world's largest consumer of coal, which covers 70% of its energy needs. Its dependency on oil is increasing steadily, as it is for several other economies in Asia, which creates a natural competition for energy resources.⁸ China's dependency on other economies restrains it from making decisive changes in the balance of power, and its energy dependency is a particular vulnerability. Consequently, China is investing heavily in developing its own energy resources and reducing its dependency on imported coal, oil and gas. Through its energy cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation⁹ it is developing pipelines westwards to the Caspian Sea, and it is also investing in third world countries' energy infrastructures, such as oil drilling in Sudan.¹⁰ These investments support its diplomatic and economic position, spread its risk over more suppliers and, most importantly, reduce its dependency on the US and the Middle East.

In military affairs, China has shown more restraint in its use of force under its New Security Concept as opposed to the mid-1990s where it was threatening Taiwan with invasion. On several issues it has shown patience and moderation and made use of multilateral diplomacy and economic cooperation, such as in a number of territorial disputes with

sovereignty; Mutual non-aggression against anyone; Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; Equality and mutual benefit; Peaceful co-existence.

⁶ Phillip C. Saunders, 'China's Role in Asia' in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda (eds.), *International Relations of Asia* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), p. 131.

⁷ Rémy Davison, 'China and the Asia-Pacific' in Michael K. Connors, Rémy Davison and Jörn Dosch (eds.), *The New Global Politics of the Asia-Pacific* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 55-56.

⁸ IHS Jane's, 'Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Armed Forces, China', 15 October 2010, <www.janes.com> [Accessed 1 April 2011].

⁹ In 1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan formed the *Shanghai Five* to create confidence-building measures and reduce military tension in Central Asia. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined, and it became the *Shanghai Cooperation Organisation*, which aims at security (with a particular focus on terrorism, separatism, and extremism), economic and cultural cooperation.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

neighbours that historically have caused tension.¹¹ Still, China's annual military expenditure has accelerated since 1996 and by 2009 had increased nearly five-fold.¹² China is modernising its military through reform, procurement of modern weapons and development of doctrine¹³ and it has become visible in peacekeeping and joint exercises. It is developing its power projection and area denial capabilities, which demonstrate a shift in focus towards protecting interests off the Chinese mainland.¹⁴ Even though China has recently shown restraint in its use of force, the shift in the regional military power balance is remorselessly in China's favour, and it is a concern for its neighbouring states.

Overall, China can be said to be benefitting from the existing world order. The regional stability and economic possibilities have perhaps never been more favourable for China. However, the main threats to China that can either weaken its position and wealth, or threaten its regime, are criticism of its domestic affairs and state system and its dependency on energy.

When considering China's strategic options, its position and relative capabilities would suggest that it could continue to strengthen these through cooperation with the US and compliance with international norms. This way, China could become the most important partner to the US in Asia and the Asia-Pacific instead of Russia or its rivals Japan and India. In fact, this option was already in the cards for China, when Obama visited Beijing in late 2009, but it was politely turned down.¹⁵ Of course, such a strategy would imply that China would eventually have to give up its claims to Taiwan and implement regime changes. Instead, China seems to be strengthening its position and capabilities in order to balance against US influence in the region by slowly eroding the position of other powers in regional affairs. Rather than trying to be an example as an aspiring superpower, China is seeking to preserve the minimum necessary legitimacy and prestige while emphasising the flaws of others. It does this by promoting its difference in norms and cultures as well as the notion that the Chinese way is as good as any other, by defending the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, and by promoting multi-polarity as an alternative to US hegemony.

Nationalism and domestic political stability

Economic growth has given credibility to the regime's performance, but it has also created a wealth gap between urban and rural populations and caused corruption among local government officials. China's integration into the world economy has increased the number of, for example, Japanese and American owned companies within China. Altogether, it is a turn away from both the traditional communist ideology and the safeguarding against Western 'encroachment', which brings the legitimacy of the regime into question.

¹¹ Fravel & Medeiros, 'China's New Diplomacy', p. 26.

¹² It should be noted that the percentage of the gross domestic product has remained stable around 2% the past decade, which is comparable to that of France or Australia and only half of that of the US.

¹³ Phillip C. Saunders, 'China's Role in Asia', pp. 135-136.

¹⁴ Mark Cozad, 'China's Regional Power Projection: Prospects for Future Missions in the South and East China Seas' in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai and Andrew Scobell (eds.), *Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), pp. 289-91.

¹⁵ See for example the outcomes of the meetings between Obama and Wen at Helene Cooper, 'China Holds Firm on Major Issues in Obama's Visit', *New York Times*, 17 November 2009, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/world/asia/18prexy.html>>, and Xinhua, 'Wen: China disagrees to so-called G2', *China Daily*, 18 Nov 2009, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-11/18/content_8998039.htm> [Accessed 1 September 2011].

The notion of Western encroachment dates back to the Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth century, when colonial powers, or the 'new barbarians from the sea', not only defeated the Qing Dynasty militarily, but also attacked the foundation of Chinese culture. China was no longer the centre of the universe, but had become partly colonised and heavily influenced by European culture.¹⁶ The two following Sino-Japanese wars were likewise humiliating, and even worse, the Japanese occupation in the late 1930s resulted in massacres of millions of Chinese civilians.¹⁷

The narrative today is that it was the Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army that liberated China from Japanese occupation and in the decades after led a weakened China towards a new uprising in an unequal world. Communism is not abandoned, but it is a model that is unique to China and which is independent from Westernised democracy. The authoritative regime is necessary if economic growth and wealth for the people is to continue without compromising territorial integrity or Chinese culture.¹⁸ This narrative, as a political agenda, instils a sense of purpose in the struggle to restore China to its former greatness in the modern world, while placing the party at the centre. It is a collective idea of world class struggle from which the political elite can derive their legitimacy.

Chinese history is a narrative of a superior and independent Chinese civilization that has continuously been under threat by 'barbarians' both from the outside and from within. In the Chinese tradition, separatism is therefore seen as one of the evils that threaten Chinese sovereignty, and the regime's response to this has been to maintain a tight control of the state. This tradition suggests a low tolerance that calls for hard measures to suppress unrest. In the Chinese tradition, however, 'barbarians' can be converted and become Chinese by adopting Chinese culture.¹⁹ It is therefore not a national sentiment that calls for genocide or displacement of non-Chinese, but for assimilation. This sentiment calls for strategies that seek to win over non-Chinese people living on Chinese territory with the aim of creating cultural homogeneity in the population – not of embracing different cultures.

Political and popular nationalism

Chinese political nationalism does not seek the ends of a world revolution, but serves to maintain internal order and the current regime. This is partly done with reference to a history of greatness, victimization and uprising, and partly by identifying threats to Chinese sovereignty that can rally the people and legitimate tight political control. The mission of restoring greatness gives this sense of purpose, but if pursued aggressively, it could cause a direct threat to regional security – particularly if it also develops into an agenda of avenging past humiliation. Since the stance with the US in the Strait of Taiwan in 1996, the Chinese regime has been careful to balance its claims for Taiwan with its regional security strategies – seeking and reassuring of peaceful coexistence – while putting more emphasis on achieving greater international status.

¹⁶ Chen Zhimin, 'Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy', *Journal of Contemporary China* (February 2005), p. 38.

¹⁷ John Keay, *China: A History* (New York: Basic Books, 2009), p. 513.

¹⁸ See for example how the Constitution of Communist Party of China balances 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' with market economy while upholding the 'basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism' at <http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2007-12/13/content_90532.htm> [Accessed 1 April 2011].

¹⁹ Chen Zhimin, 'Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy', pp.36-37.

While the Communist Party has generally been able to decide the content and political agenda of Chinese nationalism, and adjust it according to national policy needs, there still appears to be a significant bottom-up form of nationalism. This popular nationalism influences the political elite and therefore it is the interaction between political elite and popular nationalism that, as a whole, influences China's security strategies. The anti-Western nationalists are perhaps the most significant in relation to the political nationalism. This movement is also called 'Say No'ism' with reference to a nationalist book published in 1996, shortly after the military confrontation with the US in the Taiwan Strait, that urged the government to 'Say No' in relations with the US and Japan.²⁰

While the regime encourages nationalistic sentiments, it also fears them. On several occasions, alleged foreign humiliation has been met with public criticism of the government as being too weak. This, in turn, can cause internal division in the elite and compel leaders to pursue nationalist objectives so as not to be accused by their opponents of being weak. The regime may desire to pursue strategies of friendly cooperation with the West and Japan in order to strengthen its international position, but it will have to be balanced with the popular nationalism or it could threaten political stability and the legitimacy of the regime. This suggests that policy-makers will, to some extent, remain restrained in their approach to the West and Japan, or will be compelled to maintain secrecy around agreements made on affairs that compromise the nationalist agenda.

Nationalism in the security strategies for Xinjiang

The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is China's most westerly region, bordering Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Mongolia. The region has long been marked by separatist movements and clashes between the largest ethnic group, the Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uighurs, and the Han-Chinese people, who comprise the dominant culture group in China.

The area of today's Xinjiang has been dominated by the Chinese dynasties for more than 2000 years, since the dynasties' efforts to secure the Silk Road. It has served as a strategic buffer zone for the Chinese mainland, first against the barbarians in the west and later against the Soviet Union. At times, the area has been lost to Turkic tribes, and twice, in 1933 and 1944, insurgencies have broken out in the region proclaiming an East Turkestan Republic.

Today, the Xinjiang region is still a strategic buffer zone to the west – not just towards Russia, but also towards the current US military presence in the region. The quality and number of Chinese forces in the area continue to increase and military infrastructure is expanding.²¹ This enables China, in times of crisis, to counter the US presence in and around Afghanistan, or to build up land and air forces at the border to India, with whom China still has border disputes.

Of perhaps more strategic importance is the recent discovery of large oil and gas reserves in Xinjiang. Since 2002, China has extended the network of pipelines linking the region's fields and refineries to Shanghai and abroad to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In 2007, Xinjiang became China's primary source of energy, producing a third of its total oil and gas resources and 40% of its coal resources.²² Xinjiang's resources and location have enabled China to take a lead position, or at a minimum a position equal to Russia's, in Central Asian affairs both in bilateral relations and through the Shanghai Cooperation

²⁰ Chen Zhimin, 'Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy', pp. 50-51.

²¹ IHS Jane's, 'Xinjiang'.

²² Ibid.

Organisation. Its resources and infrastructures are also making China less dependent on overseas deliveries and less vulnerable to changes in energy prices. Maintaining control over Xinjiang, and preventing movements towards the formation of an East Turkestan state, is therefore an indisputable end in the Chinese regime's strategies for this region.

The root causes to political instability in Xinjiang stem from the confrontation between ethnic minorities and Han-Chinese. Xinjiang is home to several ethnic groups, where the majority of the population is Muslim Turkic peoples who desire autonomy free from Chinese rule. The Chinese government's strategy for controlling multi-ethnic provinces has, in summary, been to win over the discontented people with economic development. This improves the standard of living and integrates the ethnic groups into Chinese society and culture. But concurrent with the recent infrastructural development of Xinjiang, masses of Han-Chinese have migrated to Xinjiang, whom the regime has encouraged to move westwards with economic opportunity and better tax rates. This has significantly changed the demography of the region and led to fears that Uighur culture is being overwhelmed by a flood of Han-Chinese.²³ Today, the ethnic division is estimated to be 45% Uighur, 40% Han-Chinese and 15% others.²⁴ The economic development has mostly favoured the Han-Chinese population, causing a substantial economic gap between ethnicities. In 2007, some 80% of Uighurs lived below the official poverty line, and the average income of urban inhabitants (mostly Han-Chinese) was almost four times that of rural people (mostly Uighurs and other minorities).²⁵

Chinese authorities generally respond to unrest in a direct and hard way. Since 2001, an official 'Strike Hard and Rectify' campaign has been employed with frequent security crackdowns targeting known separatist and Turkic organisations.²⁶ It can be argued that even though the heavy-handed methods reduce the immediate threat from violent elements, it also increases the general pressure on the Muslim Turkic populations, thereby deepening the core grievances. This is where elements of nationalism, and the Chinese national sentiment, can be argued to dominate the approach taken towards the security issues in Xinjiang. The approach is based on economic development strategies, migration of Han-Chinese, cultural restraints on ethnicities, little minority representation in local governance, and hard security crackdowns. This suggests that the strategies are based on the fundamental view that the ethnic groups are 'barbarians' in the frontier lands who must be subdued and assimilated into Chinese culture. Instead of committing to strategies that would address the root causes by, for example, promoting minority rights, multiculturalism, and social development, the central and regional governments prefer a hard approach. It emphasises both the existence of the historical threat from separatism as well as demonstrates to the Han-Chinese that the regime is capable of responding to the threat, which is necessary in order not to appear weak. Altogether, the narratives of the political nationalism and the authorities' resolute handling of the 'ungrateful' minorities support the legitimacy of preserving an authoritarian regime because it has resonance in the Han-Chinese population group.

China's domestic security strategies in Xinjiang are criticised at the international level, but not enough to be a restraint to China's interests in the international system. Sino-American relations, for example, remain largely unaffected by the events in Xinjiang. Arguably, the US-led Global War on Terror has given some legitimacy to fighting terrorism

²³ IHS Jane's, 'Xinjiang'.

²⁴ BBC News, 'Regions and territories: Xinjiang', 28 April 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/8152132.stm> [Accessed 1 April 2011].

²⁵ IHS Jane's, 'Xinjiang'.

²⁶ Ibid.

with all means necessary and China has not been hesitant to label separatist movements as religious (i.e. Islamic) extremists and terrorists.²⁷ In fact, combatting 'terrorism' has forged stronger ties with China's neighbours in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and particularly in military cooperation with Russia.

Following the bloody events in Xinjiang in 2009, where nearly two hundred people were killed in clashes between Uighurs and Han-Chinese, the European Union (EU) called for the Chinese authorities to 'develop a genuine Han-Uighur dialogue and adopt more inclusive and comprehensive economic policies in Xinjiang aimed at strengthening local ownership and to protect the cultural identity of the Uighur population.'²⁸ The EU also noted that it is China's biggest trading partner and investor and that 'trade and economic relations have overshadowed the question of democratic reforms, respect for human rights and the rule of law'.²⁹ Beijing called this 'meddling in internal affairs' and demanded that 'the European side stop making the same mistakes again and again, earnestly respect the principles of equality and mutual respect, and do more to benefit the healthy and stable development of China-EU relations'.³⁰ Neither the EU's expression of concern nor Beijing's response has led to changes in the trade between the two powers. This is but one example of how China continues to emphasise the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, which can, at least in part, be considered hedging strategies. Chinese leaders defend the regime's right to apply its own methods in domestic affairs, but more importantly, they demonstrate their capability to safeguard China against 'Western encroachment'.

Nationalism in the East China Sea Dispute

A significantly different case that demonstrates how security and foreign-policy issues are complicated by nationalism is the on-going dispute over the delineation of the sea-borders between China and Japan. For decades this historical dispute has revolved around a group of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea known as *Daiyu* in Chinese and *Senkaku* in Japanese. Japan claims that the islands were occupied by Japan in 1895, while China maintains that they were discovered by China in the fifteenth century and have since been part of the Greater China. The dispute remained dormant until the late 1960s, when undersea natural gas reserves were discovered in the East China Sea. Since then, diplomatic and military tension has periodically arisen over the territorial claims. Over the past decade, tension has further increased as both powers have moved to explore and drill for oil and gas close to the disputed region. The territorial dispute regularly triggers strong popular responses, both in China and in Japan.

While diplomatic negotiations have been on-going since 2004, several incidents have occurred both in the waters and at home in the two countries. In 2005, Japan decided to take ownership of a lighthouse which had been built on one of the islands by Japanese activists in 1978. This move angered the Chinese government, which called it a 'serious provocation and violation of China's territorial sovereignty'.³¹ Japan announced that the

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ European Union, 'Motion for a Resolution: European Parliament resolution on the rights of minorities in China and the use of death penalty (B7 0184/2009)', 11 November 2009, <<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2009-0184&language=DA>> [Accessed 1 April 2011].

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ IHS Jane's, 'Xinjiang'.

³¹ IHS Jane's, "China And Northeast Asia - Security". Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 11 Feb 2011, www.janes.com

two Chinese gas fields, Chunxiao and Duanqiao, were linked to Japanese fields and initiated procedures to grant drilling rights within the disputed area to Japanese gas companies. Japan's move triggered protest demonstrations outside the Japanese embassy in Beijing, and China responded by granting rights to China National Offshore Oil Corporation close to the disputed region. For a decade now, naval vessels and aircraft have regularly engaged in a game of brinkmanship, with both countries trying to assert their claims to the territory. Following the events in 2005, however, China further asserted itself by announcing that it was creating an East China Sea reserve fleet, which Japan in the following months tracked twice within the disputed area.³² In September 2010, the dispute peaked again with the detention of a Chinese trawler captain, who had rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel near the disputed islands. The incident triggered anti-Japanese demonstrations in several Chinese cities, and China cancelled a visit by a popular Japanese band and one thousand Japanese students, who were to visit the World Expo in Shanghai. The negotiations scheduled for September 2010 have been suspended indefinitely awaiting the diplomatic fallout.³³

Japan relies on energy imports for approximately 80% of its energy needs and has virtually no oil or gas resources of its own. China relies on imports for approximately 50% of its oil consumption and aims to increase its reliance on natural gas. The Chinese gas production today, however, barely breaks even with its consumption. Access to oil and gas resources within the disputed area alone would significantly reduce China's dependency on oil imports, and enable it to produce more gas than it consumes for decades ahead.³⁴ But the undersea resources cannot be exploited until a permanent settlement has been achieved. China's claims to the islands are frail and China cannot use its position to coerce a settlement in its own favour. The power balance and economic interdependencies likewise deter China from backing up its claims with military or economic means. On Japan's initiative, the two countries had in 2006 reached an agreement, in principle, of joint investments and exploration of the gas resources, but neither has been willing to propose a new demarcation of the border and little progress has been achieved since then.³⁵ While such a cooperative strategy could produce a win-win outcome, and thus strengthen both China's relative capabilities and position, it would require compromising over claims that China has now been asserting for more than forty years.

Since 1990, there have been 25 incidents where Chinese threats and provocations in the dispute can be linked to other issues that China has used to compel Japan to change its behaviour or policy.³⁶ These issues are for example, when Japan announced a reduction of its aid to China, during Japan-US talks on their security alliance, when Japan bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, and on several occasions where China has demanded concessions for Japan's atrocities in the 1937-45 Sino-Japanese War.³⁷ This suggests that China is benefitting from the enduring dispute as a means of compelling Japan instead of pursuing a win-win solution. It does, however, only offer a part explana-

³² Ibid.

³³ BBC News, "Q&A: China-Japan islands row". 24 Sept 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139>

³⁴ EIA, "Analysis Brief: China". US Energy Information Administration – Country Briefs, Nov 2010, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH>

³⁵ IHS Jane's, 'Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: China And Northeast Asia – Security', 11 February 2011, <www.janes.com> [Accessed 1 April 2011].

³⁶ Krista E. Wiegand, 'China's Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Issue Linkage and Coercive Diplomacy', *Asian Security*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2009), pp. 170-193.

³⁷ Ibid.

tion. China's gains from this dispute do not necessarily outweigh the benefits China could otherwise have gained from a settlement – in both international prestige and energy security.

It is instead the Chinese regime itself that appears to be gaining something from maintaining the status quo in the dispute. The dispute frequently stirs the popular anti-Japanese sentiment and aversion to Western encroachment and this bolsters the regime's nationalist agenda by providing it with opportunities to demonstrate its capability to resist Japan. However, if the regime does not respond appropriately to the popular nationalist demands, it will undermine its authority and it is therefore constrained by nationalism to remain on a confrontational course with Japan over historical issues. In the international system, it has therefore become a strategy of impeding Japan's access to resources by keeping the status quo and attempting to undercut its prestige by continuously drawing in Japan's history.

Conclusion

China is a growing power in global and regional affairs and since the mid-1990s it has promoted peaceful coexistence while developing its capabilities and strengthening its position. In its security strategies it seeks to balance against the US alliance system by promoting multi-polarity and strengthening its relative power capabilities while safeguarding its vulnerabilities, such as its dependency on energy imports. But China's internal political stability is challenged by an increasing wealth gap between rich and poor, corruption in the state administration, separatist movements, ethnic violence, and demands for liberalisation of the authoritative regime. The regime itself is therefore under pressure and the Chinese Communist Party retains its power through tight state control while drawing its legitimacy from economic growth and nationalist values. Nationalism is used as a political instrument to unite a diverse nation around a Chinese identity and to protect China's cultural integrity from internal and external threats. The nationalism revolves around the Party as the guardian of China, which will restore its former greatness and protect it from barbarians and Western encroachment.

The political nationalism increasingly interacts with the popular nationalism. There are regularly widespread demonstrations organised by nationalist movements, which either demand that the threat from separatists is controlled or protest against Western or Japanese influence. To the popular nationalists, nationalism therefore becomes a political agenda that they expect their regime to fulfil.

When strategic choices become nationalist issues in the public, the nationalist agenda that strengthens the regime's authority takes priority. This is seen in the dispute with Japan over the Daiouyu/Senkaku Islands, where compromises or cooperation with Japan result in strong nationalist demonstrations at home. It appears that keeping the dispute going strengthens the regime's authority at home and therefore a status quo in the dispute is preferred to a strategy of cooperation with Japan, which could have expanded its energy resources and improved bilateral relations.

The ways and means in the regime's security strategies also appear to be restrained by nationalism. In the Chinese tradition there is a constant threat from barbarians and separatism and a need to counter these resolutely such as in Xinjiang. Heavy-handed methods may also be in accord with the public sentiment and strengthen the regime's authority, and thereby the concerns for the regime's security take priority when choosing ways and means.

Even though China is pursuing strategies that can strengthen its capabilities and position, it is regime security that appears to take priority in the final choices. Both internation-

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ally and domestically, the regime seeks to exploit the opportunities that arise for strengthening its authority and legitimacy in the Chinese population, and this is done within a framework guided by nationalism. For the regime, however, the nationalist agenda is a double-edged sword that can constrain it to strategic choices that serve nationalist ends. Furthermore, nationalism and its narrative of Western encroachment, the threat from barbarians and China's sufferings during the Japanese occupation compel the regime to apply ways and means in their strategies, which can demonstrate their capability to safeguard China's sovereignty and cultural integrity.

NATO's Strategy for Afghanistan, 2003-11

Mark F. Laity¹

When looking at NATO's situation in Afghanistan it is safe to assume that when the Alliance first got involved no-one expected to be where we are now. Analysing why this happened was the basis of the lecture I gave to the Royal Danish Defence College and on which this article is based. All NATO's missions are unique, but also contain wider enduring lessons. At heart, Afghanistan highlights the need for realism, whether in analysing the mission, the nature of modern command and control, the limitations of working with civilian counterparts, and providing the necessary resources.

I do not argue or believe our presence or strategy is wrong, but we should not be blind to the fact that what has happened is not what was planned. Accepting this clears the way to coolly assessing how we got here, and what could have been done differently.

My personal involvement in ISAF² (the International Security Assistance Force) made me a witness to the evolution of much of the key strategy, and then its implementation. No-one should be surprised to discover that, in the military phrase, 'no plan survives first contact with the enemy', but in retrospect the gap between how things got done in practice and how they are meant to happen in theory may still startle many.

This was not necessarily all bad, as reality is a good if unforgiving taskmaster, and sticking to the original plan in the face of a changed situation is foolish. However, throughout our engagement there have been persistent questions about resources, organisation, clarity of purpose and maintenance of aim. The McChrystal review of 2009 argued that much of what we had done before was badly flawed. How had this happened?

Many problems can be traced back to the original terms of NATO's intervention. ISAF's troop contributing nations have fallen by increments from a semi-benign Peace Support Operation (PSO) into a full-blown counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign. COIN is not what they signed up for, expected or wanted, and at most stages there has therefore been an unwillingness to recognise a changing and deteriorating situation. This reluctance delayed making appropriately strong responses, especially as they pointed towards tough and unpopular decisions. This in turn increased the likelihood of our eventual actions being too little, too late. The result was that for much of the time, especially from the summer of 2006 we have been chasing events rather than anticipating them. We lost the initiative early. The 2009 McChrystal strategic review, with its resultant surge in numbers of troops, was intended to regain that initiative.

In the beginning; planning for peacekeeping

It is a truism to say NATO is in Afghanistan because of 9-11, but NATO's involvement was not immediate or as part of the US-led military action that defeated the Taliban. It entered much later to lead ISAF, a limited United Nations mission which started in early 2002, with

¹ The author is writing in a personal capacity and his remarks do not have an official status and should not be taken as reflecting the views of NATO.

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a restricted non-aggressive UN mandate. It was far closer to peacekeeping than the counter-terrorism being conducted by the US and its allies elsewhere in Afghanistan.

This matters because much of the support for ISAF from many NATO members was precisely because it was a Peace Support Operation (PSO) and not a fighting mission. It was limited to securing the capital, Kabul, so providing a stable base for the new democratic government to establish its authority over the rest of Afghanistan. It was August 2003 before ISAF became NATO-led, and until then it was nationally led, and successively commanded by British, Turkish and German/Dutch headquarters.

NATO's takeover was driven by two inter-related factors: the evolution of NATO's post-Cold War role, and the more basic fact that ISAF ran out of nations willing to lead it.

The wider debate about NATO's future was partly resolved by the successful 2002 summit in Prague. There alliance leaders accepted that in order for NATO's role as their pre-eminent security guarantor to continue it needed to be able to operate beyond its borders. Throughout 2002 there had been intense debate over where NATO should operate. The Cold War, with Warsaw Pact armies on NATO's borders, had made the security threat clear and the appropriate response, physically defending your borders, was obvious and easy to agree. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated a debate about what security threats existed, where they were, and how to respond. Conceptually many nations struggled at two levels, firstly with the idea that fundamental threats existed far beyond their borders, and secondly if there was such a threat, whether NATO, formed to fight the Warsaw Pact, was the right organization to deal with it.

Throughout that debate, the shadow of Afghanistan and 9/11 loomed. Firstly because it was the strongest evidence that countries beyond NATO's borders posed very real security threats. Secondly it also signaled that once the intellectual case for out-of-area operations was accepted then the theory could soon be put into practice with an Afghan deployment.

It has sometimes been argued that the Alliance never thought through its engagement in ISAF, but at the highest strategic level it was born out of considered debate about NATO's purpose and the nature of modern security. The conclusion was that major threats could come from anywhere and not just next door, so we needed a NATO capable of going to the problem before it came to us. Having agreed on an out-of-area philosophy the question is, when it came to Afghanistan, whether that philosophy was backed by a rigorous strategic assessment.

Throughout, enthusiasm for getting engaged in Afghanistan was mixed, and as previously noted for many nations it was only because ISAF was UN-mandated and limited in scope that they supported a NATO-led ISAF. The post-9/11 unity had been blown away by the rifts generated by the 2002 Iraq conflict, so association with the US-led coalition in Afghanistan was politically unpalatable for some.

NATO's entry was also driven by there being no national volunteers to follow the German-Netherlands Corps whose ISAF tour finished in August 2003. No nation felt able to maintain a 5,000-strong mission in Afghanistan, but it was argued that what nations could not do individually NATO could do collectively. It is hard to see what else could have been done. The world had backed international military intervention, supported the UN mandate for ISAF, and created the Afghan stabilization process. Without NATO the international security effort in Afghanistan would have collapsed.

A false sense of security

Even before NATO took over there were already questions about whether ISAF would expand beyond Kabul. It reflected uneasiness that however secure the Government was

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within Kabul its ability to make things happen beyond the capital region was limited, creating a vacuum in authority. Initially, NATO's position was clear; having embarked on its first out-of-area mission it was going to bed down thoroughly before considering going further.

However, the caution was soon overtaken, largely due to Germany. They had a presence in the North, where they ran so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are intended to provide a military presence that facilitates development and governance. For political reasons Germany wished to see its effort in the North fall under the ISAF flag and NATO's protection. Their pressure, supported by some nations who did want ISAF's role to expand, bore fruit, and within months the Germans came under ISAF. The first incremental growth had happened, but more due to politics than a considered enlargement plan.

Nations largely went along with this because it seemed limited and risk-free. Clearly, and with hindsight, NATO got that wrong. However, in 2003-5 nations had little reason to believe otherwise, and the whole enlargement strategy was designed to reflect that limited appetite for risk. It was agreed ISAF would only move into sectors of Afghanistan once the more robust CFC-A had pacified them. This created an anti-clockwise enlargement strategy, where having started in Kabul and then the North, ISAF would next take control in the West, then South and finally East.



The flaw was the assumption that the South was much less dangerous than the East and would soon be ready for handover. In fact the South was not getting better but worse and by the time the British, Canadians, Danes, Dutch and Romanians arrived it was nearly ready to blow. How did we get it so wrong?

I blame a simple if hugely damaging failure of intelligence. In the East, the heavy US presence on the ground made them all too aware of the dangers, but their presence out on the

ground (away from the massive Kandahar airbase) in the South was very light. During 2004 when the strategy was set, the consistent intelligence assessments were that problems in the South were due to violent crime and traditional rivalries, not a revival of the insurgency.

Some have argued NATO was too willing to believe what it wanted, but I saw no evidence of this. In a complex environment, we just got it wrong. It is of course a moot point as to what we would have done had we realised earlier just how dangerous the situation was in the South. Later on, with more detailed reconnaissance being carried out as the first ISAF troops neared deployment, worrying signs started emerging. By then it was too late.

Planning and resources

A regular criticism of NATO has been of continual changes of strategy and confusion of aim. In fact, over the years the desire of newly arrived military leaderships (at both tactical and operational level) and politicians to publicly make their mark, has disguised much strategic consistency, certainly at the highest level. Varying implementation rather than varying basic strategy has more often been the real issue.

This is highlighted in the original Operational Plan (Oplan). The fundamental aim was for ISAF to help Afghanistan to be a responsible member of the international community by providing security until the Afghan security forces reached the point where they could do it for themselves, with violence reduced to a level (not eliminated) that did not threaten sustainable governance.

This was sensible and modest, and far from the overly-ambitious nation-building some have accused ISAF of seeking. It is more accurate to note that some nations, buttressing limited home support, have talked more about other popular secondary aims such as women's rights. As the mission became ever-tougher, politicians later talked more about being more realistic, but NATO's military planners always were.

What we got wrong was not the planning but the resources. This became critical with the expansion into the South. The debate around what is needed to carry out the mission cannot, in the real world, be entirely detached from what we can get. What is needed and the art of the possible are difficult bedfellows. The so-called CJSOR (Combined Joint Statement of Requirements) process is complex, having to manage a mix of requirements, offers, national viewpoints and assessments. Looking back both what was asked for and what was offered was far too little; even to do the original mission. At best, we had the minimum to do what was needed if things went as well as they could.

Of course overshadowing the resources debate, for the United States especially, but also Britain, was the Iraq conflict and the huge level of forces it needed. As was later publicly acknowledged by US commanders Afghanistan was for some years a so-called 'economy of force' operation getting what was left over. As the McChrystal review highlighted that was not enough..

More than any failure of fundamental strategy, this shortage of resources right from the start is I argue the main reason we have been chasing the initiative rather than seizing it. If we had had twice the number of troops in 2006, would we have needed the vastly greater numbers currently deployed? One lesson of the NATO ground deployments in the Balkans was that very large initial numbers swamped the opposition and gave NATO a decisive initiative enabling a later rapid drawdown. In Afghanistan we have done the reverse, starting relatively small and building up. While ISAF's mission is far tougher and more complex than the Balkans, the principle of overwhelming the opposition at the start rather than growing with them holds true.

Into the south

Regional Commands (RC) Centre, North and West had many challenges, but ISAF's assumption of command in Regional Command South (taking over from the US-led CFC-A) in summer 2006 marked the real step change in ISAF. Prior to that the sense of ISAF as a fairly low risk Peace Support Operation held true. But as ISAF troops moved into RC South the degree to which it was different became ever more obvious. To some extent this was anticipated, and RC South forces were consequently much more robust. Even so they fell well short of what was needed and the assumptions upon which expansion was based steadily unraveled.

So, as the Canadians and British deployed, they were effectively moving into a security vacuum where the Taliban had quietly regrouped and were expanding their influence. ISAF's appearance challenged this process and the insurgents responded vigorously. Right from the start ISAF in the South was fighting an insurgency, but was set up for something less robust.

The resources shortfall was superficially hidden because the headline figure of troop numbers looked large, but the actual combat power was relatively small. Afghanistan's harsh environment meant the support element had to be large, making the so-called tooth-to-tail ratio very poor. So the numbers available to sustain a combat presence out on the ground was limited. Ultimately, the numbers to support the strategy were simply not there.

The theatre level strategy was overseen from ISAF HQ by Britain's Lt Gen David Richards. No ISAF Commander (ComISAF) has been a stronger exponent of integrating political and military actions – the so-called Comprehensive Approach. His successes and failures demonstrated early the limits of a strategy without adequate resources and the right support from the other players.

He based his strategy on the so-called 'inkspot' theory. Knowing you cannot be everywhere, he sought to focus his resources and efforts on key areas. These zones of stability, 'inkspots', would, he hoped, expand and merge. He therefore created 'Afghan Development Zones' (ADZs) within key terrain, notably the main roads and cities.

Concurrently, and recognising that administrative chaos and governance incapacity were inhibiting progress, he promoted the creation of the Policy Action Group (PAG). This was a kind of crisis cabinet, led by President Karzai, focused on the south and involving the key international and Afghan civilian and military players. The combination of ADZs and PAG was a coherent attempt to integrate all the components of a Comprehensive Approach. During Richards' time it made a difference, but was ultimately limited by inherent problems beyond ISAF's control.

The 'Comprehensive Approach' was at the heart of NATO's overall strategy. It recognised there could be no purely military solution and promoted an ideally civilian-led approach combining security, development and governance pillars. Its flaw was not just a truly daunting coordination challenge, but that success assumed the existence of a wide array of willing and capable actors seeing themselves as part of the team. The reality in Afghanistan has been different. On the international side some who should be key players have lacked capacity or enthusiasm to play a full role. A significant proportion of the civilian side also has principled and doctrinal reservations about working with the military, certainly to the degree wished. Within the Afghan government there have also been crippling capacity problems accentuated by political issues, such as corruption, and the ambivalence (and sometimes hostility) of some ministers towards ISAF.

In fact, the greatest believers in the Comprehensive Approach are the military themselves, who understand military power is necessary but not sufficient for success in an insurgency. However, the desire and capacity of the civilian side to get involved is limited,

and therefore the prospects of turning the theory of the Comprehensive Approach into practical reality are equally limited.

Richards' control over his own military was also constrained by the realities of national interests. In any multi-national military endeavour, central Command and Control (C2) command cannot be absolute – nations inevitably retain a close involvement in actions affecting their troops' lives, and it is the necessary price to access nations' militaries. However, this has consequences for effective C2 as the leading nation in each Regional Command retained a large degree of national autonomy.

In the south national autonomy issues went even lower, and the outcome for Richards was the lack of a truly cohesive strategy for RC South. Nations' inevitable focus on their own areas tended to produce provincially-oriented sub-strategies among the British in Helmand, the Canadians in Kandahar and the Dutch in Uruzgan. It meant that the Commander in RC South (which rotated amongst the British, Canadians and Dutch) was part negotiator, part commander, as in turn was ComISAF.

How this worked out in practice is illustrated by Operation Medusa in autumn 2006, which led to the defeat of Taliban forces threatening Kandahar city and Highway 1, the key arterial road running through the province. This was a critical time for ISAF. Kandahar city is the Centre of Gravity (CoG) for the insurgency in the south, and the Taliban, who doubted ISAF's military resolve and prowess, challenged for control around the city. Success for the Taliban would have given them a key military success, and a major psychological victory. It's hard to understate the importance of this battle.

The Taliban was in such a threatening position because the hard-fighting Canadians, who led the ISAF effort in Kandahar, lacked enough forces on the ground. For ComISAF, gathering sufficient combat power to respond to this threat to his CoG proved hugely challenging. He had to persuade the US to delay an offensive in RC East to allow the use of their airpower and get the loan of a US company, and then negotiate with the British and Danes in Helmand, and the Dutch in Uruzgan to borrow troops to help in Kandahar. Even then the balance of forces was touch and go.

As the battle dragged on much of ComISAF's time was spent negotiating to keep the borrowed forces for longer, sometimes successfully and sometimes not. Having reserves to put extra effort into key areas at key times is standard military practice, but throughout Richards' period of command RC South lacked any tactical reserve.

In the end it went well for ISAF with the Taliban suffering a strategic level reverse. However, ISAF's problems did not end there. In line with the Comprehensive Approach (and Counter-Insurgency (COIN) doctrine) ISAF wanted a sustained presence on the ground to secure areas it had wrested from Taliban control. However, it simply lacked the numbers to achieve this, and later had to launch another offensive as the insurgents re-infiltrated. This was a frequently repeated pattern in Kandahar and elsewhere.

Another dilemma was the practical implications of the inkspot strategy and ADZs. Focusing on key areas meant less presence elsewhere, and in practice ignoring some areas. However, the idea of abandonment was anathema to many, including President Karzai, who argued that allowing the insurgents to seize and control areas would undermine the government's authority and give his opponents a propaganda victory.

But holding territory everywhere undermined any attempt to build up critical mass in key terrain. For example, in Helmand the British ended up dispersed and fighting major battles in remote villages of arguable value. However, giving up territory to concentrate forces more usefully elsewhere in turn created major tensions within ISAF and the government, and were effectively exploited by the insurgent for strategic communication purposes. It was a dilemma created by resource shortfalls.

This was particularly the case with the loss of the town of Musa Qala in Northern Helmand in February 2007, just as General Richards was handing over to the incoming Com-ISAF, General Dan McNeill. The retaking of Musa Qala, with all its symbolic impact, obscured the achievements of Richards' period of command. Most of the strategic principles still being applied were in fact laid down by General Richards, but without the resources to apply them.

The US takeover

The arrival of General McNeill in February 2007 marked several major changes. The US significantly increased its forces, and also provided an increased budget for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and particularly police, training. This started closing one of the open flanks in NATO and the international community's strategy – building up a force to take over from ISAF. ISAF was only meant to hold the ring until the Afghan army and police could take over, but until 2007 neither the manpower nor budget existed to create an effective Afghan army and police force.

General McNeill's arrival also saw the US assuming overall ISAF control, an inevitable development given the scale of the US contribution. Until then, they had commanded the now defunct CFC-A, while other nations commanded ISAF, at times an awkward arrangement. McNeill's arrival ended one barrier to proper unity of effort. However, US command, with ISAF now being a permanent 4-star appointment, also added to questions about the operation of NATO and ISAF's structure and organisation, which challenges the traditional paradigm of tactical, operational, strategic and political-military levels of command.

Between Afghanistan and NATO's political authorities in Brussels there were now three 4-star generals of equal rank in a row. The first in ISAF reported to the next at Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCB) at the operational level, who in turn reported to the third at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at the strategic level, who reported to the political authorities at NATO HQ, where there was a further 4 star in the shape of the Chairman of the Military Committee. Theoretically 4 star officers are subordinate to each other according to the seniority of the HQ they command, but in practice the human dynamics make this rather more complicated. The value added of the higher levels of command, especially JFCB, has been much discussed.

Especially within ISAF (but also elsewhere) there was open doubt about the value of so many layers of command. This also reflected the fact that ISAF was effectively straddling all levels of command, whether dealing with President Karzai or the consequences of tactical airstrikes that had strategic impact if they killed civilians. Planned changes in NATO's future command structure in part reflect the awareness that the practical gap between tactical action on the ground and political impact at grand strategic level has been compressed and needs addressing through structural change.

McNeill's style was also reflective of a particularly US approach. US ISAF commanders have respected the fundamental strategy agreed by NATO, but within that framework all exercised considerable personal control over its interpretation and implementation. The level of influence of Brussels was greater on European commanders than on Americans, who looked far more to the Department of Defense and the White House. One illustrative detail is that most Americans stuck almost exclusively to their US-only computer systems rather than the NATO-wide systems.

In McNeill's case, he was a sceptic about the ADZs and the PAG, the core of the Richards' strategy, and moved away from that approach. Whereas Richards had been happy to engage at the political-military level, McNeill saw himself as an operator who wanted to keep out of politics. McNeill and Richards were polar opposites in temperament and ap-

proach and McNeill's arrival saw a distinct break rather than continuity. Neither would he have been regarded as conducting COIN of the kind espoused in the new US COIN doctrine released two months before he took up his post. In essence, he was seen by his staff as focused on finding, engaging and defeating insurgents, thereby creating the space for others to exploit.

McNeill's successor in June 2008 was US Army General Dave McKiernan. It was on his watch that the advance of the insurgency became clear, leading to the sense of crisis that led to the later surge and strategy review under McChrystal. McKiernan lost his job in June 2009, although it would be wrong to lay overmuch blame for the insurgent advances at his door because they had been building long before his arrival. Indeed, he saw the looming crisis and made many of the same recommendations later put into effect by McChrystal. He also enforced an increasing focus on COIN as recommended by the new US COIN doctrine, but the tide was flowing against ISAF strongly by then.

In terms of command style, McKiernan was a typical US 4 star. He brought a hand-picked US team of close aides. Usually formed into an advisory team, these aides acted in some respects as a mini-HQ within the HQ. In terms of strategic thinking these personal staffs had a key role, and McKiernan, McChrystal and his successor, General David Petraeus all used this kind of grouping as personal think tanks. In analysing how ISAF's strategy has been applied and interpreted, the effect of this aspect of US 4 star style should not be overlooked. Many non-US personnel staffing the conventional staff divisions (eg J3, J5) have often felt bypassed to some degree.

Crises and response

General McChrystal's appointment and the launching of an urgent strategic review was an explicit recognition that the ISAF mission was close to crisis. However it is arguable what in fundamental policy terms was really new in the review. Whether it was reintegration, strategic communication, or improved police training, these were all existing policies or recommendations from previous commanders. This is not to say nothing changed. Most importantly there was the major increase in numbers, mainly US (freed up by reductions in Iraq), but also large numbers from other NATO countries. Without that comprehensive review to assess and justify the need they would not have been approved by the nations. The review also fused some disparate elements into a far more coherent whole. Almost as important as the numbers was the more focused and determined mood amongst ISAF nations that went with it. So, apart from the provision of the necessary numbers, there was a widespread recognition of the scale of the problem, signalling a change in mindset.

This demonstrates it is not just the content of a strategy that matters, but the appearance and manner of its implementation. With increasing war-weariness, the appearance of freshness in the strategy was as important as the reality that it was not radically different. General McChrystal's appointment sent a clear signal of renewed resolve, and that perception of a new start was vital to move forward.

The McChrystal review was another example of the apparent inversion of the traditional chain of command. It covered the strategic, operational and tactical levels, but was led by the theatre commander, with the supposedly more senior headquarters at JFCB, SHAPE and NATO HQ mainly in support.

McChrystal's dominant role remained for the year that he was in charge. In command terms it is arguable how much ISAF felt it needed higher HQ. The dominance of the theatre level in all aspects of the Afghan mission was further accentuated by the arrival of General David Petraeus.

CONCLUSIONS

Generals Petraeus and McChrystal were, since the move south, the first ComISAFs to have resources aligned to the strategy. Unfortunately, as our numbers have risen, the insurgent has grown with us, so a level of force that would have been overwhelming in 2006 is now merely adequate.

Given the faulty assessments about the true situation in the south then it is easy to say lessons need to be learned on intelligence, but I would highlight a more subtle point about the problems of assessments when you move into very different environments. NATO made significant mistakes when first engaging in the Balkans, but the fact that those missions were relatively easier than ISAF meant we did not pay a heavy price for our failings. Understanding new environments, especially when they are culturally so different, requires a very different mindset and approach.

Ultimately more damaging than the initially faulty assessment was the slowness with which nations as a whole accepted and adapted to a very different situation. Nations wanted it to be a Peace Support Operation but from mid-2006 we were fighting an insurgency, but many did not want to acknowledge this. Even years later, a few nations would object to the word 'insurgency' being put into planning documents.

There may also still be illusions about the Comprehensive Approach. The civilian-led combining of security, governance and development is treated with something approaching reverence by many, but it has severely disappointed on the ground, largely through a combination of incapacity and unwillingness on the part of civilian actors. The fact that military power is necessary but not sufficient remains true, but governments need to look afresh at the Comprehensive Approach and how they can ensure that the institutions and agencies they largely fund cooperate appropriately.

For the military ISAF has not always been well served by our structures and headquarters. The dedication is impressive, but at every level there is a constant drumbeat of complaint about too many layers in an over-complex system. Ironically this has been worsened by the number of improvised, informal links brought in to try and make the formal system work. NATO's new command structure may help, but a relentless focus on simplifying processes and structures is needed. The dominance of the theatre commander on overall strategy as well as implementation also raises questions. Arguably it is actually appropriate to the circumstances, but then raises issues about the role of higher headquarters which are formally senior, but in practice less influential, and how they should adapt.

One flaw has been addressed – training the Afghan security forces (ANSF). The slow early progress in this area is surprising given its centrality to the strategy. Right from the start NATO/ISAF's core mission was to manage security until locally grown forces could take over. So the sooner the ANSF can be built up the sooner we are done, but as noted earlier this was not properly underway until 2007. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) is now a success story, and with over three years before we fully hand over security responsibility to the ANSF we still have time.

But the abiding lesson remains the need for absolute realism. At the beginning of the mission we found it hard to accept what we needed in terms of resources and commitment, maybe fooled ourselves, and paid the price. So, now armed with more resources and clear strategy, as we approach the end we must be ruthlessly objective about what is necessary to finish the job.

Governance in Southern Afghanistan – Managerial and Strategic Challenges

Ole Kværnø, Chief Governance, Regional Command South & South West October 2009 to November 2010.¹

In the current debate over a comprehensive civil-military approach to the population-centric counter-insurgency strategy conducted by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan one key argument stands out: At the operational level sub-national 'governance' is the centre of gravity of the campaign. Only the presence of sufficiently legitimate government structures at the sub-national level in the districts of Afghanistan that are able to deliver a minimum of political and social services can lead the population to prefer the authority of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) to insurgent alternatives. Accepting this argument should further lead us to accept and adopt a doctrine of what could be called 'Governance Led Operations' rather than continuing to conduct 'Security Led Operations', which is currently the case. Understanding what this is and what it entails is of pivotal importance not only to conducting the campaign in Afghanistan. It is also important to understanding the link between the strategy syllabus and operational level military theory at any staff college. It is required to understand how a comprehensive civil-military approach can be implemented into integrated civil-military planning at the operational level if we are to succeed in moving the 'comprehensive approach' from a predominantly rhetorical notion backed up by insufficient resources and political will to a joint civil-military planning tool as a standard 'modus operandi'.²

From 1951 the United States of America funded and carried out a vast nation-building project in Southern Afghanistan. The most notable symbol of the achievements in this project that aimed to transform the Helmand River valley into a modern, western type society was the construction of the capital town of Helmand. The town that came up within ten years from scratch as a model town had paved streets lined with trees, white-stucco homes behind the tree line, a high school, a community pool open to children of both sexes and plans for a university. The Americans called the town Lashkar Gah – the Afghans called it 'Little America'.³

The project was a success in terms of physical delivery of infrastructure such as schools, plumbing, sewage, roads, court houses, even cutting out a large chunk of desert for farm land irrigated by canals in Nawa, Marjah and Nad e Ali. It was, however, a disaster as a sustainable development project. All construction work was carried out by American companies and American engineers, which meant that when they left from the late sixties onwards they took with them all construction and maintenance capacity. It was so obviously a result of a faulty focus. Focus was not on building local Afghan capacity and local

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² Robert Dorff, "Understanding and Teaching Strategy at the US Army War College", *Militært Tidsskrift*, no. 4, 2011.

³ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "In Afghanistan, the rise and fall of Little America", *The Washington Post*, 5 August 2011.

ownership of the project, but rather on producing visible outputs of the project that could immediately be accredited to the programme managers. The philosophy was that once people saw the outputs that the infrastructure of modern society could deliver, they would cherish it and would feel encouraged to maintain and further develop it.

Almost sixty years later, in March 2010 the District Delivery Program was conceived by the US Embassy in Kabul and advisers to the Afghan Government's Independent Directorate for Local Governance. The aim with the program is to ensure basic service delivery in up to 80 local districts throughout Afghanistan so as to serve as a stabilising instrument that would create long term sustainable development effects such as self-sustained social and political authorities producing social and political deliveries demanded by the local populace. The problem, however, remains exactly the same as sixty years ago: Focus is on producing military security effects to allow governance outputs to be delivered, such as notional governmental authority and apparent rule of law structures without considering sustainability and local ownership through genuine local capacity building. The argument of the article is that we will not be able to succeed in a population-centric counter-insurgency campaign unless we develop our ability to implement the notion of 'comprehensive approach' through integrated civil-military planning at the operational level on the basis of the common agreement that the centre of gravity of the campaign is sub-national governance.

From light military footprint to heavy civil-military integration

When unilateral US Operation Enduring Freedom was commenced in 2001, the strategy was based on a light military footprint and was entirely enemy centric with Al Qaeda and Taleban as the focal point of all operations. When the UN Security Council Resolution 1386⁴ established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under British lead, the scope of the overall campaign was still limited and focused on security. However, the take-over introduced a shift in focus from a strictly military campaign towards an integrated state- and nation-building campaign. The mandate's slide away from a strictly military campaign towards an integrated state- and nation building campaign was accelerated with NATO's take-over of ISAF in 2003⁵ and the expansion of the mandate beyond Kabul. In December 2003, the North Atlantic Council authorised the Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones, to initiate the expansion of ISAF by taking over command of the German-led PRT in Kunduz. The other eight PRTs operating in Afghanistan in 2003 remained under the command of Operation Enduring Freedom, the continuing US-led military operation in Afghanistan. On 31 December 2003, the military component of the Kunduz PRT was placed under ISAF command as a pilot project and a first step in the expansion of the mission. Six months later, at the Summit meeting of the NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul, NATO announced that it would establish four other provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in the north of the country: in Mazar-i-Sharif, Meymana, Feyzabad and Baghlan. From 2005 until end of 2006, NATO further expanded the campaign to include ISAF-led PRTs throughout the country with a gradual counter-clockwise extension beginning in the West of Afghanistan to include the South and the East by the end of 2006. Simultaneously, with this geographic expansion of the campaign, a functional expansion also took place as the two 'civilian' lines of operation, governance and development, were introduced into the integrated civil-military planning efforts. It was, however, not until early 2009 that this development was completed with the change of strategic

⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1386, 20 December 2001.

⁵ UNSC Resolution 1510, 13 October 2003.

focus in the counter-insurgency campaign. Until 2008, when General David D. McKiernan took command, the campaign was still focused on clearing the physical terrain from the enemy, the insurgents. General McKiernan commenced a process of a strategic shift of focus towards a population-centric campaign which was completed when General Stanley A. McChrystal took command over ISAF. This shift changed the strategic priorities to the effect that the two civilian lines of operation took priority over the security line of operation. When General McChrystal established his operational command, ISAF Joint Command, in August 2009 he ended a long and gradual strategic shift from a light military-only footprint in 2001 to a full-fledged integrated civil-military state- and nation building campaign that sees governance and development as the centre-pieces of the strategy.

Sub-National Governance: The Centre of Gravity for Transition

The international community may have had no difficulties supporting the reconstruction of national governance structures in Kabul. However, it found it equally difficult to support the establishment of such governance structures at the sub-national level and even more difficult to support and oversee the establishment of good governance processes both at national and sub-national level. Lack of good governance and most notably the inherent corruption at all levels is probably the biggest problem in the remaking of a legitimate Afghan governmental authority that offers political and social services demanded by the people. The services of uncorrupted justice structures to provide policing and dispute settlement down to district level would undoubtedly be between the services that would be in highest demand if they were provided⁶. But also provision of basic political services such as inclusion in policy-making would be in very high demand. And such provision would inherently carry with it legitimisation of government and state by the people, which is the centre of gravity in any nation-building effort.

In July 2010 at the Kabul 'Inteqal' Conference, the international community committed to the Joint Framework for Inteqal⁷. The framework describes the conditions along the main strand of operation ('Lines of Operation or LOOs') - security, governance and development that should be achieved with support from the international community to complete the process of transition. It is indeed stated in the framework that the whole process must be based on conditions rather than on timelines. However, the deadline for the transition of security has been set to the end of 2014. One consequence of publishing a deadline is that international support is currently focused on supporting the Afghan government in building Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) structures sufficiently large and capable to allow transition of the responsibility to provide basic physical security at the sub-national level by 2014. Whereas this might be inescapable it is definitely also unhelpful because it has diverted the attention of the international community away from good governance as the necessary condition for establishing and maintaining legitimacy of government. Inability to establish legitimate government structures and a minimum of good governance would deteriorate both the legitimacy and the ability by the ANSF to maintain security over time. In other words, an improved security situation that allows transition of security is only sustainable if it is supported by progress in governance. To accomplish this, priority must be given to sub-national governance, and change in the role of the international community's primary instrument for supporting the Afghan government in governance efforts, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), must be brought about. The PRTs should be

⁶ Asia Foundation, "A Survey of the Afghan People", 2010, pp. 7-19.

⁷ Dari for 'transition', "Government of Afghanistan and North Atlantic Council Joint Framework for Inteqal", 20 July 2010.

based on a mainstream civilian development model, supporting autonomous provincial and district governance, replacing capacity substitution and direct delivery by the PRTs with genuine capacity building and partnered delivery. Accomplishing this change would greatly improve ISAF's and GIRoA's chances of establishing legitimate and sustainable government structures. However, such change has only been rudimentary so far and has only appeared in very few regional commands, with Regional Command South West (RC SW) as a potential exception. The PRT in Helmand is unique in the sense that it has civilian leadership and in the sense that it has already changed its approach from direct delivery of output to capacity-building and technical assistance. In this sense, the Helmand PRT could be used as best practice by other regional commands and PRTs. Unfortunately, the Helmand PRT is illustrative of another problem alluded to above – the lack of integration between the three lines of operation: security, governance and development. RC SW has only one PRT, the one in Helmand, which at least in theory should make it easy to ensure such integration. This is evidently not the case. Indeed, almost the opposite appears to have happened. On the one hand, there is a clear division of responsibility at the regional level between the military command in RC SW assuming lead responsibility for security and transition of security to ANSF. On the other hand, the civilian-led PRT is responsible for development and governance. The physical separation between the civilian PRT and the military headquarters further complicates the situation. In combination, the physical separation and the division of labour have made it virtually impossible to align the military and civilian efforts. Such alignment has only been established at the tactical level in the British Task Force Helmand's area of responsibility. Alignment, or indeed integration of planning, has not taken place between the civilian efforts of the PRT and the vast majority of the forces in Helmand, which is currently made up by II Marine Corps Expeditionary Force. Alignment is entirely necessary to avoid that security is transitioned without being embedded in a fundamental basis of good governance. This minimum must include Afghan governance structures at provincial, district and municipal level capable of incorrupt delivery of the basic functions and services of state. A critical mass of the population must prefer these structures to non-government alternatives such as the Taleban. If popular support for viable governance structures is not achieved before the process of transition of security in all provinces is completed, transition is unlikely to be sustainable.

Strategic Alignment of Programmes and Plans

The argument above that sub-national governance constitutes the centre of gravity for the strategic end-state of the campaign implies that another alignment must be facilitated: an alignment between the different programmes and plans. A plethora of different Afghan and international plans and programmes exist that are at best non-aligned and at worst counterproductive. Ideally, these would be reduced to a minimum to ensure that a few key plans and programmes contribute to one general plan for a province that defines how the Afghan government and the international community address this particular province. This development is illusory at the national level because of the complexity of government and bureaucracy at this level. However, at the provincial level it is possible to at least identify one coherent strategic plan consistent with plans at the grand strategy level such as the Afghan National Development Strategy⁸. Currently, this structure is not in place. The most prominent current example of the problems that the lack of alignment creates is the efforts spent planning the implementation of the District Delivery Programme under the

⁸ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan National Development Strategy, "A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction 1387-1391 (2008-2013)", Kabul, 2008.

Independent Directorate of Local Governance.⁹ This programme is the major sub-national capacity-building programme which aims to achieve a visible local government presence in all districts. The programme entails the establishment of a functioning government system which provides basic services and builds the foundations for a sustainable infrastructure. By now, 18 months after the beginning of the programme, almost all effort and money in Southern Afghanistan have been spent on identifying and filling positions and paying salaries to key administrative personnel in local bureaucracies. Virtually no basic service delivery has yet emerged in Southern Afghanistan as a result of the District Delivery Programme, which is by far the heaviest and most expensive sub-national governance programme. This is problematic in itself, but even if the District Delivery Programme eventually starts to produce results, the problem remains that the programme is detached from and non-aligned with the transition programme¹⁰. The District Delivery Programme is based only on districts and is not linked to a provincial transition approach. Such links are critical to develop and identify other conditions for provincial transition than security conditions, such as the presence of functional and incorrupt structures of justice, education and government. This is but one example among hundreds of plans and programmes that need to be aligned (or scrapped) to allow a focused effort to take priority and ensure that a successful transition process has taken place by 2014.

Conclusion

The strategic end-state of the military campaign in Afghanistan, transition of security responsibility to ANSF at the sub-national level throughout the country, can obviously succeed through capacity building of large and capable ANSF structures. However, such transition will not be sustainable unless it is accompanied by integration into the campaign of the two civilian ‘lines of operation’, ‘governance’ and ‘development’. The need for such integration is based on the argument that a relationship of mutual dependence exists between physical security and social security. Transition of security may hence be accomplishable but will then fail to be sustainable over time if GIRoA is not assisted in bringing about a minimal level of physical presence of government at the sub-national level. Furthermore, sub-national government must be capable of delivering a minimum of social and political services demanded by the populace. This must be accompanied by a minimal level of ‘good governance’ to ensure sufficient feedback mechanisms to be used by the populace to make demands on and accept the authority of GIRoA rather than the insurgent alternatives. If we are to establish such social and political structures, we must accept that kinetic operations, i.e. the application of physical violence, are convincingly carried out as support operations assisting a greater good. In other words, kinetic operations must support the provision of governance and development. GIRoA and ISAF are able to facilitating such a development by adopting and accepting a tactical doctrine of ‘Governance-Led Operations’ rather than the current tactical doctrine ‘Security-Led Operations’.

The ability to work towards the strategic end-state of comprehensive transition would be greatly enhanced if GIRoA, ISAF and the rest of the international community involved in state- and nation building in Afghanistan would accept reducing the plethora of different and often contradictory plans and programmes to a minimum and seek to align at least the major ISAF and government plans and programmes towards transition. In the end, this may involve abolishing useless national signatory programmes, such as the District Delivery Programme. The potential embarrassment of having to admit past failures is far more acceptable than failing to succeed with the transition process.

⁹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “IDLG, District Delivery Programme”, March 2010.

¹⁰ Government of Afghanistan and North Atlantic Council, “Joint Framework for Inteqal”, Kabul, 20 July 2010.

Cyberstrategi i Danmark¹

Carsten Fugleholm,² major, Forsvarsstaben.

Hvorfor er det interessant at beskæftige sig med cyberstrategi i Danmark, når der ikke for nærværende eksisterer en dansk strategi for området?

Der er mange grunde til, at det er vigtigt at undersøge, om Danmark har brug for en sådan strategi, og i hvilket omfang der allerede eksisterer en strategi, selvom den ikke italesættes som sådan. Området er nyt og repræsenterer en del af dansk sikkerhedspolitik, der får stadigt større bevågenhed og relevans i flere fora. Inden for det sidste år er det blandt andet blevet fremhævet som et fokusområde ved NATO-topmødet i Lissabon og i det efterfølgende nye koncept for NATO.³ Et fokus, der blandt andet tager sit afsæt i de angreb i cyberspace, som Estland, Georgien og senest Frankrig har været udsat for.⁴ Cyberdefence foregår i et globalt domæne, cyberspace, uden de normale fysiske begrænsninger og regler bestemt af tid, rum og territorialgrænser.⁵ Danmark agerer som statslig aktør med afsæt i Danmarks fysiske placering og afgrænsning. På samme måde agerer internationale organisationer som NATO og EU ud fra internationalt anerkendte grænser. Cyberspace åbner nye muligheder ved at bryde med disse fysiske grænser. Derved udfordrer cyberspace begreber som det euro-atlantiske område og suveræne stater. Derved er udvikling af en dansk cyberstrategi ikke kun interessant, fordi den er i sin vorden, men også fordi den har en karakter, der kan udfordre vores traditionelle opfattelse af begreber som krig mellem stater, afskrækkelsespolitik og definitionen af angreb i militær forstand.

Cyberstrategi udfordrer ved sin karakter ansvarsfordelingen i forhold til forsvaret af Danmark, der tillægges nye dimensioner i relation til cyberspace. Er det et anliggende for Forsvarsministeriet, eller er det nødvendigt med en bredere ansvarsfordeling, som igen kan afføde behov for koordineret planlægning? Hvornår er et cyber-angreb et angreb af en fremmed magt på dansk territorium og dermed et anliggende for forsvaret og Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste (FE), og hvornår er det en kriminel handling, som er et anliggende for politiet og Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET)? Er vitale danske interesser truet?

Der er i dansk politik ikke tradition for at italesætte strategier for sikkerhedspolitikken. Det kommer tydeligst til udtryk ved fraværet af en national sikkerhedsstrategi.⁶ Sammenholdt med teorier om strategiformulering og strategisk planlægning synes det derfor sand-

¹ Grundlaget for artiklen er forfatterens speciale, skrevet på Stabskursus 2010-11.

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³ NATO New Concept, *Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, NATO Headquarters, 2010, s. 5.

⁴ Et angreb, der skete i december 2010, og dermed efter topmødet i Lissabon.

⁵ Peter Gottlieb, *Cybersecurity: A Primer*, American Intelligence Journal, National Military Intelligence Association, Arizona, USA, 2010, s. 18.

⁶ Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch, *Kompas og kontrakt. For en dansk sikkerhedsstrategi*, Dansk Institut for Militære Studier, København, 2008, s. 6.

synligt,⁷ at den samlede indsats risikerer både at efterlade huller og duplikere indsatsområder, eftersom arbejdet ikke foregår med et fælles, politisk defineret udgangspunkt – eller rettes mod en fælles vision.

At en stat inden for et bestemt område ikke eksplicit italesætter og/eller rammesætter tiltag som en eksplicit strategi behøver imidlertid ikke at betyde, at der ikke i praksis udarbejdes en strategi. Essensen af en strategi kan ses som en proces, der oversætter politiske visioner til opnåelige mål ved at anvende de midler, der er til rådighed på en brugbar måde.⁸ Således er der en række tiltag på vej i Forsvarsministeriet og Forsvarskommandoen (FKO),⁹ og der eksisterer allerede en række tiltag i Ministeriet for Videnskab, Teknologi og Udvikling (Videnskabsministeriet), der samlet kan betragtes som en strategi, uden at initiativerne er italesat som en sammenhængende strategi.

På trods af at cyberstrategi har fået øget bevågenhed, kan det diskuteres, om emnet fremstår som vitalt for danske interesser. Der kan argumenteres for, at de vitale danske interesser fastsættes på politisk niveau, herunder af regeringen og Folketinget, og at det politiske niveau agerer ud fra befolkningens opfattelse af, hvad der opfattes som vitalt. Cybertrusler mod Danmark kan i befolkningens øjne være ret diffust og dermed vanskeligt at tage alvorligt som sikkerhedspolitisk centralt. Det kan derfor være en udfordring dels at finde den fornødne legitimitet i befolkningen og dels at oparbejde den fornødne motivation hos underlagte myndigheder, der i praksis skal indfri de politisk fastsatte mål på området.

Hvis cybertrusler ikke opfattes som centrale i befolkningen, og cyberdefence dermed ikke opfattes som en vital dansk interesse, kan det få den selvforstærkende effekt, at der ofres mindre politisk fokus på emnet. Det kan bl.a. betyde, at tiltag som dem, der blev besluttet på NATO-topmødet i Lissabon, i højere grad iværksættes af embedsværket end af politikerne. Det kan igen medføre svigtende legitimitet af de iværksatte tiltag og udfordre de implementeringsstrukturer, der skal omsætte tiltagene til konkrete handlinger.

Derfor er det relevant at undersøge hvilke kapaciteter og implementeringsstrukturer de øvre statslige myndigheder benytter sig af i arbejdet med cyberstrategi, samt med hvilken legitimitet det foregår. Formålet med analysen er at pege på, hvilke huller eller overlappende indsatsområder der kan være i strategiudviklingen. På grund af den transnationale karakter af cyberdefence er det nødvendigt at undersøge såvel nationale som internationale forhold.

Da emnerne cyber og cyberdefence er relativt nye, kan der være en tendens til, at begreberne på området bruges i flæng og uden øje for, hvor der er overlap eller modstridende anvendelser. I denne artikel defineres begreberne som følger: *Cyberspace* anvendes i betydningen det elektroniske medium af computernetværk, hvori online kommunikation foregår, hvilket er en amerikansk ordbogsdefinition.¹⁰ Begrebet Computer Network Operationer (CNO) anvendes omkring de egentlige militære kapaciteter til gennemførelse af defensive, informationsindhentende/informationsudnyttende og offensive militære operationer i cyberspace.¹¹ *Cyberdefence* som begreb anvendes i betydningen sikkerhedsap-

⁷ Liselotte Odgaard og Villiam Krüger-Klausen (O&K), *Preparing for the Imperfect World: A Proposal for How to Carry Out Strategic Planning*, Forsvarsakademiet, København, 2011.

⁸ *Ibid*, s. 7.

⁹ Blandt andet arbejde med CNO, jf. Forsvarsforlig 2010-14, og Udkast til lovforslag om behandling af personoplysninger i den statslige varslingstjeneste for internettrusler (GovCERT).

¹⁰ *The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language*, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009.

¹¹ Rapport fra analysearbejdet vedrørende Computer Network Operations. Forsvarets Materieltjeneste, 2008.

pplikationer til beskyttelse af infrastrukturen for computerinformationssystemer mod cyberangreb.¹²

Kapaciteter

I Danmark er de statslige kapaciteter inden for cyberdefence domineret af to sektorer:¹³ Den militære sektor, hvor femårige forsvarsforlig angiver den politiske vision på området¹⁴ og NATO, der løbende udvikler politiske visioner for området.¹⁵ Den anden sektor er den civile, hvor danske og EU-politiske visioner løbende skaber arbejde til processen med at omsætte idealistiske mål til strategier.¹⁶

I feltet cyberstrategi ophæves de traditionelle grænser mellem den civile og den militære sektor,¹⁷ fordi der kan ske angreb direkte på vitale, civile danske interesser og institutioner, uden at militæret har været varslet eller indsat. Det betyder, at der er behov for ikke-militære kapaciteter inden for cyberdefence, hvis ikke militæret skal forestå den daglige beskyttelse af den civile sektor. Det taler for, at de generelle ressourcer, der er til rådighed i de øverste statslige myndigheder, skal tildeles både den militære og den civile sektor.

Det forhold afspejles i den nuværende overordnede opdeling af de økonomiske ressourcer på statsbudgettet, der danner det økonomiske grundlag for statens virksomhed.¹⁸ Udtrykt ved finansloven tildeler statsbudgettet økonomiske ressourcer til cyberdefence gennem bevillinger til henholdsvis Forsvarsministeriet og Videnskabsministeriet.¹⁹

Når det på statsligt niveau skal afgøres, om der er tilstrækkelige generelle kapaciteter til rådighed for planlægning og implementering af cyberdefence, er det nødvendigt at et samlet behov kan opgøres eller anslås. I fraværet af en fælles national policy for cyberdefence bliver det samlede behov lig med summen af de to sektorer opgjorte behov hver for sig. Det giver risiko for, at der tildeles for mange ressourcer til cyberdefence, fordi tilsvarende kapaciteter kan findes to steder, og fordi de samme vidensressourcer genereres i begge sektorer, frem for at komplementære ressourcer udvikles under hensyntagen til, at cybertrusler går på tværs af sektorer.

Den politisk stillede opgave til den militære sektor anviser, at der inden for Forsvarsministeriets område skal opbygges en Computer Network Operations (CNO)-kapacitet med henblik på at forsvare egen brug af og forhindre modstanderes udnyttelse af cyberspace.²⁰ De militære kapaciteter, der afsættes til den stillede opgave, består dels af et Military Computer Emergency Response Team (MilCERT) etableret under FE i perioden 2010-

¹² NATO, *Policy on Cyber Defence, C-M(2007)0120*. EU: Tilsvarende ordlyd, men kaldet "Critical Information Infrastructure Protection", Green Paper on A European Programme For Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2005.

¹³ Forsvarskommandonotat (FKO Notat), *Beskrivelse af de aktuelle eller kommende IKT-relaterede aktiviteter og initiativer på Forsvarsministeriets ministerområde, som er særligt relevante i relation til Højhastighedskomiteens arbejde*, Forsvarskommandoen, København, 2009, s. 1.

¹⁴ Forligstekst, *Forsvarsforlig2010-2014*, Folketinget, København, 2009, s. 9.

¹⁵ NATO New Concept, 2010, s. 5.

¹⁶ Dansk eksempel: Lov om den statslige varslingstjeneste for internettruslers behandling af personoplysninger, 11. februar 2011. EU eksempel: EU-Kommissionens meddelelse "Beskyttelse mod storstillede cyberangreb og sammenbrud: øget beredskab, sikkerhed og robusthed" af 30. marts 2009.

¹⁷ Gottlieb 2010, s. 18.

¹⁸ Grundloven § 45.

¹⁹ Finansloven 2010, pkt. 12.21.01 og 19.11.04.

²⁰ Forligsteksten 2009, s. 9.

2014.²¹ MilCERT har til opgave at indsamle informationer om hændelser, der har speciel interesse for sikkerheden i koncernens informationssystemer. MilCERT skal bearbejde og videreformidle informationer til koncernens myndigheder med henblik på at advare mod potentielle trusler samt at støtte koncernens myndigheder i undersøgelse af eventuelle uregelmæssigheder på koncernens informationssystemer, der har sikkerhedsmæssig karakter.²² Desuden har MilCERT en kapacitet til rådighed, der kan gennemføre CNO med henblik på at gennemføre militære operationer i cyberspace i sammenhæng med de øvrige militære operationer.²³

Den politisk stillede opgave til den civile sektor løses af den civile pendant til MilCERT, Governmental Computer Emergency Response Team (GovCERT). GovCERT blev oprettet i IT- og Telestyrelsen under Videnskabsministeriet i 2009 på baggrund af en regeringsbeslutning som en statslig varslings-tjeneste for internettrusler.²⁴ Formålet med GovCERT er, at staten får overblik over trusler og sårbarheder i tjenester, net og systemer relateret til internettet. Endvidere skal GovCERT løbende vurdere det IT-sikkerhedsmæssige risikobilde for statens anvendelse af internettet og varsle myndigheder om internetbaserede hændelser og trusler.²⁵

Vægtningen af de stillede opgaver synes derved balanceret mellem den militære og civile sektor, hvor begge opstiller CERT, og den militære sektor desuden skal udvikle kapacitet til CNO.

Der synes at være stort sammenfald i GovCERTs og MilCERTs opgaveportefølje. Overlappet kunne indikere, at de tildelte ressourcer kunne prioriteres og vægtes bedre ved en sammenlægning eller fælles placering af de to agenturer med henblik på at opnå synergi ved samarbejde og nedlægge kapaciteter, der ikke udnyttes eller findes i flere sektorer. Da CNO-kapaciteterne er en del af cyberdefence, men samtidig omfatter de rent militære områder vedrørende informationsudnyttende og offensive operationer, der ikke er en del af den civile kapacitet, favner Forsvarsministeriet bredere end Videnskabsministeriet inden for cyberdefence. Det kan samlet tale for, at kapaciteter til cyberdefence samles under Forsvarsministeriets område, da det vil give mulighed for en enklere og lettere gennemskuelig vægtning af de tildelte ressourcer inden for cyberdefence.

Der er tiltag i Danmark, der indikerer, at man fra politisk hold har forståelse for de særlige karakteristika ved cyberdefence, der giver behov for indgriben på tværs af sektorer. Det fremgår blandt andet af den opgave, der er blevet tildelt den militære sektor. Det fremgår af Forsvarsforliget 2010-14, at en cyber-kapacitet skal have evnen til at samarbejde med samfundets øvrige kapaciteter på dette område og med tilsvarende kapaciteter i andre lande.²⁶ Endvidere er IT- og Telestyrelsen oprettet under Statens IT-råd. Denne institution har til formål at sætte dagsordenen for en offensiv anvendelse af IT i den offentlige sektor. Rådets medlemmer repræsenterer alle danske ministerier og har direktøren for IT- og Telestyrelsen som formand.²⁷ Det betyder, at der i form af Statens IT-

²¹ FKO Notat 2009, s. 1.

²² Forsvarskommandobestemmelse 358-1 (FKOBST), Bestemmelser for den militære sikkerhedstjeneste Elektronisk version 2.39.00, Forsvarskommando, København, 2011, s. 233.

²³ FKO Notat 2009, s. 1-2.

²⁴ IT- og Telestyrelsen, *GovCERT Grundlag, indledende afgrænsning og operationalisering*, IT- og telestyrelsen, København, 2009, s. 3.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Forligsteksten 2009, s. 9.

²⁷ <http://www.itst.dk/it-arkitektur-og-standarder/it-styring/rad-og-fora/statens-it-rad>. 22. august 2011.

råd eksisterer en koordinerende kapacitet, der har vidensressourcer fra samtlige ministerier og udfylder en rådgivende rolle i forhold til regeringen.

Flere vesteuropæiske stater har opbygget kapaciteter i cyberdefence, der er underlagt én myndighed. I Norge hører cyberdefence under Nasjonal Sikkerhetsmyndighet. Denne myndighed er igen underlagt det norske forsvarsministerium og rapporterer til justits- og politiministeriet vedrørende civile opgaver og til forsvarsministeriet vedrørende militære opgaver.²⁸ I Frankrig er der oprettet en national myndighed til cyberdefence,²⁹ som varetager både civile og militære opgaver.³⁰ Det giver mulighed for udarbejdelse af en samlet policy og en samlet opgørelse af erkendte eller anslåede behov for generel ressourcetil- deling. Blev en tilsvarende opbygning etableret i Danmark, synes det sandsynligt, at ko- ordinationen og samordningen af indsatsen ville blive styrket. Derved ville problemet med overlappende kapaciteter og vidensressourcer mindskes.

Implementeringsstrukturer

Ser vi på det internationale niveau, indgår Danmark aktivt og konstruktivt i udviklingen af den fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik i EU. EU fungerer som en støtte for Danmarks omsættelse af mål for cyberdefence til fælles handling i samarbejde med dets allierede i NATO.³¹ Inden for rammerne af Europarådet har Danmark allerede i 2005 ratificeret Kon- ventionen om cyber-kriminalitet og er dermed med til at implementere de cyber-tiltag, som staten har tiltrådt.³² FN's Generalforsamling har siden 2000 vedtaget fem resolutioner, der omhandler cyber-sikkerhed.³³ Gennem dansk medlemskab og tiltræden til resolutio- nerne har Danmark medvirket til at implementere tiltag, der kan støtte statens ønsker inden for cyberdefence.

Under FN findes Den Internationale Telekommunikationsunion (ITU), som har vedtaget foreløbig otte resolutioner, som relaterer sig til cyber-sikkerhed, og som Danmark via sine seks medlemmer har indflydelse på.³⁴

The Cybercrime Convention Committee har eksisteret under Europarådet siden 2004 og har i alt fem medlemmer, der vælges årligt, inklusiv formand og viceformand.³⁵ Dens konvention er den eneste bindende internationale aftale vedrørende cyber-kriminalitet og synes derfor at være med til at påvirke, hvilken retning det internationale samfund bevæger sig i på cyberdefence området.³⁶ Danmark har endnu ikke haft et medlem i komitéen.³⁷ Det indikerer, at Danmark sandsynligvis vil kunne opnå større legitimitet i og en mere direkte anvendelse af komitéen ved aktivt at søge medlemskab af den.

I NATO har Danmark gennem sit medlemskab medvirket til at implementere blandt andet NATO policy vedrørende cyberdefence.³⁸ For eksempel afspejles prioriteringen i valg af implementeringsstrukturer ved det igangværende arbejde med opbygning af CNO-kapa- citeter, som netop blev vedtaget på NATO topmødet i Lissabon. Én NATO implementerings-

²⁸ <https://www.nsm.stat.no/Om-NSM/Organisasjon>. 22. august 2011.

²⁹ Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information.

³⁰ GovCERT Faktablad på <https://www.govcert.dk>. 22. august 2011.

³¹ Gorm Rye Olsen og Jess Pilegaard, *Småstater og international indflydelse, Danmark og EU's fæl- les sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitik*, Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, København, 2005, s.6.

³² Convention on Cybercrime CETS No.: 185, 2001.

³³ Resoluitioner: 55/63(2000), 56/121(2002), 57/239(2002), 58/199(2004), 64/211(2009).

³⁴ <http://www.itu.int/cybersecurity>. 23. august 2011.

³⁵ Jf. Information Document Concerning the Cybercrime Convention Committee, s. 4.

³⁶ Convention on Cybercrime Committee, 2010, s. 1.

³⁷ Jf. Mødereferater fra de årlige møder i komiteen, 2006-10.

³⁸ C-M(2007)0120, NATO Policy on Cyber Defence.

struktur er dog bevidst fravalgt. Danmark er ikke med i NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, der er ét af NATO's i alt ni Centers of Excellence.³⁹ Disse centre er oprettet med henblik på at forbedre kapaciteter, samarbejde og informationsdeling mellem NATO, NATO-lande og NATO-partnere inden for cyberdefence.⁴⁰ Her synes det danske strategiske samarbejde med USA og Storbritannien, der ligesom Danmark står uden for dette forum, at blive prioriteret højere end samarbejdet inden for NATO, som minimum indtil centeret har skabt resultater. Når centeret har demonstreret at det kan levere varen, er der mulighed for at Danmark udvider paletten af implementeringsværktøjer i NATO til også at omfatte dette center.

Idet Danmark har mulighed for at øve indflydelse gennem internationale implementeringskanaler, synes det formålstjenligt, at strukturerne påvirkes i en fælles retning. Når strategi inden for cyberdefence udvikles inden for flere ministerielle områder, bliver det vanskeligere at koordinere en fælles retning på internationalt plan, frem for hvis strategiuudviklingen var samlet under én myndighed. I det efterfølgende undersøges de væsentligste strukturer under de overordnede organisationer og ministerier:

Ser vi på det nationale niveau, anvendes Videnskabsministeriets IT- og Telestyrelse som den primære struktur for implementering af tiltag inden for cyberdefence i den civile sektor. Under styrelsen eksisterer der en række fora, der tager sig af forskellige dele af cyberdefence.⁴¹ En anden væsentlig national implementeringsstruktur er det nationale beredskab. Relateret til cyberdefence aktiveres denne struktur først i tilfælde af større IT- og telehændelser, men da beredskabet periodevist øves ud fra relevante trusler, synes det tydeligt at medvirke til implementering af tiltag inden for cyberspace, der afprøves under øvelse og videreudvikles på baggrund af erfaringer herfra.⁴²

Når større IT- og telehændelser indtræffer, koordinerer repræsentanter fra GovCERT, FE og PET snitfladerne mellem myndigheders ansvarsområder og tager stilling til, om hændelsen kan håndteres af den enkelte myndighed gennem et samarbejde mellem de tre myndigheder, eller om hændelsen skal løftes til Den Nationale Operative Stab (NOST) niveau.⁴³

NOST har faste medlemmer fra Rigspolitiet, PET, FKO, FE, Beredskabsstyrelsen, Sundhedsstyrelsen og Udenrigsministeriet.⁴⁴ Staben har til opgave at skabe overblik over en given situation med henblik på at tilvejebringe et relevant beslutningsgrundlag for de sektoransvarlige og skabe grundlag for den fornødne koordination og prioritering af både opgaveløsning og ressourcer.⁴⁵ Repræsentanter fra andre myndigheder kan inddrages i gruppen efter behov.⁴⁶

Beredskabet bygger på en all-hazard-tilgang, hvor ét beredskab skal kunne håndtere typer af hændelser,⁴⁷ og er dermed også relateret til cyberdefence. Det peger i retning af, at implementeringen af tiltag på cyberdefence-området ville styrkes såfremt IT- og Telesty-

³⁹ <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/05-may/e0514a.html>. 23. august 2011.

⁴⁰ <http://www.ccdcoe.org/11.html>. 23. august 2011.

⁴¹ Eksempelvis IT-sikkerhedskommitéen, Beredskabsforum for IT og Tele samt Statens informations-sikkerhedsforum.

⁴² Jf. Redegørelse fra regeringen om indsatsen mod terrorisme, 2008, s. 12.

⁴³ Interview med chef for dansk GovCERT Thomas Kristmar.

⁴⁴ <http://www.kriseinfo.dk>. 23. august 2011.

⁴⁵ Terrorberedskab, *Det danske samfunds indsats og beredskab mod terror*, Statsministeriet, København, 2005, s. 5.

⁴⁶ <http://www.kriseinfo.dk>. 23. august 2011.

⁴⁷ Beredskabsstyrelsens *Fact Finding Mission i forbindelse med The Ontario-US Power Outage 14. august 2003*, s. 15.

relsen blev en del af NOSTs faste stab, da styrelsen er pålagt det overordnede IT-ansvar i Danmark og står for GovCERT. De centrale opgaver der varetages af styrelsen peger på, at den er en relevant myndighed at inddrage i hændelser med nationalt omfang.

Under Videnskabsministeriet arbejdes der således specifikt med strategiudvikling for IT, der er en del af den samlede cyberstrategi. Det indikerer, at der inden for cyberdefence anvendes implementeringsstrukturer, der bidrager til at legitimere opbygningen af langsigtet strategisk planlægning. Derfor synes der at være voksende konsensus om, at en sammenhængende cyberstrategi er en forudsætning for at udnytte statens kapaciteter optimalt.

Samlet taler antallet og spændvidden af nationale implementeringsstrukturer for, at der er et relativt robust grundlag for, at statens tiltag inden for cyberdefence løbende kan implementeres i de relevante dele af det civile samfund. Det kan eksempelvis være i statsadministrationen, energiinfrastrukturen og sygehusvæsenet, hvor der er præcedens for en sådan fremgangsmåde.

I den militære sektor anvender Forsvarsministeriet primært FKO og FE til at implementere de overordnede strategiske tiltag inden for cyberdefence. FKO har eksempelvis i 2011 udgivet Bestemmelser for Den militære Sikkerhedstjeneste.⁴⁸ De indeholder retningslinjer for informationssikkerheden generelt og specifikt for Military Computer Emergency Response Team (MilCERT),⁴⁹ som under FE's ledelse varetager cyberdefence i relation til de systemer, som bruges i den hjemlige eksisterende struktur.⁵⁰

Legitimitet

I det teoretiske koncept som er en del af undervisningen på Forsvarsakademiet handler legitimitet på statsligt niveau om at vinde opbakning til den politisk ramme for et policy-område. I dette tilfælde er policyområdet cyberdefence, hvorfor det bliver relevant at identificere partnere, der støtter dansk policy samt de potentielle modstandere, der kan forhindre Danmark i at nå sine mål med cyberdefence.⁵¹

Gennem lovgivning er der givet retningslinjer for, hvordan ansvaret for IT-sikkerhed eller cyberdefence er fordelt. Hermed er der skitseret et permanent partnerskab. Det enkelte ministerium har sektoransvar, og Videnskabsministeriet har det overordnede ansvar på IT-området og dermed for cyberdefence inden for landets grænser.⁵²

Det betyder, at der imellem samtlige ministerier er et regelbestemt gensidigt afhængighedsforhold. Det kan bidrage til legitimitet både internt og i forhold til det øvrige offentlige Danmark, fordi de offentlige myndigheder går ensartet ind i tiltag vedrørende IT/cyber-space.

På det tværministerielle plan, som synes at være en vigtig faktor i den interne legitimitet i et felt, hvis karakter griber ind i samfundet på tværs af sektorer, har Danmark tradition for tværministerielle arbejdsgrupper og råd. Disse nedsættes, når sager har betydning for flere dele af statsadministrationen.⁵³

Nationalt er legitimitet i praksis søgt etableret og øget, dels ved at indgå samarbejde med såvel relevante statslige myndigheder som danske teleoperatører samt udvalgte leve-

⁴⁸ FKO BST 2011: 1-526.

⁴⁹ FKO BST 2011: 211-226.

⁵⁰ FKO Notat 2009: 1.

⁵¹ O&K, 2011.

⁵² Bredskabsloven, *LBK nr. 660 af 10/06/2009 Gældende (Beredskabsloven)*, Folketinget, København, 2009, kap. 5.

⁵³ Eksempelvis Den tværministerielle økonomiske arbejdsgruppe omkring kampfly, jf. Økonomi- og erhvervsministerens redegørelse til beretning nr. 9/2008.

randører af informations- og kommunikationsteknologi, og dels ved at skabe stor åbenhed omkring iværksatte tiltag. GovCERT har egen hjemmeside med beskrivelser af såvel lovmæssig baggrund for GovCERT som overordnet budget samt vejledninger til brug primært for statslige institutioner, men som er tilgængelige for alle interesserede.⁵⁴ IT- og Telestyrelsen indbyder til borgermøder, når CERT-tiltag skønnes at have den generelle offentligheds interesse, eksempelvis i forbindelse med høring af et lovudkast vedrørende behandling af personoplysninger i den statslige varslings-tjeneste for internettrusler, og møderne suppleres med pressemeddelelser.⁵⁵

I den militære sektor bliver der måske ikke indkaldt til borgermøder i samme stil som i IT- og Telestyrelsen, men store dele af beslutningsgrundlaget for de militære arbejder er offentligt tilgængelige. Det gælder naturligvis forsvarsforligsteksten, men også Bestemmelser for Den militære Sikkerhedstjeneste, der blandt andet detaljeret beskriver MilCERT og kommunikationssikkerhed generelt,⁵⁶ samt Forsvarsministeriets IKT-strategi 2008-2011. For dele af CNO-kapaciteternes vedkommende synes det naturligt, at mindre information er til rådighed, da der er tale om militære kapaciteter, der også kan anvendes offensivt og informationsudnyttende og derfor ikke kan udstilles offentligt, da modstandere i cyberspace derved kan beskytte sig mod sådanne tiltag.

I forhold til den nationale legitimitet kan der være modstandere af de statslige mål med cyberdefence i form af repræsentanter fra ikke-statslige myndigheder, der kan være utilfredse med omfanget eller typen af statsligt cyberdefence. Et sådant eksempel er kritikken fra formanden for Rådet for større IT-sikkerhed i 2009 af GovCERT,⁵⁷ hvor han i pressen kritiserede, at GovCERT alene beskytter statslige instanser og dermed ikke kommuner og regioner.⁵⁸ Det synes mindre sandsynligt, at den type modstandere kan hindre staten i at nå målene med strategisk planlægning, men de kan potentielt reducere den legitimitet, som staten måtte have opnået på området. Det peger i retning af, at der i et land som Danmark, hvor der synes at være relativ stor offentlig debat, kan være behov for tilsvarende stor åbenhed omkring tiltag i den strategiske planlægning af cyberdefence. Dette fordi åbenhed og beredvillig deling af information om beslutningsgrundlag sandsynligvis kan reducere kritikken i den offentlige debat og derved understøtte legitimiteten.

Internationalt lægger Danmark sig i den civile sektor naturligt op ad sine allierede på den internationale scene, som for eksempel FN, EU og Europarådet. Her er fokus på cyberkriminalitet, og dermed bygger på den opfattelse, at fjenden er den eller dem, der begår handlinger mod fortroligheden og integriteten af nationers computersystemer.⁵⁹

Koblingen mellem international og national legitimitet kan blandt andet ske gennem de konventioner, Danmark tiltræder, og de love, forordninger og cirkulærer, som Danmark i relation til EU-medlemskabet er forpligtet til at implementere nationalt.⁶⁰ I 2010 hidrørte 50-60 % af alle love og forordninger, der blev vedtaget i Danmark, fra EU.⁶¹ Dermed synes

⁵⁴ <http://www.govcert.dk>. 23. august 2011.

⁵⁵ <http://www.govcert.dk>. 23. august 2011.

⁵⁶ FKOBST, 2011, s. 211-233.

⁵⁷ Et råd nedsat i 1998 af forskningsministeren med henblik på at medvirke til at både national og international IT-brug kan ske sikkert, jf. <http://www.rfsits.dk>. 23. august 2011.

⁵⁸ Bragt i internetmagasinet Version2.dk, den 28. maj 2009.

⁵⁹ Cyberkonvention, *Convention on Cybercrime, European Treaty Series - No. 185*, Council of Europe, Budapest, 2001, s. 4.

⁶⁰ Jf. Lov nr. 447 af 11/10/1972, Lov om Danmarks tiltrædelse af De europæiske Fællesskaber, § 2 og 3.

⁶¹ Jacob Mchangama, *EU-rettens stigende indflydelse på Danmarks demokratiske styrefor*, Center for Politiske Studier, København, 2011, s. 1.

det sandsynligt, at kommende love og forordninger inden for cyberdefence, der vedtages i EU og har indflydelse på Danmark, vil have relativ stor legitimitet på statsligt niveau.

I den militære sektor er partneren naturligt primært NATO, som beskriver fjenden/modstanderen i cyberspace bredere til at udgøres af enkeltpersoner eller grupperinger.⁶² Der er således i identifikationen ingen skelnen mellem, om fjenden befinder sig i eller uden for staten. Med afsæt i NATO's nye strategiske koncept er et nyt koncept om NATO's cyberdefence blevet udviklet og godkendt af medlemmernes forsvarsministre i marts 2011.⁶³ Ud fra dette koncept forventer NATO at revidere den eksisterende fælles cyberdefence policy frem mod juni 2011.⁶⁴ NATO har yderligere anerkendt, at cyberdefence har global karakter, idet der i 2008 og 2009 blev oprettet to koordinerende fora,⁶⁵ der rækker ud over NATO's medlemslande og omfatter NATO-partnerlande og internationale organisationer.⁶⁶

Arbejdet med Danmarks CNO-kapacitet i Forsvarsministeriet blev tilsvarende sat i gang i forlængelse af godkendelsen af NATO's nye strategiske koncept.⁶⁷ Med forsvarsministrenes godkendelse af NATO-konceptet om cyberdefence synes det sandsynligt, at udviklingen af den danske kapacitet vil tilpasses den reviderede fælles policy. Dermed kan Danmark formentlig opnå relativt stor accept af statens strategiske mål med cyberdefence blandt internationale parlamentarikere, andre stater og deres ministre.⁶⁸

Samlet taler det for, at Danmark har relativt høj legitimitet på det militære cyberfelt både internt i NATO og blandt de stater, der er partnere med NATO, samt blandt de stater, der som minimum respekterer NATO. Det skyldes, at Danmark opfattes som et mønstermedlem af NATO.⁶⁹

Konklusion og perspektivering

Efter at have undersøgt de kapaciteter og implementeringsstrukturer som Danmark allerede anvender samt den legitimitet, der understøtter cyberdefence, kan det konkluderes, at de politiske visioner rent faktisk omsættes til mål. Endvidere vurderes det at de midler, der er til rådighed, anvendes på en brugbar måde. Dermed har Danmark i praksis en cyberstrategi.

Den danske tradition for både uofficielt og officielt samarbejde på tværs af myndigheder synes at medvirke til, at Danmark er på vej mod at opbygge en cyberstrategi, der tager højde for den særlige transnationale karakter, som trusler i cyberspace har.

Undersøgelsen af de nævnte områder peger dog samtidig på, at manglen på en nedskrevet national cyberstrategi betyder, at områder, der er udpeget som centrale for cybersikkerhed, ikke varetages, og samtidig at nogle indsatsområder varetages af flere enheder. Eksempelvis beskyttes regionale og kommunale administrationer fra centralt

⁶² Risikovurdering, *Efterretningsmæssig Risikovurdering 2010*, Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste, København, 2010, 51.

⁶³ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49193.htm. 22. august 2011.

⁶⁴ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49193.htm. 22. august 2011.

⁶⁵ Council Guidelines for Cooperation on Cyber Defence with Partners and International Organisations og Framework for Cooperation on Cyber Defence between NATO and Partner Nations.

⁶⁶ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49193.htm. 22. august 2011.

⁶⁷ Kommissorium for Etablering af en CNO-kapacitet inden for Forsvarsministeriets område, af 27. januar 2011.

⁶⁸ O&K, 2011, s. 13.

⁶⁹ Jens Ringsmose, *Danmarks NATO-omdømme, Fra Prügelknabe til duks*, Dansk Institut for Militære Studier, København, 2007, s. 2.

hold, mens samtlige sektorer på statsligt niveau har egne kapaciteter til at varetage dele af cyberdefence.

De undersøgte forhold indikerer, at antallet og størrelsen af huller og overlappende indsatsområder vil kunne reduceres, såfremt det overordnede ansvar for den strategiske planlægning af cyberdefence underlægges én myndighed. En sådan myndighed kan gennem et råd, hvis medlemmer repræsenterer alle statens ministerier, udarbejde policy som grundlag for en fælles cyberstrategi. Det kunne eksempelvis ske ved, at Statens IT-råd under IT- og Telestyrelsen får udvidet sine opgaver til at omfatte rådgivning om og udvikling af policy for cyberdefence. Med henblik på at forenkle og lette den indbyrdes vægtning og prioritering af opgaver inden for feltet kan kapaciteter til cyberdefence samles under Forsvarsministeriets område. Grundlaget for den nytiltrådte regering peger i retning af en sådan sammenlægning.⁷⁰

Såfremt todelingen af ansvarsfordelingen fastholdes, kunne et skridt til øget ekspertise inden for cyberdefence og strategien herfor være, at IT- og Telestyrelsen gøres til fast medlem af NOST.

Undersøgelsen peger i retning af, at Danmark som stat har et relativt stort handlerum for at agere i strategisk planlægning af cyberdefence, og at staten såvel nationalt som internationalt anvender en bred vifte af implementeringsstrukturer. Det betyder, at Danmark har gode forudsætninger for at kunne styrke feltet cyberdefence. Dog understreger karakteren af cybertrusler, at det ikke er noget Danmark som stat kan håndtere alene, hvorfor Danmarks relativt store handlerum kan udnyttes til gennem stærke internationale partnerskaber at opnå statens mål inden for cyberdefence.

Nationalt har og udvirker Danmark en cyberstrategi, også selvom den ikke er nedskrevet i ét dokument. Internationalt deltager Danmark i gennemførelsen af en række tiltag inden for cyberdefence, men her kan fraværet af overordnet nedskrevet cyberstrategi vanskeliggøre det internationale samarbejde, fordi det fremstår uklart hvilke mål Danmark som stat har på området.

⁷⁰ Regeringsgrundlag, *Et Danmark der står sammen*, Statsministeriet, København, 2011, s.40.

When Governance is individuals: “..one heart attack away from a really big problem”

Niels Klingenberg Vistisen, Cand. Mag. and Major, Danish Army.

This article is based upon my experience as the Chief Governance planner of Regional Command Southwest, in the fall of 2010, at a time when Governance in the Helmand province of Afghanistan was still at a fragile state, and where the international surge was at its peak, just in the aftermath of *Operation Moshtarak*, the airborne invasion of Marjah, the insurgent stronghold in central Helmand.

Governance, as explained below, was one of the three key lines of operation in the counterinsurgency campaign, alongside Development and Security.

I was also triggered by the Rajiv Chandrasekaran article in the Washington Post from 12th December 2010 “Afghan strategy’s proving ground”,¹ concerning the Helmand district of Nawah-ye Barakzai. The article captures several key aspects of the nature of what we are trying to do and some of the key challenges, possibly without Rajiv Chandrasekaran understanding just how key some of his points are. Overall, Rajiv describes the immense impact of an influx of US Marines into a district, and how they succeed in many of the things the counter-insurgency tactics describe, indeed to such an extent that it was a model case for General Petraeus to prove the COIN concept. The necessity to prove the concept comes after some mistrust in the actual capability to win the war, even at the tactical level. Rajiv elaborates to describe the governors role in the fight, and dwells on his health, stating they are “one heart attack away from a really big problem” quoting one of the advisors from the US Marine Corps – the Marines. I recommend reading the article from the Washington Post before continuing to read this article, to get adequate background and understand my points about the reliance on individuals.

This, in essence, is the governance problem and challenge of the current way counter-insurgency is conducted in Afghanistan, and perhaps in particular in the rural and dangerous areas like Helmand. Nawa-ye Barakzai district is but one example where this is the case, and the real risk of this is not even adequately described in Rajiv Chandrasekarans article about that district with its governor of flailing health.

The importance of governance in Afghanistan and its historical context

When the whole counter-insurgency campaign and tactics build on Governance, Development and Security, it is probably less implicit how important and vital governance really is in this equation, and how multifaceted it is in Afghanistan, given the specific political history and culture of most provinces. Notwithstanding the importance of governance and development in the various counterinsurgency manuals, the realization of both the lack of and the importance of governance and development only came as part of the strategic reviews of Afghanistan conducted in 2008 and 2009.² This in turn resulted in the surge of troops to Afghanistan. The value of this surge, is exactly what General Petraeus is trying to prove in his briefings about Nawa-Ye Barakzai.

It will be my statement that bad governance can lose us the struggle against the Taliban/Criminal insurgency, but only real economic development can permanently win it,

¹ Washington Post, 12. December 2010: “

² “Obamas wars”, Bob Woodward, Simon and Schuster, New York 2010.

When Governance is individuals: “..one heart attack away from a really big problem” •

good governance cannot. That bad governance can lose us the struggle, is sufficient reason to devote the energy and face the risks outlined in this article.

Governance is the actual political and administrative leadership of the population, the interaction interphase, where the Government of The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, abbreviated GIROA, meets the local afghan, out in the village. Programs such as the “district development program” focuses on the district level in Afghanistan, particularly because it is the level where the afghan meets GIROA, never encountering directly the strong Kabul based central government. This is particularly true in remote areas such as the southwestern provinces of Helmand and Nimruz, where there is little tradition for a strong link to the central government in Kabul.

Corrupt governance in Afghanistan was a primary reason for the popular support to the Taliban alternative in the early 1990s. Without the financial support of the Soviet Union, Kabul did not have sufficient funds to adequately pay the local governance structures, who in turn turned corrupt to an extent that alienated the local population to invite Taliban in as an alternative. Although corruption is an accepted part of Afghan culture, there are limits. There is a distinction between acceptable corruption and predatory corruption, which we shall dwell on later.

The current state of governance in Helmand

All districts in Helmand, a total of thirteen, had a district governor by the end of 2010, but besides that, the actual depth of the official GIROA at district level varied immensely across the province.

By the end of 2010 governance was categorized “emerging” many places in Helmand. This was the colour coding and short description used in the internal ISAF reports about the status of governance, falling in between categories “at risk” and “emerging”. The measure for this was a combination of the fill rate of the tashkiel in the districts, that is how many of the official positions were filled, and the quality of the key leaders in a district. The key leaders were defined as the district governor, the district chief of police (DCoP: Afghan National/Uniformed Police) and the chief of the National Directorate of Security (NDS). These three positions were deemed vital to the success of a district, and effort was put into ensuring the quality of the individuals in these positions as well as that they were filled. These three positions were the real face of GIROA at the district level, and a lot of pressure was put on these individuals, and filling the positions. This was adequately described in the Washington Post article, focusing on the responsibilities of the District Governor, and how the US Marines interacted with him. Having such a strong focus on the top three individuals in a district did not mean that the rest of the civil administration, the secretaries, the line directors for the departments of education, health, power, infrastructure etc. were forgotten. A district government structure, tashkiel, is much more than just the top three, and the top three are only the leaders. Below them, to run the administration, are the civil servants, which hardly feature in the article in the Washington Post. This also points to the big challenge of governance in Helmand, the overreliance on a few good individuals, making governance fragile and at risk to assassinations and accidents, and also more prone to corruption and abuse of power.

Filling the tashkiel at the district level is difficult, facing several challenges. Applicants for some of the positions are sometimes as scarce as hens teeth. Many Afghans shy away from applying, because of the danger involved, both from non-targeted threats such as IEDs, and more direct insurgent targeting of GIROA officials. Besides, for many of the jobs, such as judges, prosecutors, health officials etc. there are in reality no applicants with proper qualifications in Helmand. People with such skills are primarily staying in Kabul or

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other bigger cities, where it is safer and where they can earn more. In addition, because the afghan official financial system hardly works, many officials at the district level would not be paid for months, being promised “your wages, including back pay will arrive soon”, only to be disappointed again and again. Many of the officials actually filling the positions actually live in the provincial capital of Lashka Gah, where it is safer and electricity etc. is fairly stable, only rarely travelling out to the actual district where they hold a position. This leaves the actual tashkiel fill sometimes a false echo, because some of the people are not actually out in the district, performing work, although the position is listed as filled. All together this situation has serious impact on actual GIROA responsibility and delivery of services and responsiveness to the local population. This effectively adds pressure to the top individuals in the district, including and specifically the district governor, making governance more individual than desirable, hinging on a few key individuals. Essentially, this is the problem stated in this article, and one of the key points of Chandrasekarans article; that Nawa-Ye Barakzai district is “one heart attack away from a really big problem”.

Nawa and the lessons to learn

Although the progress of Nawa described in the article is impressive and follows the counter-insurgency manuals and design, the basis of it should raise concerns, particularly the overreliance on individuals. It becomes clear that everything is done to support the district governor, Abdul Manaf, and that the governor himself is quite aware of the support he can gain from the ISAF forces, both on terms of security, development and as small things as medical treatment and access to the marine base right next to his office. Although there is no real alternative to supporting the district governor, it must not reach an extent where the biggest worry about government, according to the article, is actually the health of the governor. Then, government have become so reliant on individuals, that is almost becomes detrimental to the effort of building effective and responsive governance. This must also be viewed over time, to create a sustainable end state. Even if the immediate effect is drastically increased security and success in Nawa, this must be turned to a lasting and resilient condition, lest the ISAF forces have to stay forever. Overreliance on, and focused engagement with the key individuals is also factor of the lack of actual government structures, the civil servants described above. The fact that the Marines have to provide accommodation to the line ministry representatives in Nawa, suggests the unsustainable nature of the presence of these in the district.

Given the recent history of government corruption and ineffectiveness, the approach of building on individuals and using money and projects to create support for these individuals, also creates the opportunity for corruption. With money and the power of individuals come the temptation, and without a structure, the symbolic value of one previously good individual turned corrupt becomes immense. Corruption is a way of life and business in Afghanistan, perhaps particularly in the south, but as Chandrasekaran describes, there are limits. The excess government corruption under the previous provincial governor Sher Mohammed Akhundzada actually became so predatory that the population turned against the government and invited in the insurgents. Apparently, criminal behavior is growing in Nawa-Ye Barakzai, perhaps as a result of the influx of money and the opportunity of corruption. Money may buy immediate support for the governor, but may also lead to the corruption and crime that may eventually invite back in the Taliban, once the Marines leave the district.

The story of Nawa, with regards to the general success in counter-insurgency, is not unique. Although Governor Manaf and Rajiv Chandrasekaran questions the applicability of the Nawa experience to other districts throughout Afghanistan, it is clear that some of the

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counter-insurgency tactics work. Cash for work, as in Nawa, succeeds in hiring more than 16.000 men for short-term manual labour, pushing out the Taliban and reducing their recruitment base. This is applicable elsewhere as well, and used in national programs, and with American commanders emergency response program (CERP) funding. However, the overreliance on individuals and the difficulties of attracting professionals for the government offices is also a common feature across districts. Many districts face similar success and conditions as Nawa. Perhaps, the contrast of increased security over a short period of time is not as visible or stark, but otherwise the districts face similar progress and challenges. In many places the top three officials positions are filled, in much the same way as in Nawa, but with the same challenges. That, perhaps, the DG and DCoP may work well with the ISAF forces, but may also embody some of the inherent trends of corruption, something which may not readily be visible to the international forces working with them. One particular chief of police from a district was liked by the Marines for viciously fighting Taliban and handing over captives, but at the same time being so brutal and corrupt that the population feared him more than they feared the Taliban. Under such an individual, directly supported by ISAF, it is almost impossible to build a functioning and non-corrupt police force or government body in a district, achieving the resilience against insurgency once ISAF is gone.

In this light, Nawa can easily become a model case for the counter-insurgency across Afghanistan, but in a different context than General Petraeus used it in power point slide presentations by end 2010. It can be the proof that on short term tactical level, the reliance on individuals, DGs and DCoPs and others, combined with expensive cash for work for unemployed afghans, influx of western money and ISAF supported security, does work. It does push out the insurgency and establishes trust in legitimate Afghan government. However, it can immediately thereafter become a model case for how this short term tactic spells unsustainable progress and long term failure, particularly because of the lack of depth and resilience of local Afghan government structures, potentially resulting on corruption and collapse. The overreliance on the individual in the method becomes a long term drawback and presents serious risks. These risks are already identified on the ground, when an adviser can say: “we are one heart attack away from a really big problem”.

The reign of Gulab Mangal in Helmand

The provincial level government in Helmand is hardly any better than the district level, although provincial governor Gulab Mangal is described by many as the best governor in Afghanistan. He has himself wanted a new position for some time, and he is no favourite of president Karzai. Karzai is friendly with former Helmand governor, criminal and power-broker Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, and would like to replace Mangal as soon as possible. The international community, ISAF, holds its hands under Mangal, putting pressure on Karzai to keep him in place, because he has proved effective, is not overtly corrupt, and is working well with the internationals in Helmand. Mangal is our man, not the afghans, and another individual that a lot hinges on. Mangal is perhaps a powerful and good provincial governor, but also just one man in what should be a large provincial administration. If Mangal would be replaced by a corrupt provincial governor, the administration would not be able to continue its current line, but would deteriorate into corruption and ineffectiveness. This is also part of the political culture in Afghanistan and particularly in Helmand, where government have never been strong or assertive, and never actually delivering much, but often at the forefront of corrupt activity. One strong criminal or corrupt power-broker can soon ruin the good work of one good individual, such as Manaf or Mangal, and again turn the population against GIRoA and into the arms of the insurgency. Particularly

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with the lack of appropriate funding and wages, the temptation for a GIROA official to supplement his delayed wages with corruption is understandable.

When government often consist of a just handful of people, corruption quickly becomes visible to everyone, both for the people, but also for the ISAF community, and the legitimacy for GIROA becomes severely damaged. Governance, and GIROA, becomes individuals, not an institution, and extremely susceptible to the failure or removal of a very few individuals, with a disproportionate effect on the entire mission in a province like Helmand.

Community councils and local governance bodies and structures

To interact with these few individuals in the local governments, the district community councils have been established, consisting of up to 45 elders and women of district, elected by peers, and to some extent representative in terms of geography, tribal affiliations and more. It is important to grasp, that these councils are established as part of the District Delivery Program Chandrasekaran is describing as “a British program”, which still haven't provided on budget funding to the normal district level business. The District Delivery Program, however, is adopted at the NATO/US cornerstone of the operational design for the campaign, and not a solely British program. It is however, not actually providing any funding through afghan channels. The community councils are most likely also representative of the insurgents, Taleban, criminals, businessmen, and more, perhaps the only way you can get all represented at one time. The District community councils have been given a direct role in local governance, as they are a big part of the district delivery program, proposing and identifying projects the people wants and needs, to go into the planning for the district government to deliver. In this case, the process of identifying, discussing and prioritizing the projects, is as important as the actual delivery of the projects, as the main goal is to tie the local government to the people, and the vehicle is this district community council. Here, the lack of actual government capacity becomes a direct inhibitor for delivery. The reliance on individuals described above, does not actually put in place the structure of officials to handle the funding stream to pay for these identified projects. It is important to recognize, that the community councils are not actually part of the local government, or GIROA, but serves a function to connect the government to the population. The establishment of these more or less fully elected bodies, like the District Community Councils, to some extent also functions as a filter between GIROA and the people, establishing something which is not fully culturally afghan. In the daily business by ISAF and the PRT, the community council provides an opportunity to engage with the wider group of elders, thus in one way expanding our interaction beyond the individuals in government, but it may very well at the same time in fact divert our attention and efforts away from the proper district level administration, the civil servants in the tashkiel.

How to change it?

Realizing that this overreliance on individuals is a problem for both sustainability and thus also for our mission, easily incurring setbacks, the question arises of how to change what we are doing, to avoid and overcome the problem. Positive and skilled individuals are a necessity as a starting point and an inroad to allow the building of resilient and enduring institutions, yet realizing some individuals often are the biggest blockage for this to happen. What we must not allow ourselves, when building governance on the ground in a district, is to succumb to the lure of immediate effect, of unrealistic timelines, and the consent winning activity cycle, which almost always impairs our view of individuals. This is no easy fix, particularly not when the life of young ISAF soldiers is on the line. It is a planning task for ISAF and stabilization advisors, to realize the possible change of strategy, from a

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reliance on an individual, to start forcing the afghan process to work. This would actually often mean actively deciding not to do something, which either seems natural or is directly asked for by the Afghans, and something which could result in consent winning, at least towards ISAF. There is no checklist to achieve the aim of building institutions, but it requires an in depth understanding of the process gains contra the products delivered. What we must be certain on is not to aggravate the problem set further by over empowering individuals, to the point where one heart attack would be a major setback, as with Abdul Manaf in Nawah-Ye Barakzai. Furthermore, we should be careful not to establish further bodies and institutions such as the district community council, or the district delivery program. Projects, such as the solar lights in Nawah-Ye Barakzai must be carefully applied, and the extremely short term effect of such coalition force projects have been well documented in other studies. There has to be a focus on the real problem in Afghanistan, the corruptness of the local governance as the real reason for support to the insurgency, and always to refer back to this original problem. This will substantially prevent us from focusing on various symptoms and the wrong projects. Most of what we do, will in one way or another prevent legitimate afghan structures from doing it, thus de facto undermining them, and hurting the real cause: building a legitimate GiRoA to counter insurgency.

In sum, there is no easy solution, and it must be dealt with in the fundamentals of our approach, at all levels. There is nothing wrong with the concept of counter-insurgency, but in the execution and implementation of it at the lowest levels. The long term approach must be thought out and respected, in the initial stages of stabilization, when the consent winning activities and huge support to a district governor, to a small community and the building of a community council appears as good ideas. We must think two steps ahead and respect existing structures and informal bodies. Thus we must already from day one avoid aggravating the problem and carefully work with the positive individuals we still need to make the inroads and who will allow us, as soon as possible, to start building the institutions and the resilience in structures, against changing individuals, corruption and insurgency.

The perception of governance today – risks and challenges

While pointing to the problems of governance, and highlighting how we bet on a few individuals in each district, there are few answers to what the international community should or could do differently. There are also limitations in ISAF and PRT capacity to build these structures, as well as the bottleneck of few qualified Afghan officials to hire into this structure we would like to build. However, no matter the challenges and risks, we have to avoid building a fragile structure, realizing that sometimes it may be worse in the long run, than not building anything at all – or at least building less. Speed and results must be overruled by sustainability and resilience in government structures. Perhaps, the delivery in Nawa-Ye Barakzai is sufficient, for Afghan standards, and more energy should be devoted away from Governor Manaf and the looming risk of a heart attack being a major setback – towards forcing Manaf to use his government structure, and using the structure there is, no matter how ineffective it is. It is what is there, in Helmand, Afghanistan.

At the end of this article, where I have attempted to point at the risk of overreliance on individuals, I will use the summary of my hand over notes to my successor, from December 2010, when I left the function as Chief Governance Planner. This should sum up my position and concerns.

The state of governance right now in Helmand, is capable, delivering but fragile. We have an overreliance on good individuals, like the provincial government is synonymous with Mangal, and it can backfire. It makes districts vulnerable to assassinations etc. We

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must build on institutions, and focus on the top three – DG, DCoP and NDS chief, ensuring they are all capable and function as a team. We must look for trends across districts, for example the poor state of barely effective DCoP's across several districts, and see the trend. We must engage the provincial political level to engage on these characters. District community councils have proved that they work. But, as they become our center of Gravity, the insurgents will target them, and intimidate people not to participate. Protect the people who stand up for the legitimate government. This is more important than killing insurgents. To build the capacity in the institutions as mentioned above, it is vital to use all security operations, coalition as well as combined and Afghan, and all development projects, under local Afghan leadership – that is, full partnering. We must sacrifice operations tempo, to develop our partners. Ensure that all development projects are cases of learning for the district governments line ministry representatives etc., and ensure they are nested with the District Development Plan developed by the District community Councils and the District government. Coordination, cooperation and patience are the big challenges for governance and the COIN fight.

Helmand, December 2010

Kort om bogudgivelser og anmeldelser

I september åbnede Statens Forsvarshistoriske Museum en særudstilling om krigen i Afghanistan. Udstillingen blev åbnet af Hans kongelige Højhed Prins Joachim. Den er blevet særdeles rosende omtalt i pressen. Samtidig udgav museet en antologi af Morten Tinning og Signe Lund: *"Den fjerne krig – 17 perspektiver på Afghanistan"*. Den indeholder 17 forskellige artikler om krigen i Afghanistan, landets historie, de tidligere krige etc. Inden redaktionens slutning har det ikke været muligt at finde en "uhildet" anmelder til bogen, og den sædvanlige kreds af anmeldere fra Forsvarsakademiet kan anstændigvis ikke anvendes, da de også har ansvaret for en del af de 17 bidrag til antologien. 383 sider illustreret. Pris kr. 299. Bogen kan indkøbes via museet.

Yderligere to af kvartalets bøger omhandler den danske indsats i Afghanistan, og de er meget forskellige. Den første bog, *"Mamma doc"*, dækker en beretning fra en kvindelig læge, som har arbejdet som læge i forsvaret igennem 17 år. Hun har været i alle tre værn, været på Balkan, i Irak og Afghanistan, arbejdet på Grønland, i søværnets inspektionsskibe og om bord i redningshelikopterne herhjemme. Hun har en række observationer og erfaringer, som hun deler ud af, og de vil formentlig dele forsvarets personel i to grupper: Dem der giver hende ret, og dem der synes, at hun nok skulle være gået lidt mere diplomatisk til værks. Den anden er en bog spækket med flotte billeder fra Afghanistan. Den er historien om en ung kvindelig fotograf, som gerne vil lave en kalender til "drengene" fra Afghanistan, og hun får tilladelse fra Hærens Operative Kommando til at tage med ned og fotografere de danske soldaters hverdag under de vilkår, der nu engang hersker i området. Hun bliver selv alvorligt såret, og det er der kommet en udmærket beretning ud af. Læs anmeldelsen af *"Tæt på"*.

"Politik og sikkerhed i Mellemøsten – analyser og teorier" af Søren Schmidt er en gennemgang af politik, sikkerhed, økonomi og religion i Mellemøsten samt Iran, Afghanistan og Pakistan, som ikke altid regnes med til Mellemøsten. Bogen omhandler således Libyen efter Gaddaffi, Israels problemer med naboerne, Irans atomprogram, Syriens sikkerhedspolitik og fredsprocessen i Afghanistan. Bogen spænder vidt, og to af dens pointer er, at ikke alle problemer kan forklares med religiøse årsager, og at Mellemøsten ikke selv er i stand til at løse sine problemer.

"F-16 – oplevelser på danske vinger" er en utrolig flot bog, som dækker danske F-16-fly fra 1980 til 2011. En lang række piloter har bidraget med deres meget forskelligartede oplevelser, men vigtigst er vel flyvevåbnets fotograf Henning Kristensen, som igennem 30 år har dokumenteret de danske F-16-fly mange operationer fra et bagsæde i de to sædede fly. Han har leveret størsteparten af de mange smukke og imponerende billeder. Bogen indeholder også oplysninger om flyets tekniske informationer, blandt andet med modifikationer, *"Mid-Life Update"* og danske forbedringer.

I bogen *"Bortført i København – japanske skæbner i Nordkorea"* bliver læseren introduceret til et ganske absurd miljø. Da et antal japanske flykaprere i 1970'erne havner i Nordkorea, beslutter de nordkoreanske myndigheder efter nogen tid at benytte dem som frontsoldater i en kommende verdensrevolution, men de pågældende lever i et totalt isole-ret samfund, og så opstår tanken, om ikke man skulle anskaffe nogle koner til dem, så de kunne få nogle børn, som også kunne deltage i verdensrevolutionen. Derfor skal man kidnappe unge japanske kvinder til dem, og en af dem, en ganske naiv og ung japansk kvinde, bliver bortført fra København. Da en af de involverede nordkoreanere er en kendt

mand i vestlige efterretningskredse skygger PET dele af aktiviteten – og fotograferer de involverede.

Verdens ældste tegneserie, Bayeux tapetet, er blevet beskrevet i en helt ny udgave af arkæologen Mogens Rud. Hele tapetet på 70 meter er afbilledet i bogen, og hver enkelt detalje bliver forklaret. Desuden redegør forfatteren for tapetets historie og fremstilling. Det er en spændende historie om retten til den engelske trone, en invasion fra Normandiet til England, den engelske sejr ved Stamford Bridge og det efterfølgende nederlag få uger senere nær Hastings i 1066. Der er tale om komplicerede militære operationer, hvorunder blandt andet en rytterhær skal bringes over Kanalen. Hele logistikken har også været ganske omfattende. Historien om invasionen fra Normandiet er godt fortalt.

Klummeskribenten Jørgen Larsen fra Berlingske Tidende har udgivet et nyt bind med historier om det gamle København. De er alle illustreret med gamle fotografier, og tilsammen får man et ganske godt billede af livet i hovedstaden i tidligere tider. En del af de historiske oplysninger omhandler de militære forsvarsanlæg så som voldanlæg, kaserner, Hovedvagten samt Flådens baser på henholdsvis Gammelholm og Nyholm. Det er både interessant og fornøjelig læsning.

I serien om *"Flådens skibe"* er Tom Wismann kommet til minelæggerne af Falsterklassen. Det er et nydeligt hæfte med oplysninger om baggrunden for skibenes bygning, originale tegninger, maskineri, bevæbning, billeder fra livet om bord etc.

God læselyst

Poul Grooss, anmelderredaktør

Tidsskrifter, hæfter, publikationer, afhandlinger m. v.

Forsvarsakademiet har udgivet to *"Research Papers"* på engelsk:

"Libyan Myths and Realities" af Dr. Bruce St John er udgivet i august 2011. Rapporten er på 14 sider. Den indeholder en beskrivelse af Libyens befolkning og det oprør, som tog sin start den 17. februar 2011. Rapporten er således udkommet et par måneder inden præsident Gaddafis død, men det er et nyttigt lille værk, hvor man kan læse om Libyens historie, de forskellige stammer og områder, den nationale enhed og betydningen af islam. De libyske politikere søger forhåbentlig vejen til demokrati, som den hårdt prøvede befolkning forhåbentlig også ønsker. Et af de første skridt på vejen er udarbejdelsen af en ny forfatning.

"Tactical Information Operations in Contemporary Coin Campaigns" af Thomas Elkjær Nissen er udgivet i august 2011. Denne rapport er på 59 sider og omhandler brugen af informationer i forbindelse med *"Couterinsurgency Operations"*. Den omhandler problemer omkring formidling af nyheder, oplysninger, propaganda og meget mere, men kommer også ind på hvorledes en operation styres, hvorledes man bruger psykologisk krigsførelse etc. Tilsvarende behandler den modpartens eller oprørernes brug af informationer og propaganda. Målgruppen for begge parter er den lokale befolkning.

Bogudgivelser

"Mamma doc – krigslæge på mission" af Wiera Malamá Lorentzen. Udgivet af Gyldendal den 3. oktober 2011. 304 sider illustreret. Pris kr. 299,95 (vejledende).

Denne bog er på mange måder usædvanlig. Den kan bruges som debatbog i forbindelse med diskussion af en række emner. Helt centralt står selvfølgelig de lægelige problemer i forbindelse med danske militære operationer i udlandet. Forfatteren har dikteret til journalist Søren Flott, som har bearbejdet stoffet. Hendes baggrund er noget usædvan-

lig og spiller en rolle for det videre forløb i bogen. Hun er født i en russisk-polsk familie i Polen, som delvist har en jødisk baggrund. På grund af opblussen af jødehad i slutningen af 1960'erne kommer hendes familie til Danmark, og hun gennemfører lægestudiet i København. Hendes mor er i øvrigt også læge. Efter forskellige sygehusstillinger får hun i 1993 kontakt til forsvaret og bliver ansat på kontrakt.

Hun oplever nogle rædsler på Balkan midt i 1990'erne, og hendes udmærkede beskrivelse af forholdene kan medvirke til at forklare andre, hvorfor Danmark havde en militær tilstedeværelse på Balkan, og hvad opgaverne gik ud på. Der er ingen tvivl om, at forfatteren er både idealist og læge, og hun har nogle synspunkter omkring lægegeringen, som hun gerne vil dele med læseren. Hun beskriver en række konfrontationer med mindre engagerede og mindre professionelle folk såvel i det danske kontingent som i andre nationers kontingenter. De fleste som har deltaget i internationalt samarbejde, det være sig i humanitære eller militære operationer ved, at man ofte bliver nødt til at bøje sig hist og her for at få tingene til at glide. Stejle holdninger kommer man ikke så langt med – uanset om man har ret eller ej.

Forfatteren har formentlig ret i en lang række af sine synspunkter og iagttagelser, men læseren kender af gode grunde ikke hele historien fra alle parter. Der er nogle drøje – og formentlig velfortjente - hug til en række halvhjertede personer i sundhedstjenesten, som under deres udsendelse til Balkan og på senere udsendelser ikke arbejder optimalt. Chefer og andre får også læst og påskrevet, og der er ris til hær, flåde og flyvevåben, men der er også ros til de velfungerende og velmotiverede teams og enkeltpersoner, som hun møder. Hun er læge for "drengene", og dem er hun bekymret for. For dem er hun "*mamma doc*", som også er bogens titel. "Drengene" ved, at de har en professionel læge med. Hendes ekstra sprogkundskaber (polsk og russisk) giver hende ekstra muligheder som læge på Balkan og i Afghanistan samt som læge på et inspektionsskib i Nordatlanten, hvor en russisk trawler har brug for lægehjælp.

Der er ingen tvivl om, at forfatteren arbejder med ildhu, og hun har nemt ved at arbejde professionelt med engagerede mennesker under sin meget varierede tjeneste rundt omkring i forsvaret. Man kan også roligt tilføje, at hvis der er udsigt til en konfrontation, så spilder hun ikke chancen og går uden om den. Hendes omgivelser lærer også hendes temperament at kende, og diplomatisk er hun nok ikke. Hun nævner selv, at hun har været privilegeret i sin tjeneste. Hun har været på polaroverlevelseskursus i Thule, på dykkerkursus i Canada, sejlet som læge om bord i Flådens inspektionsskibe, været læge om bord i redningshelikoptere (S-61 og Lynx) og arbejdet på diverse felthospitaler på Balkan, i Irak og i Afghanistan. Hun har gjort sig mange erfaringer, foretaget observationer og nævnt problemområder, som hører med til det internationale samarbejde.

For personel i Forsvarets Sundhedstjeneste kan grader ikke sammenlignes med kvalifikationer, og helt galt går det, når man prøver at gøre det internationalt. En tysk oberstløjtnant på et felthospital i Afghanistan behøver ikke at være dygtigere end en dansk overlæge af major eller orlogskaptajnsgrad. Hun efterlyser et brugeligt system med kvalifikationer, og det bliver nok svært. Når hun, netop som tilfældet er i Afghanistan, fører sig frem med kritiske synspunkter om behandling og professionalisme på et tysk felthospital, så reagerer de øvrige læger på hospitalet ikke med lutter imødekommenhed. Endvidere har hun været præsenteret for mindre heldigt uddannet udenlandsk personel, som har lov til at foretage visse indgreb "*i særlige situationer*". De er ikke læger, men "*paraphysicians*", og dem er hun ikke glad for. Hvornår der foreligger "*en særlig situation*" er uklart for hende.

Det er en ganske spændende bog. Lægeløftet er et helt centralt emne, men det er lidt svært for læseren at følge alle hendes argumenter. Hvis man for eksempel som dansk læge for et kontingent udsendte soldater på Balkan hører om nød uden for lejren, så er det

prisværdigt, at lægen er med til at lindre denne nød, men hun bringer ikke svaret på, om lægen så skal kaste hele sin arbejdsindsats over på de millioner i nød, som er på den anden side af hegnet. Der må vel være en eller anden form for afgrænsning af lægeløftet, som man ikke hører om, ligesom de medbragte ressourcer skal anvendes fornuftigt.

Blandt hendes øvrige observationer og bekymringer skal følgende nævnes:

- *Hun er ked af, at læger, som af den ene eller anden grund midt i 1990'erne havde svært ved at få job, havnede i forsvaret, som åbenbart havde ry for at ansætte alle.*
- *Hendes erfaringer omkring traumer og samtaler er helt centrale, og personellet, som startede på Balkan fik ikke megen behandling på trods af voldsomme oplevelser.*
- *Forsvarsminister Søren Gade får ros, som en "VIP", som er nærværende og lytter til det udsendte personel, hvilket ikke gælder alle besøgende.*
- *Bogen rummer en udmærket omtale af CIMIC-folkenes arbejde for at forbedre det civile samfund i Afghanistan.*
- *Omtalen af et besøg i Kabuls kvindefængsel er særdeles tankevækkende og kunne i sig selv formentlig rumme stof til en hel bog.*
- *Hendes erfaring med udsendte journalister til indsatsområderne er, at de helst vil fokusere på de negative historier. De drikker for meget og burde have et helbredscheck, inden de udsendes, så de ikke bliver en ekstra belastning for en sanitetstjeneste med begrænsede ressourcer.*

Hendes håb er, at bogen medvirker til at åbne øjnene for de mennesker i forsvaret, som er i stand til at ændre på tingene. Hendes egen observation er, at en del af de ansatte ikke tåler kritik. Hun har forladt forsvaret efter 17 år.

Kritik kan være mange ting. Den kan være konstruktiv eller destruktiv, og de fleste af de her rejste problemer vil kunne tackles på en eller anden måde, men nogle af dem kræver tid og mentalitetsændringer. En række af kritikpunkterne fra 1993 og frem har formentlig allerede fundet deres løsning. Det meste af kritikken kan forhåbentlig bruges af forsvaret til at skabe forbedringer for de udsendte og for sundhedstjenesten. Forfatteren taler under alle omstændigheder af erfaring. Læsere fra forsvaret vil formentlig dele sig i to grupper: En for og en imod forfatteren.

Poul Grooss, kommandør,
Center for Militærhistorie, Forsvarsakademiet.

"Tæt på" af Maria Giørtz-Behrens. Udgivet af Gyldendal den 17. oktober 2011. 220 sider illustreret. Pris kr. 299,95 (vejledende).

Det er en interessant bog bygget op om en kvindelig civil fotograf, Maria Giørtz-Behrens, som under et besøg i Afghanistan bliver såret af en vejsidebombe og hermed bliver den første civile dansker, som bliver alvorligt såret i Afghanistan. Hun har taget en flot serie fotografier, og dem er der rigtig mange af. Hendes historie er fortalt til journalist Anne-Sofie Storm Wesche, som har sat ord på billederne. Sproget er desværre præget af "moderne journalistik", hvilket betyder, at skribenten ikke er i stand til at skelne mellem verberne "at ligge" og "at lægge", hvornår man skal bruge "hans" og "sin", "mig" og "jeg" samt "af" og "ad". Nogle fagudtryk eller militære termer i billedteksterne bliver først forklaret væsentlig senere i bogens tekst, og der bruges en del militære fagudtryk, som formentlig kun opfattes af militært personel.

Hovedpersonen er en ung 26-årig kvindelig fotograf, som er meget fotogen og sandelig med på mange af bogens billeder, men hun giver faktisk med sin historie til journalisten og sine meget beskrivende fotografier en veldokumenteret beretning om forholdene i Afghanistan. Hun får lov af Hærens Operative Kommando til at optage billeder til en kalender for personellet i Afghanistan. Historien indeholder en meget sød kærlighedshistorie, idet hun bliver kæreste med en af soldaterne. Hendes fortælling dækker indledningsvis alle problemerne omkring de udsendte og familierne, der går hjemme og frygter for et telefonopkald. På et tidspunkt er rollerne lige pludselig byttet om. Hun er udsendt, og hendes kæreste er hjemme i Danmark. Medens hun opholder sig ude i ørkenen, bliver hun såret af en voldsom vejsidebombe, og hun må opereres på et militærhospital i Afghanistan og senere på Rigshospitalet. Efter nogen tid går det op for hendes familie og hende selv, at hun lider af PTSD: *Post Traumatic Stress Disorder*.

Hun er en sej, lille dame, som meget gerne vil gøre noget for "drene" i Afghanistan, og fordi hun er kæreste med en af dem, så forstår hun deres problemer og deres hverdag. Hun fanger hele den ånd, som et godt militært team består af, og hun beskriver deres professionalisme, deres stolthed, sorg og glæde. Hendes billeder er fremragende. Det eneste man kan klage over er, at næsten alle motiverne er sand- og grusfarvede, men det er jo noget, der hører med til Afghanistan.

Dette er ikke en debatbog om Afghanistan. Til gengæld kan den bruges af folk, som gerne vil vide noget om de danske styrker i området, samt af pårørende til de udsendte, der vil se og høre lidt om, hvad det hele drejer sig om. Hun beskriver på en god måde, hvilke opgaver feltpræsten løser, hvorledes felthospitalet virker, hvorledes forsyninger bringes ud etc. Også hun har den observation (ligesom i bogen "*Mamma doc*" anmeldt oven for), at udsendte journalister helst vil kaste sig over negative historier i stedet for at beskrive noget, som går godt. Hun beskriver situationen, som hun har oplevet den, og hun tager ikke stilling til de overordnede beslutninger om krigen. Det lader hun andre om, men hun har været dygtig med kameraet samt til at fortælle journalisten om dagligdagen for de udsendte danske soldater.

Poul Grooss, kommandør,
Center for Militærhistorie, Forsvarsakademiet.

"Politik og sikkerhed i Mellemøsten – analyser og teorier" af Søren Schmidt. Udgives af Gyldendal den 24. november 2011. 120 sider illustreret. ISBN 9788702105483. Pris kr. 174.

Søren Schmidt, ph.d., er ekstern lektor på Roskilde Universitet samt ved Institut for Statskundskab på Københavns Universitet med speciale i Mellemøsten. *Politik og sikkerhed i Mellemøsten, analyser og teorier* er ikke et sammenhængende værk, men består af 16 selvstændige artikler med analyser af aktuelle emner og begivenheder i Mellemøsten, skrevet af Søren Schmidt. Alle artikler på nær én har været bragt i dagbladet Politiken mellem februar 2006 og marts 2011. Udover at give indblik i aktuelle begivenheder i Mellemøsten bredt forstået, er bogens formål også at demonstrere, hvorledes samfundsfaglige teorier kan anvendes i studiet af nutidige samfundsforhold. Således følger der efter hver analyse en kort og enkelt introduktion til den samfundsfaglige teori, som ligger til grund for den forudgående analyse.

Bogen er inddelt i fire hovedtemaer: Politik, sikkerhed, økonomi og religion. Hvert tema indeholder mellem tre og fem analyser, der relaterer sig til det pågældende emne. Indde-

lingen fungerer overordnet set udmærket, men virker i nogle tilfælde en smule søgt – primært i de to dele af bogen, der omhandler økonomi og religion.

Den politiske del indeholder analyser af henholdsvis omvæltningerne i Mellemøsten i forbindelse med det Arabiske Forår, Libyen efter Gaddafi, Egyptens militær, Israel-Palæstina problematikken samt fredsprocessen i Afghanistan. Der introduceres teorier omkring blød og hård magt, statsopbygning og interessegrupper. Afsnittet illustrerer glimrende de politiske bevægelser og den tumult, der er opstået blandt andet som følge af det Arabiske Forår, og de problemer der følger heraf.

Næste del har regional sikkerhed som hovedtema og analyserer krigen i Afghanistan og Irak, problematikken omkring Irans atomprogram samt Syriens sikkerhedspolitik. Realisme, spilteori og teorien om *"two level game"* tages her i anvendelse. Analyserne introducerer ganske udmærket konflikterne og sikkerhedsdynamikkerne i Mellemøsten og anskueliggør, hvorledes de spiller ind på resten af regionen. En mere detaljeret beskrivelse af forholdet mellem to af regionens vigtige spillere, Iran og Saudi-Arabien, kunne i den sammenhæng have været givtigt.

Bogens økonomiske del indeholder tre analyser: Syriens blomstrende økonomi med Kina som forbillede, den tilbagestående økonomiske situation i Irak og situationen i Pakistan. I disse afsnit præsenteres teorier som institutionel økonomi, om rentier- og produktionsstater samt om økonomisk udvikling og politisk styreform. Modsat den politiske og sikkerhedsmæssige del synes det sværere at få øje på den røde tråd gennem de tre analyser i denne del af bogen. Der er eksempelvis en analyse, som primært omhandler det pakistanske demokrati samt terrorbekæmpelse, hvilket synes kunstigt indplaceret i en økonomisk kontekst.

Fjerde og sidste del har religion som overordnet tema. Denne del indeholder tre analyser af henholdsvis efterspillet af krigen mellem Israel og Hizbollah i 2006, al-Sadrs tilbagevenden til den politiske scene i Irak samt en analyse og diskussion af, hvorvidt den daværende irakiske borgerkrig (artiklen er fra 2007) skyldtes religionsforskelle indenfor islam, eller om årsagen skulle findes andetsteds. Teorier om sociale bevægelser, sammenhængen mellem religion og politik samt hvordan etnisk-religiøse konflikter opstår i svage stater med et skrøbeligt eller ikke-eksisterende sikkerhedsapparat bringes i spil. Denne sidste del af bogen synes ligesom forrige del heller ikke at være lige så stringent som de to første. I den ene analyse nævnes religion blot i forbigarten og synes således svær at indplace-re i en "religiøs" kontekst. Der kommer dog en vigtig pointe frem, nemlig at der er grænser for, hvor meget religion kan forklare i Mellemøsten.

Overordnet kan bogen siges at have fire gennemgående pointer. For det første, at der blandt befolkningerne i Mellemøsten er et udbredt ønske om demokrati og erhvervelse og sikring af individuelle rettigheder, hvilket det arabiske forår er et udtryk for. Imidlertid står adskillige ting i vejen, før disse ønsker kan indfries – heriblandt manglende eller dårligt fungerende politiske institutioner, ringe retsstatsprincipper samt økonomier, der primært er domineret af olie. For det andet, at de regionale konflikter har væsentlig betydning for udviklingen i de enkelte stater. I den sammenhæng er det især udviklingen i den arabisk-israelske konflikt, striden om Irans atomprogram samt konflikten mellem Saudi-Arabien og Iran, der er afgørende for regionens fremtid. For det tredje, at det er begrænset, hvor stor forklaringskraft Islam har, når det drejer sig om at forstå de regionale dynamikker i Mellemøsten. Det er i den sammenhæng mere relevant at benytte sig af politiske, sikkerhedsmæssige samt økonomiske årsagssammenhænge frem for religiøse eller kulturelle forklaringer. Og for det fjerde, at Mellemøsten er ude af stand til selv at løse sine mange problemer.

Bogen er en udmærket introduktion til den politiske, sikkerhedsmæssige og økonomiske situation i Mellemøsten. Imidlertid fylder hver artikel ikke mere end omkring tre sider,

hvilket umuliggør en dybdegående analyse af den enkelte case. Det kan også diskuteres, hvorvidt definitionen af Mellemøsten er for bred, i og med at både Afghanistan og Pakistan er medtaget som regionale aktører. Bogen kan dog med fordel læses af folk, der ikke tidligere har beskæftiget sig med Mellemøsten, og som ønsker kendskab til de regionale dynamikker samt et indblik i hvilke samfundsaglige teorier, der kan trækkes på.

Andreas Da Cunha Bang, BA scient.pol., Københavns Universitet
Institut for Strategi, Forsvarsakademiet.

"F-16 – oplevelser på danske vinger" af Thomas Kristensen og Henning Kristensen. Udgivet af Gyldendal den 17. oktober 2011. 240 sider illustreret. Pris kr. 399,95 (vejledende).

Thomas Kristensen er selv F-16-pilot, og bogen er flot illustreret med farvefotos taget af fotograf Henning Kristensen fra Flyvevåbnet. Han går normalt under navnet "Foto-Henning", og han har siden 1981 siddet i bagsædet på mange "missions" og taget de fleste af de mange fotos. Thomas Kristensen har taget initiativet til bogen, men de enkelte afsnit er skrevet af forskellige F-16-piloter, som har haft en oplevelse med deres F-16-fly. Bogen er bygget op som en række fortællinger om danske F-16-fly, deres piloter og deres oplevelser. Begejstringen for flyet strømmer læseren i møde allerede fra forordet, og det er bogens gennemgående træk: Det er et fantastisk fly, det har en enorm motorkraft, og det kan manøvrere.

Blandt de 53 små historier fra piloterne står ni mindre indslag om kendte personer, som har fløjet i bagsædet på de tosædede udgaver af flyet. Det er interviews med Deres kongelige Højheder Kronprins Frederik og Prins Joachim, den tidligere forsvarsminister Søren Gade, en række journalister, eks-jægersoldaten B. S. Christiansen, en kvindelig læge samt endelig den tidligere forsvarschef Christian Hvidt, som fløj det første F-16-fly til Danmark i 1980.

Der er to afsnit om flyets tekniske egenskaber skrevet af ingeniør Kai E. Poulsen: Et om selve flyet som det så ud ved modtagelsen i 1980 samt om de efterfølgende modifikationer. Det andet handler om de danske fingeraftryk, som efterhånden er sat på nutidens F-16-fly. Takket være skrappe specifikationer fra Flyvertaktisk Kommando til forbedringer er det på en lang række områder lykkedes for Danmark at forbedre flyet samt sælge de danske løsninger til en række lande, her i blandt også USA. Det har givet Danmark en række eksportindtægter, først og fremmest til firmaet Terma.

En ordliste prøver at gøre det ud for den nødvendige tekstforklaring til den ganske uhildede læser, men her har forfatterne nok overvurderet læserskarens evner til at forstå flyverjargon. Den kunne godt have ti gange så omfattende.

Bogen er spækket med farestrålende fotos af F-16-fly i alle tænkelige situationer, og de er fantastisk flotte. Som nævnt, er hovedparten taget af bogens anden forfatter, Foto-Henning. Desværre er de alle uden tekst, så man må for eksempel selv tænke sig til, hvad landskabet nedenunder måske udgør. Endelig er der lidt oplysninger om eskadrillerne, som modtog de oprindelige F-16-fly, og hvad der blev af dem.

De enkelte historier varierer meget. Nogle piloter har skrevet flere, og de bringes i alfabetisk rækkefølge efter piloternes trebogstavs pilotnavn. Det er umuligt at undgå at lægge mærke til piloternes begejstring for at flyve F-16, og det er sådan set en styrke for bogen. En af piloterne udtrykker det klart på denne måde: "*The most fun you can have with your pants on!*". Den giver sig ikke ud for at være et litterært værk, men mange af hændelserne kredser jo om alvorlige hændelser. Man kan ikke undgå at blive imponeret over de flotte fotografier. Alvoren fremgår af ulykker og især de krigsmæssige missioner på

Balkan, i Afghanistan og senest i Libyen. Den første mission i Libyen er kommet med inden redaktionens slutning, og det var godt. Her har de danske F-16-fly og deres personel på jorden og i luften gjort en fremragende indsats.

Poul Grooss, kommandør,
Center for Militærhistorie, Forsvarsakademiet.

”Bortført i København – japanske skæbner i Nordkorea” af Asger Røjle Christensen. Udgivet af Gyldendal den 11. oktober 2011. 256 sider illustreret. Pris kr.299,95 (vejlende).

En ganske besynderlig bog om et ganske besynderligt emne. I de senere år har forholdet mellem de to nabolande Japan og Nordkorea ikke været særlig godt. Det skyldes blandt andet Nordkoreas atom- og missilprogram og Nordkoreas militante og aggressive optræden over for Sydkorea. Det største problem mellem de to lande er imidlertid den såkaldte ”bortførelsessag”, som jævnligt er forsidestof i Japan. Det er både en banal og en kompliceret sag. Omvendt hævder Nordkorea, at Japan ikke har sagt nok undskyld for Den anden Verdenskrig, så derfor behøver Nordkorea ikke nødvendigvis at holde sig til sandheden, hele sandheden og kun sandheden.

Hele sagen tager sit udgangspunkt i en flykaping i 1970. Nogle særdeles revolutionære japanske studenter kaprer et japansk rutefly og flyver til Nordkorea, som er komplet uforberedt på at få et sådant besøg. Efter moden overvejelse får studenterne asyl af de nordkoreanske myndigheder, som vurderer, at der nok ligger et politisk nyttigt potentiale gemt i de unge mennesker. De bliver isoleret og derpå opdraget i ”juche-filosofien”, som er et resultat af den store leder Kim Il-Sungs anskuelse. Der er tale om rendyrket hjernevask. Da det har stået på i nogle år, finder man i Nordkorea ud af, at disse mennesker, som jo ikke lever sammen med andre nordkoreanere, men holdes isoleret i en særlig revolutionær landsby, at de nok trænger til nogle japanske koner. Hvis man fik fat i nogle japanske kvinder, så kunne det resultere i nogle nyttige (japanske) børn, som kunne drage ud i verden og sprede Kim Il-Sungs glade budskab.

Herefter sættes Nordkoreas efterretningstjeneste til at kidnappe unge japanske kvinder. Metoderne er meget forskellige. Nogle bliver slået ned på japanske strande, puttet i en sæk og afskibet til Nordkorea. I andre tilfælde opsøger man enlige japanske kvinder i Vesteuropa, giver dem et jobtilbud og flyver dem til Pyongyang. En af disse bortførelser finder sted i København i 1983. PET er klar over, at noget er i gære, for mindst en af nordkoreanerne er kendt som efterretningsmand. Derfor foreligger der dokumentation om dette tilfælde, og PET har taget et foto af den kidnappede japanske pige, den 23-årige Keiko Arimoto, i selskab med nordkoreanere. Det er kun tre og et halvt år efter, at den nordkoreanske ambassade midlertidigt måtte lukke, da ambassaden var involveret i omfattende smugleri af tobak og spiritus – og formentlig også narkotika. De nordkoreanske ambassader skulle ifølge dekret være ”selvforsynende”. De fik ikke penge hjemmefra.

I løbet af 1990’erne bliver det klart i Japan, at en række forsvundne personer er blevet bortført til Nordkorea. Hermed bliver de japanske politikeres førsteprioritet at skabe klarhed over hændelserne og få de pågældende hjem igen. Nogle kommer hjem, men nogle er ifølge nordkoreanske myndigheder afgået ved døden. Der er dog ingen, som tror på de nordkoreanske myndigheders forklaringer, som rummer en mængde småfejl, fusk, usandheder etc. Måske er flere hundrede japanere blevet bortført, men ”den lille liste med navne”, som drøftes mellem de to lande, er på blot tretten personer. Det er relativt unge mennesker, og det virker statistisk usandsynligt, at otte ud af tretten skulle være omkommet

ved ulykker og sygdom på under tyve år. Keiko skulle ifølge oplysningerne være død, men nogle japanere i Nordkorea påstår, at de har set hende efter den officielle dødsdag.

Sagen bliver ikke opklaret, og der er ingen "happy end", men læseren får alligevel et nyttigt indblik i såvel japansk som nordkoreansk tankegang. Forfatteren har været korrespondent i Japan og er japansk gift. Han har en række væsentlige kontakter, som han trækker på for at få alle sagens aspekter frem. Tilbage i byen Kobe sidder Keikos forældre nu knap 30 år senere og aner faktisk ikke, om deres datter er i live. I Pyongyang sidder den kære leder Kim Jong-Il, og hvad han kan finde på, det er nok svært at gætte.

Poul Grooss, kommandør,
Center for Militærhistorie, Forsvarsakademiet.

"Bayeux tapetet" af Mogens Rud. Udgivet af Gyldendal den 29. september 2011. 160 sider illustreret. Pris kr. 199,95 (vejledende).

Bayeux tapet er blevet kaldt for verdens første tegneserie, og den centrale begivenhed er slaget, hvor Wilhelm Erobreren slår den engelske hær og bliver kronet til Englands konge. I denne bog er hele "tapetet", som i øvrigt er et 70 meter langt broderi, blevet affotograferet, og så gennemgår forfatteren hele den lange historie, som broderiet beskriver, herunder også hvorledes det er lykkedes at bevare tapetet frem til i dag. Der mangler formentlig en stump af det, og man har en formodning om, hvad der mangler. Alt det har resulteret i en meget flot og interessant bog. Højdepunktet i fortællingen er "slaget ved det grå æbletræ", som er bedre kendt som slaget ved Hastings i 1066. Det fandt i øvrigt ikke sted ved Hastings, men noget længere inde i landet ved det, der senere blev til et kloster og en lille by, som ligger på selve slagmarken, og som passende har fået stednavnet "Battle".

Forfatteren er arkæolog, og hans bog, som er et resultat af årelang interesse, er en fornyet udgave, hvor der er gjort meget ud af illustrationerne. Hele historien om arveforholdene til den engelske trone inden år 1066 er noget kompliceret, og det redegør forfatteren meget grundigt for. Når den engelske konge dør, kan tronen gå til enten hans familie i England, eller til de danske vikinger i England eller til normannerne. De sidstnævnte er efterkommere af vikinger, og de har i generationer boet i Normandiet. Hvis man ser på deres afbillede skibe, kan man tydeligt se, at de er bygget lige som vikingeskibe, og nogle af dem er forsynet med dragehoved. Hermed bliver læseren præsenteret for hovedpersonen med de mange navne: William Bastarden, William of Normandy, Wilhelm Erobreren eller Guillaume le Conquérant.

Formålet med tegneserien står ikke helt klart. En af hovedpersonerne er ham, der har betalt for det, nemlig Wilhelm Erobrerens halvbror, biskop Odo af Bayeux. Biskoppen deltog selv i hele slaget. Som kirkens mand måtte han ikke bruge et sværd, thi der står jo skrevet "*Alle som griber til sværd, skal falde for sværd*". Derfor ses han i stedet med en jernbeslået kølle, som ingen jo kan have nogen indvendinger imod.

Det er en forherligelse af Wilhelm Erobreren, biskoppen og selvfølgelig af de noble normanner. Forfatteren nævner en karakteristik af Wilhelm, som er lavet af en anonym munk i Caen få år efter hans død. Her omtales han som en velovervejede, veltalende og retfærdig mand. Han var mådeholdende med spise og drikke, og han afskyede drukken-skab. Han var viljestærk og kunne virke såvel barsk som overbevisende.

Forfatteren regner med, at biskop Odo har iværksat arbejdet med tapetet kort tid efter slaget i 1066. Det har formentlig skullet være klar til indvielsen af hans kirke i Bayeux i 1077. I en inventarliste fra kirken i 1400-tallet står anført, "*at tapetet hænges rundt langs*

kirkens skib ved relikviefesten". Tapetet er lavet til analfabeter, så der er indlagt opbygge- lige ting og moralske temaer, så som "at syndens løn er døden", at man skal holde sig på dydens smalle vej etc.

Tapetet beskriver en militær operation. Læseren kan følge med i "tegneserien", og de latinske sætninger er oversat. Små sproglige fejl indikerer, at den latinske tekst er skrevet af latinkyndige i England og ikke i Normandiet. Man kan følge bygningen af skibene, ombordtagning af heste etc. Når man når til den engelske kyst kan man se, at styrken samler proviant, og under selve slaget kan vi følge ryttere, bueskytter og andre kæmpende krige- re.

Poul Grooss, kommandør,
Center for Militærhistorie, Forsvarsakademiet.

"Gamle København – flere historier og fotos fra en svunden tid" af Jørgen Larsen. Udgivet af Gyldendal den 17. oktober 2011. 200 sider illustreret. Pris kr. 299,95 (vejledende).

Læsere af Berlingske Tidende har i årevis kunnet glæde sig over Jørgen Larsens histo- riske klummer. Sidste år udkom hans første bind (anmeldt i Militært Tidsskrift Nr. 1/2011), og her forligger fortsættelsen med i alt 73 små, interessante og vittige indlæg om Københavns historie. De er alle ledsaget af historiske fotografier.

En del af historien omhandler selvfølgelig byens militære anlæg så som Københavns befæstning, voldene, de militære vagter, Holmen, Nyboder og meget mere. Især voldene spiller en rolle, for da de omsider bliver opgivet som militært betydningsfulde områder, eksploderer byen ud over de gamle volde. Hermed får man også fortalt baggrunden for tilblivelsen af det moderne København.

Tager man bogens rækkefølge er blandt andet følgende emner behandlet, som på en eller anden måde har relation til de daværende militære styrker:

- Nedlæggelsen af den militære vagt på Vesterport i 1856,
- Opgivelsen af de militære volde omkring byen,
- Gammelholm og Nyholm,
- "Det andet Christiansborg" og branden i 1884,
- Københavns befæstning fra 1886 og
- Admiral Niels Juels palæ på Kongens Nytorv.

Forfatteren bemærker i disse forbindelser, at udbygningen på den anden side af vol- dene, på det nuværende Østerbro og Nørrebro, tog uforholdsmæssig lang tid, fordi hæren havde retten til at godkende alt byggeri. Her måtte kun bygges træhuse, som kunne ned- brændes i en fart, så skudfeltet var frit. Endvidere at Niels Juel var blevet en holden mand, fordi kongen skulle betale en vis del af den svenske flådes værdi. Den engelske gesandt (ambassadør) indberettede, at admiralen boede bedre end landets enevældige konge. Det er den bygning på Kongens Nytorv, som i dag huser den franske ambassade. Endelig skriver han, at da Venstre ikke ville yde noget til Københavns befæstning, så dannede for- svarsvennerne, som støttede Højre, foreningen "*Den frivillige Selvbeskatning til Forsvarets Fremme*".

Klummerne er korte, selvforklarende og meget humoristiske. Mange af forfatterens hi- storier er tankevækkende, og han har en dyb indsigt i emnet.

Poul Grooss, kommandør,
Center for Militærhistorie, Forsvarsakademiet.

"Minelæggerne af Falster-klassen 1962 - 2004" af Tom Wismann. Udgivet på forlaget Steel & Stone Publishing i oktober 2011. ISBN 978-87-994312-1-2. 48 sider illustreret. Pris kr. 110 incl. moms og porto ved henvendelse til forlaget: Tlf. 22 87 20 29, e-mail steel.stone@mail.tele.dk og www.flaadensskibe.dk.

I serien om Flådens skibe er Tom Wismann kommet til nummer ni, som omhandler de fire minelæggere af Falster-klassen. Inden beskrivelsen af disse minelæggere ridser forfatteren baggrunden op for minekrigsførelse i danske farvande og beskriver tidligere minelæggere. Efter den tyske besættelse startede Flåden mere eller mindre på bar bund. Tre mindre minelæggere havde klaret sig igennem trods begivenhederne den 29. august 1943, og i 1951 modtog Flåden minelæggeren *Langeland*. Da amerikanerne gik ind i våbenhjælp-programmet, havde minelægning høj prioritet, og to ombyggede amerikanske landgangsskibe, *Vindhunden* og *Beskytteren*, gav et tiltrængt tilskud til minelægningskapaciteten.

Da "Cost Sharing"-programmet blev en realitet, tilbød amerikanerne at betale for to af de fire planlagte afløsere for de ældre landgangsskibe. Chefen for Søminevæsenets Mine-sektion bad daværende kaptajn/løjtnant P. E. Pedersen (i søværnet kendt som PEP) om at se på specifikationerne på en fremtidig type minelægger, idet Orlogsværftets direktør havde indkaldt til et planlægningsmøde herom. Det fik han at vide umiddelbart inden en weekendvagt på Holmen, hvor der også var en værnepligtig ingeniør Levinsen ("teknikerløjtnant") på vagt. Han var uddannet skibsingeniør, og på denne vagt lavede de to det projekt, som siden er blevet kaldt verdens bedste minelægger. Da Orlogsværftets folk så dette forslag, blev deres eget lagt til side. Dette her var lavet af en erfaren mineofficer, som vidste, hvor problemerne omkring minelægning lå, og dem var der taget højde for.

USA betalte for *Falster* (skrognummer N80) og *Møen* (N82), medens Danmark betalte for *Fyen* (N81) og *Sjælland* (N83). Der blev bygget to minelæggere i Nakskov og to i Frederikshavn. Endelig modtog den tyrkiske flåde en minelægger magen til. Den blev bygget i Frederikshavn. Den fik NATO-skrognummer N108 og navnet *Nusret* efter en minelægger, som stoppede de allieredes Dardanellerkampagne under Den første Verdenskrig.

Bogen vil være til stor glæde for fast personel og værnepligtige, som har gjort tjeneste om bord i Falster-klassen. Det var nogle særdeles gode og velindrettede skibe. Bogen beskriver konstruktion, minelægningsopgaverne, aptering (indretning), maskineri, bevæbning, minelast, dagligliv om bord og meget mere. På midtersiderne ses Søværnets Materielkommandos tegninger over skibet.

De mange illustrationer viser godt og dårligt vejr, kongeligt besøg, minelægning, konfrontationer med Warszawapagten i Østersøen, grundstødning og meget andet. Endelig er der en fortegnelse over skibscheferne for de fire skibe og et "levnedsløb" for hvert enkelt skib. Omslaget er i farver. Øvrige illustrationer er i sort/hvid. De tre næste bøger/hæfter om henholdsvis korvetten *Thetis*, inspektionsskibene af *Hvidbjørnen*-klassen og fregatterne *Peder Skram* og *Herluf Trolle* imødeses med spænding. Disse hæfter er meget nyttige og populære for personel, som tidligere har sejlet med enhederne.

Poul Grooss, kommandør,
Center for Militærhistorie, Forsvarsakademiet.

Skrivevejledning

Af hensyn til tidsskriftets ensartede fremtræden og forenkling af redaktionsprocessen bør manuskripter, der sendes til *Militært Tidsskrift*, være udformet i overensstemmelse med nedenstående retningslinjer:

Manuskripter afleveres elektronisk (som vedhæftet fil på e-mail eller FIIN, alternativt på diskette). Illustrationer i form af figurer, tabeller eller lignende afleveres desuden i hard copy. Så vidt muligt skrives teksten i Word, Arial 12 pkt. med halvanden linjeafstand. Såfremt teksten er skrevet i et andet program, anføres programmets navn. Der skrives *uden* fast højremargin og *uden* orddeling. Under artiklens titel anføres forfatterens titel, navn og tjenestested. Dog gives boganmeldelser ingen titel, men indledes med bogens bibliografiske reference (se eksempel nedenfor); anmelderens titel, navn og tjenestested anføres efter anmeldelsen.

Afsnitoverskrifter (mellemrubrikker) skrives med **fed** skrift og nummereres ikke. Benyt højst to niveauer af mellemrubrikker. Såfremt der benyttes to niveauer, skrives mellemrubrikken i 2. niveau i *kursiv*. Der foretages ikke indrykning af første linje i nyt afsnit efter mellemrubrik eller efter figurer og tabeller samt længere citater. Ved alle andre nye afsnit begynder teksten ved første tabulatorstop. Der er ikke blank linje mellem afsnit.

Citater på mindre end fire linjer skrives som løbende tekst. Længere citater rykkes ind og skrives med blank linje før og efter citatet. Efter indrykning på grund af citatet begynder teksten ved venstre margin. Kursivering og understregning bør begrænses mest muligt. Det samme bør anvendelsen af militære forkortelser. Første gang en forkortelse (bortset fra alment kendte som EU, NATO og lignende) anvendes, bør den forklares i en efterfølgende parentes. Anvendte forkortelser er: osv., dvs., mv., jf. bl.a. I løbende tekst skrives pct. (ikke %). Skriv 1990'erne (ikke 1990erne). Der kan anvendes enten grammatisk kommatering eller "nyt komma", blot bør det være konsekvent.

Noter placeres som fodnoter, ikke slutnoter. Der benyttes enkelt linjeafstand i noter. I noter kursiveres bogtitler og tidsskriftsnavne. Artikelstitler sættes i anførselstegn. Forfatterens titel/grad medtages ikke.

Eksempler på noter: Poul Kiærskou, "Forberedelse til indsættelse af i den internationale mission". *Militært Tidsskrift*, nr. 4, 2003, pp. 558-566. Michael Howard, *Den Første Verdenskrig*. København: Borgen, 2004, p. 17. Friis Arne Petersen, "The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy 2003" i Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2004, pp. 5-24.

I en note, der henviser til litteraturen i en umiddelbart foranstående note skrives: Ibid. efterfulgt af sidetal. Henvises der til en tidligere note, skrives forfatterens efternavn efterfulgt af op.cit., der igen følges af sidetal.