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## RESEARCH PAPER

### **SECURITY SECTOR STABILISATION IN A NON-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT**

A contribution to Multinational Experiment 6 (MNE-6)

**By Dr. Peter Dahl Thruelsen**

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Multinational Experiment 6 (MNE-6) represents the latest in the MNE series of experiments. The experiment series began in November 2001 as a venue to develop better methods to plan and conduct coalition operations. MNE-6 is a two-year effort involving 16 nations and NATO's Allied Transformation Command (ACT). The goal is to improve coalition capabilities using a whole of government approach to counter actions of irregular adversaries and other non-state actors.

Dr. Peter Dahl Thruelsen is a research fellow at the Institute for Strategy, the Royal Danish Defence College. His main area of research is conflict resolution, nation building, security sector reform and counterinsurgency. The author can be contacted by mail at: [ifs-71@fak.dk](mailto:ifs-71@fak.dk)

Institute for Strategy - [ifs@fak.dk](mailto:ifs@fak.dk)  
Faculty of Strategy and Military Operations  
Royal Danish Defence College PO Box 2521 DK-2100 Copenhagen



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Copenhagen March 2010  
Royal Danish Defence College  
Ryvangs Allé 1  
DK-2100 Copenhagen  
Denmark  
Phone: +45 3915 1515  
Fax: +45 3929 6172  
Editor: Director, Institute for Strategy, Nicolas T. Veicherts,  
ifs-01@fak.dk, phone +45 3915 1210  
Graphic Design by Bysted  
Layout by Bent-Ole Kure  
ISBN: 9788791421945

Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House

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## Security Sector Stabilisation and Reform in a Non-permissive Environment<sup>1</sup>

Security sector stabilisation (SSS) and subsequent security sector reform (SSR) in a non-permissive environment are not straightforward processes. Many would argue that the mere character of this environment undermines many of the fundamental elements of reform, and that trying to implement a full-scale SSR programme is doomed to fail because of the many compromises that need to be made while the fighting is ongoing. Whereas SSR is inherently a political activity and traditionally builds on a negotiated peace deal in which the conditions for SSR are specified, SSS focuses on '...the range of activities that enable essential and minimum security functions to be established and maintained...'<sup>2</sup> In a non-permissive environment, where no or only fragile political institutions and political systems are available, the internal political activities needed to supervise a complete SSR programme, i.e. rebuilding sustainable core security structures and oversight bodies, often do not exist, thereby hampering both local ownership and the long-term sustainability of the reform programme. It is within this context that SSS programmes are implemented as the initial driver to create the conditions needed for a full SSR programme later.

This paper will focus on implementing SSS (with the aim of a full SSR programme) in a non-permissive environment and on identifying lessons in order to balance the short-term challenges with a long-term focus so that the initial efforts of the reform programme will not undermine long-term success. The focus will be on the role of external military forces in building the core security actors and their connection with the management and oversight bodies (see Figure 2). When talking of balancing the challenge, it is important to emphasise that SSS in a non-permissive environment can only lead the way towards a full SSR, and that SSS cannot be seen as a full programme implementation. It is important that this is understood, even though compromises have to be made. If not, there is a great risk of the short-term focus undermining the long-term goals, thus creating new institutions that are not subject to political or civilian control and that cannot become sustainable without an external presence. An initial SSS programme that is implemented while the fighting is still ongoing therefore still needs to be holistic in nature and led by a long-term strategy with a clear political aim. When the local administrative capacity and experience are not sufficiently present or are too weak, there will be an initial dominant external lead with local participation, but only minor local ownership and lead. However, this balance will have to shift so that the focus on sustainability can be prioritised in the interests of a transition taking place.

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(1) This paper builds on inputs (MNE-6 study papers) from Denmark, Norway and United Kingdom, and on review comments from the MNE-6 community. A special thanks to the British and Italian participants.

(2) Stabilisation Unit (2009): *Stabilisation Issues Note: Security Sector and Rule of Law*, p. 10. <http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/resources/securitysectorlaw.pdf>

Working within the spectrum of conflict, SSS and following SSR is seen as crucial elements that should be led by the same long-term politically defined strategy, but with greater emphasis on creating security on the right side of the spectrum as a precondition for implementing the full programme when moving to a more permissive environment (see Figure 1). This understanding is vital because focusing only on SSS as an element in establishing security in a counterinsurgency environment will probably not lead to a politically controlled security sector capable of meeting the needs of the local population when the fighting has ceased. Thus SSS in a non-permissive environment will probably be unable to re-establish the state's authority and its monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, but will be able to create instruments along the way led by the long-term strategy, thereby creating and underpinning the crucial basis for a complete SSR programme.




Figure 1: Spectrum of conflict<sup>3</sup>

To define a non-permissive environment, the above description of the spectrum of conflict and the campaign themes within it will be used. The four campaign themes<sup>4</sup> are not to be identified by the activities involved but are determined by the context and the conditions that exist in the area of operations.<sup>5</sup> The level of non-permissiveness moves along this spectrum from general war fighting to low-risk military engagement. The absence of violence in the form of organised kinetic

(3) Based on NATO ATP 3.2.1: Land Operations

(4) The four campaign themes are: Major Combat (MC), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Peace Support (PS) and Peacetime Military Engagement (PME).

(5) NATO AJP-3.2: Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, pp. 1-9.

activities against the host government and coalition forces illustrates the move from counterinsurgency to peace support. The recommendations and considerations regarding SSS presented in this paper will focus on the context of organised violence in which an insurgency challenges the sovereignty of the host nation (see Figure 1).

- Core security actors: armed forces; police service; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coastguards; border guards; customs authorities; and reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias).
- Management and oversight bodies: the executive, national security advisory bodies, legislative and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).
- Justice and the rule of law: judiciary and justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; and customary and traditional justice systems.
- Non-statutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security companies, political party militias.

Figure 2: Elements and actors in security sector reform<sup>6</sup>

### **Security sector programmes and stabilising states**

Building national security forces is not a new phenomenon in counterinsurgency. Building both the national police and the military to take over responsibility for security gradually in an insurgency-affected country has taken place in most historical campaigns. It was seen by the British in Malaya and the US in Vietnam, where building both the local police and the military became a crucial part of the strategy. Recent experience in Iraq showed that building national security forces became a cornerstone of the ‘surge’ and its eventual success. National security forces in a non-permissive environment, however, has not always been seen as an integrated element of a complete SSR programme, but primarily as something to ease the pressure on the external forces, provide the local population with an alternative and acquire extended intelligence from the local environment in which the operations were conducted. As John A. Nagl puts it, ‘Those forces embedded with the local population become intelligence collectors and analysts – the key to ultimate

(6) OECD (2007): *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform – Supporting Security and Justice*, p. 22. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf>

victory. They are the holders and builders, and generally should consist of local forces leavened with advisors from the counterinsurgency force.<sup>7</sup>

In contemporary conflicts, local capacity-building has proved to be more than just a matter of satisfying tactical-level needs; it also incorporates strategic, political-level accountability and ownership, reforming the entire security sector and not just some of the tactical elements. This development should be seen as a natural and crucial element in capacity-building to ensure democratic control over the new security sector.

Since the early to mid-1990s, the extended package of national capacity-building – SSR – has been on the agenda when long-term, sustainable solutions to conflict and post-conflict situations have been sought. The agenda at this stage was dominated by the wish to control and demobilise the various armed formations in the conflict, and programmes focusing on disarmament frequently became an integral part of UN resolutions agreed upon prior to the deployment of UN peacekeepers. Mere disarmament, however, was often not enough to stabilise the post-conflict situation, and programmes for soldier reintegration and the rebuilding of police and military forces began to emerge. It became obvious that, when demobilising the former warring factions, a security vacuum might emerge that could seldom be filled by international troops, making the need for a new and reformed security sector urgent. In a report issued by the UN Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace*,<sup>8</sup> the UN not only found itself securing ceasefires, but also becoming involved in aspects such as:

disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.<sup>9</sup>

These new tasks were again emphasised in the 1995 report, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*,<sup>10</sup> while the *Brahimi Report*<sup>11</sup> of 2000 recommends reforming the core function of the UN with respect to the role of peacekeeping to meet the new challenges.

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(7) John A. Nagl (2006): 'Forward', in Galula, David (1964): *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Praeger Security International, London, United Kingdom, p. ix.

(8) <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html> A/47/277 - S/24111.

(9) <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html> paragraph 55 (A/47/277 - S/24111).

(10) <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html> A/50/60 - S/1995/1.

(11) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/)

## Security sector stabilisation and reform

As has been seen, building national security forces is not a new phenomenon within the context of military engagements in external states. The recent US doctrine on counterinsurgency warfare, FM 3-24, stresses this by stating that ‘Developing effective HN [Host Nation] security forces—including military, police, and paramilitary forces—is one of the highest priority COIN [counterinsurgency] tasks’.<sup>12</sup> Several empirical lessons based on classic counterinsurgency campaigns support this point, as Marcus Skinner has observed. First, the establishment of security and of the rule of law in order to win the support of the local population are crucial. Secondly, the national security forces, especially the police, ‘provide a vital connection to the people....’<sup>13</sup> Finally, the provision of security is a precondition for the state’s survival.<sup>14</sup> Thus the importance of incorporating this focus into the campaign plan early on in the engagement is emphasised. The overall aim with this focus is to a large extent to localise ownership of the engagement by transferring security tasks from the external to the internal security forces.

Theory and practice show that there is more to local capacity-building than merely satisfying tactical-level needs: it also incorporates a strategic focus with political-level accountability and ownership, as well as a broader focus on reforming the entire security sector. This development should be seen as a natural and crucial element of capacity-building in order to ensure democratic control over the new security sector. As the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations explains, the objective in building a new security sector – security sector reform – is to create:

effective, accountable and sustainable security institutions operating under civilian control within the framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights. The focus should be on executive security agencies, armed forces, police and law enforcement agencies, relevant line ministries and judicial and civil society oversight bodies.<sup>15</sup>

However, implementing these elements in a non-permissive environment is complex or even impossible. The overwhelming security concerns in this environment and the need to create a minimum level of stability foster activities that to some extent compromise the above. Therefore, a short-term tactical-level focus to achieve this minimum level of stability is needed to enable later progress on the more traditional SSR elements. The British Stabilisation Unit has described this balance in the following way:

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(12) FM 3-24: *Counterinsurgency*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, United States, pp. 6-22.

(13) Skinner, Marcus (2008): ‘Counterinsurgency and State Building: An Assessment of the Role of the Afghan National Police’, in *Democracy and Security*, 4: 290-311, Taylor & Francis Group, p. 292.

(14) Ibid.

(15) See: Decision No. 2007/11 of the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee.

Security Sector Stabilisation (SSS) activities are very different from Security Sector Reform (SSR). SSR refers to a comprehensive set of activities taking place under strong national political leadership, owned by a broad set of indigenous stakeholders and operating within a framework of democratic accountability. These conditions are very unlikely to exist in stabilisation environments. However, SSS and rule of law activities can help lay the foundations for SSR by promoting political consensus, building capacity for civilian oversight and adopting a sector-wide approach.<sup>16</sup>

The challenge becomes how to strike a balance between satisfying the concern for security improvements and maintaining a strategic focus on the political system and institutions and civil society so that the initially created tactical-level structures will not undermine long-term sustainability and ownership. Holistic programmes from full-scale SSR implementation should therefore still lead the way, but initial benchmarks and less strict criteria probably have to be employed in the phase from SSS to SSR. For example, national participation is crucial, but national lead when no capacity for it is to be found can easily hamper the progress of the whole programme, as well as foster internal rivalry between the local parties in the programme. This does not mean that national lead is not the strategic aim, but simply that the local capacity for lead must be built prior to this stage.

In looking at the whole SSR package and not just the initial stabilisation activities mentioned by the Stabilisation Unit, Herbert Wulf has identified four dimensions of reform: political (civilian oversight and good governance), economic (allocation of resources and sustainability), social (internal and external security guarantee) and institutional (security structure and division of labour).<sup>17</sup> All four dimensions must be objects of reform from the beginning, including within a non-permissive environment or counterinsurgency context (see Figure 3 for a historical example). However, this is not always possible in the initial phases of reform in an environment such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Iraq. Here the long-term objectives of, for example, good governance and security guarantees will not develop as quickly as the short-term aspects of building security structures and training personnel.

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(16) Stabilisation Unit (2009): *Stabilisation Issues Note: Security Sector and Rule of Law*, p. 11. <http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/resources/securitysectorlaw.pdf>

(17) Wulf, Herbert (2004): *Security-Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries*, Berghof Research Center, Berlin, Germany, pp. 4-5.

### Experiences from Malaya

A historical example where the balance between building efficient national security forces and the eventual transfer of these to a sustainable host government is the experience of the British in the Malayan Emergency. When the British initiated a programme of building a national army and police force, the point of departure was poorly trained and equipped security forces not capable of engaging in the insurgency. In the initial phase of the Malayan Emergency from 1948-50, the focus was on quantity more than quality in building up the local security forces. This strategy contributed with other elements to gaining greater initiative over the insurgents and eventually turning the campaign around. An important element in the British strategy, the Briggs Plan, was also to focus on the long term. Among other things, '[t]he police were redirected back to normal, rather than paramilitary, duties' once the insurgency had peaked. From mid-1952 the retraining of the police by putting them through four-month training courses thus began by using the improved security situation as a window for improving the local security forces and transferring them to more traditional duties as the population requested. Together with this the British placed a strong focus on building a functioning administration and on securing the 'hearts and minds of the people' in the struggle against the insurgents. At the end in the 1950s, the British left the country, leaving a largely functioning democratic state capable of defeating the remnants of the insurgents.

Figure 3: Experiences from Malaya<sup>18</sup>

Below, three phases and elements of SSS as a precondition for full-scale SSR in a non-permissive environment will be examined. The focus will be on core security actors – more precisely the armed forces and the police service – and on different elements of importance to be considered prior to and during implementation. The three phases and elements are: planning and implementation; assessing progress; and transition to the host nation. At the end of this paper, a matrix will list the main recommendations (Figure 7). Before proceeding, however, it should be stressed that all conflict settings are unique and that elements such as culture, history, ethnicity, political system, economic foundation and educational level have to be built into the specific country programme if successful implementation is to be achieved.

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(18) Corum, James S. (2006): *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, p. vi.; Dixon, Paul (2009): 'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, volume 32, Issue 3 June 2009, pp. 369-70. and Hack, Karl (2009): The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, volume 32, Issue 3 June 2009, pp. 388 and 396.

## Planning and implementation of SSS and SSR in a non-permissive environment

### Lead and command and control

A fundamental point of departure when engaging in SSS as a precondition for SSR and more specifically when building national security forces in a non-permissive environment is to define within the mandate who the overall champion is, that is, who is in charge. There is no general rule or experience that points to either a lead nation or a lead organisation as the best option. Experience does, however, indicate that a clear lead is needed and that this lead should be undertaken by an actor of a size that is capable of both critical decision-making (political capital) and implementing these tough decisions (resource foundation). It has often been seen that the lead actor (international or national) is too weak or not genuinely involved in the tasks, with severe consequences for successful programme implementation.

When the lead has been decided, it is important to get other actors with an interest in the process to acknowledge the role of the lead actor and to accept that bilateral involvements have to be rooted and made subject to the champion. It is often seen in crisis management that too many resources are used just to coordinate efforts between many bilateral actors with the aim of not implementing projects that duplicate or undermine other already existing projects. It should be accepted that actors who only participate bilaterally with no interest in coordinating the various efforts can be excluded from the programme. Therefore, the lead should be an actor that has both the mandate and the prestige to take that hard decision. That said, it is recognised that, subject to the overall lead, the sub-strategic leadership can be implemented through a variety of actors, and that the lead actor can change from level to level within the mission. This means that, within a specific mission, but subject to the champion, different actors can take the lead on e.g. the regional, provincial and district levels. Also, situations can emerge where a strong bilateral involvement is needed to bring a negative development back on track. This was, for example, seen in Somalia in 1993 where the US-led United Task Force (UNITAF) intervened to create a secure environment in Mogadishu when the UN mission in the country had failed to do so. Later this was also seen in Sierra Leone in 2000, when the British government decided to send a force to the country with the purpose of restoring order, especially in Freetown, in support of the UN mission there. For bilateral interventions such as these, however, it is important that they are in close cooperation and coordination to the appointed lead of the mission to avoid undermining each other's objectives.

Within the lead actor, a clear command and control structure should be created. There should be only one chain of command, which must be transparent for both the host nation and the external actors (i.e. civil society organisations) so that they can follow the process – a crucial element of long-term SSR. In missions where this

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transparent structure cannot be implemented for some reason and where the leadership is not clear or followed by all actors, a transversal coordination mechanism should be sought. Within this overall body, activities such as planning, coordination and assessments of programme progress should be treated continuously for the complete duration of the programme.

### **Starting structure and strategy**

A clear mandate and strategy are crucial for successful programme implementation. The mandate should include the overall strategic benchmarks for the SSS and SSR programme and should authorise the lead champion of the process. This is crucial to prevent internal revivalism and tension between external and especially internal power-brokers of the former warring factions. The mandate also has to consider how and when to dissolve the former militias, and whether or not they are to be incorporated into the new forces. Unsolved questions of former militias often hamper later progress when this is not dealt with at an early stage.

Even though initial implementation of SSS in a non-permissive environment will focus on stability generation, the programme should be led by a long-term sighted strategy. This should be developed early on in the process for all elements of the security services, incorporating also the sequencing of the different elements to support and not undermine each other. It has often been seen that too narrow a focus on satisfying short-term tactical-level security needs without having a clear structure for transforming tactical progress into long-term sustainability can prolong the subsequent SSR programme extensively. When formulating the strategy, however, it is important to keep in mind the fact that the strategy should be open to adaptation when internal or external preconditions for formulating the strategy change. Especially in a non-permissive environment, adapting the strategy should not be seen as a fiasco. On the contrary, it should be seen as reflecting the necessary strategic maturity of the actors involved in an environment of this complexity.

The mandate and following strategy should define the overall organisation and structures early in the programme. The crucial decision on whether to build the national security forces on existing structures (replenishment) or new ones (rebuilding) has to be taken at this stage. This decision should be built on an analysis of the history of the country, the armed struggle, the role of the security forces and the local power structures. The strategy must also incorporate other elements of the greater SSR programme, meaning that SSS is not a final or stand-alone programme. At a minimum, how the different elements correspond to each other is important for sequencing implementation. Here elements such as the rule of law and the state of the justice sector play an important role when building new police and military forces. All these elements have to go hand in hand.

### **Political control and national ownership**

Implementing SSR in a permissive environment traditionally leaves room for an early national lead of the programme. However, this is seldom the case when planning SSS in a non-permissive environment or in an environment in which the political structures and human capital have been eroded due to decades of conflict. When this is the point of departure, local participation in the new government structures has to be planned according to the level of capacity that exists in the country. The strategy of the programme should take into account a sequenced incorporation of local actors with the eventual aim of a full transformation to a national lead (which will probably occur in the SSR phase). One could divide the level of local involvement into local participation as the mildest level of inclusions, followed by local ownership and eventually local lead. In some sectors local lead might be possible from day one, but in other sectors only local participation might be possible. This means that one of the main identified external actors will take the lead until the local capacity has been built up to replace this actor.

Despite the preconditions, local ownership and lead should eventually be the aim of the programme. This has to be signalled clearly to the host nation as a natural lever for transition. If the local population is not incorporated into the newly formed structures, it will not be confident that it will ultimately be able to control the future of their own country.<sup>19</sup> Eventually, this will create resistance and undermine the prospects for a successful transition. Local participation should therefore be clearly formulated at the beginning of the programme with the aim of listing transparent goals and signalling to the local population that the new security forces are not merely an element of external control and colonisation – this is not just a patron–client relationship. This means that clear criteria for handover and lead should be available early in the reform process so that it can gradually be implemented on the basis of local evidence-based analysis and evaluation. Therefore, as an element in establishing political control and national lead and ownership, programmes must be launched within the SSS phase to build local institutional capacity at ministry level, as well as the administrative and technocratic capacity to support lower-level program implementation and the long-term sustainability of the new structures.

### **Size of the structures and funding**

SSR in a permissive environment will normally give the economic dimension substantial weight when determining the size of the new security structure. In this context, the actual economic state of the country, together with its economic potential, will be important focal points, and this dimension will probably be the most important one. However, when engaging in SSS in a non-permissive environment, the economic dimension will play only a minor role in the initial stages of the programme, when

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(19) Edelstein, David M. (2004): *Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail*, International Security, Vol. 29, No.1, pp. 49-91.

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the focus is on stabilising the country. In this context, the size of the new structures should be built on extensive evidence-based assessments of the security situation in the country. This means that analysis conducted in the field down to the provincial and district levels should be carried out to determine the local security dynamics and threats that the new security forces will have to counter when they have been deployed around the country. The size of the new security forces should then be determined on the basis of this analysis.

This does not mean that the economic dimension and ultimate economic sustainability should not be part of the assessment. Economic considerations have to be built into the long-term strategic goals of the SSR programme, but the economic burden will have to be carried by the external actors through the SSS phase, otherwise it will probably not be possible to build new security forces of a size that are capable of stabilizing the country. The economic burden on the external actors in this context should not be underestimated, therefore economic trust funds earmarking funds for the SSS process should be established early in the process. These trust funds should be flexible with regard to their allocation so that the strategic plan will determine resource allocation and priority and not be determined by individual donor preferences. This flexibility will allow the lead actor to prioritise the resources in alignment with the strategy, the evolving security situation and the constant assessment of programme progress.

### **Training, monitoring and mentoring**

This element is fundamental in balancing the relationship between the quality and quantity of the new security structures. As seen in the Malayan emergency, building large numbers of national security forces can have a crucial effect on the momentum of the insurgency. It is, however, vital that these new forces are subject to external monitoring and mentoring if they are to cope professionally with the extensive security challenges and adapt to the ever-changing environment. Also, when implementing such programmes in the SSS phase, plans for reforming the trained units when entering the SSR programme must be made ready early in the process. This is especially important if one wants to avoid initiatives in the SSS phase that will ultimately undermine the programmes of SSR, thereby creating a holistic approach to programme implementation. Here international training and mentoring teams play a profound role in all stages of this development, from basic training to participating in combat operations and eventually in the transition process. These teams will have to follow the national units 'on the job', mentoring them and monitoring their progress (see Figure 4). In doing so, they also become the international community's ears and eyes in relation to the local forces by trying to avoid abuse, looting, corruption and other activities that will undermine the local perception of the new forces as legitimate security providers.

Especially the element of corruption seems to be universal in this environment, and the international actors must establish mechanisms to handle the problem. Without a doubt, corruption performed by the national security forces contributes to public fear and alienation and can in extreme cases turn the public away from the government by undermining the trust between it and the local population. Training and supporting e.g. police officers when they are perceived to be corrupt and illegitimate by the locals can escalate the already precarious situation in the area. The question often facing the international actors and host nation is probably not how to eliminate all the corruption in the SSS phase, but rather which kinds of corruption should be tolerated and which not. Some types of corruption will not be perceived as a problem from a local perspective, but only from an international one. It would probably be unrealistic to tackle all corruption, such as salaries allocated to police widows in the absence of a system of compensation or citizens paying the local police to stay at their posts to secure the area, and this would probably also be counterproductive in the SSS phase. Over time as part of SSR, developments and reforms will prove much more efficient than cracking down on the low-level individuals taking bribes. In the SSS phase, the international trainers and mentors will play an important part together with centrally controlled pay reforms to increase the salaries of the national security forces and ensure that those salaries end up in the pockets of ordinary officers.

Mentoring teams working in a non-permissive environment will have to be formed with experienced international military and police personnel, who will often have to work side by side to counter the security threat. When building local capacity in this environment, different types of security forces should be formed and trained. Fighting e.g. insurgents will help ensure that regular police, criminal investigation police, gendarme-type police and community police are all available for the variety of tasks that emerges. The regular police and criminal investigation units should be used in the major cities and major infrastructures, the gendarmerie in the most troubled areas and for civil unrest, and the community police in the rural areas and smaller villages. This variety of units will then need to be trained and mentored by equally specialised units from the international community (gendarmes training gendarmes etc.).

For this purpose, training centres should be built across the country, taking into consideration the local infrastructure, local power dynamics, security situation and ethnicity so as to enable balanced recruitment and appropriate ethnic representation in the new forces. At these centres, common training programmes should be developed for all the new units to go through. Bottom-up programmes not aligned from centre to centre will not work in an environment in which these units might meet in combat. Where close cooperation is essential – a common standard should be the point of departure. Hereafter, when units end their basic training and are stationed across the country, they will often have to receive additional training

specifically designed for their operational environment. At this stage, building on a common level, locally adapted programmes building on area to area experiences should be the focus of the specialised training. This specialised training programme will often differ from region to region because of the character of the local environment and the external military involvement there.

Again international training and mentoring teams must be involved. They must be formed so as to reflect the security environment and subsequent tasks and have an inbuilt method for constantly collecting lessons from the field, as well as to build these into the specialised training programmes. An important element for the international teams is continuously to include local instructors so that the trainer programmes are developed simultaneously. In this environment, focusing on the local characteristics of the specialised training programmes will often be of longer duration than traditional programmes because the soldiers have to be able to participate in quite complex combat operations shortly after training.

Depending on the initial mandate of the programme, training programmes for transferred officers from formerly warring parties will have to be prepared. Often these officers have not had a formal military or police education, and they will therefore have a hard time filling the position they have been assigned in the new security forces. This can result in inefficient units and create tensions within the new forces. Also, educational programmes focusing on reading and writing may be needed depending on the specific level of illiteracy in the country: for example, police officers who cannot read or write will not be able to handle the job of community policing which the local population often expects.

**Police mentoring**

To coach, teach and mentor police units to support the development of a professional, ethical, fit-for-purpose police service, capable of spreading the Rule of Law and the authority of the Host Nation across districts in accordance with central policy direction and national standards and within the wider Rule of Law architecture. The police must be able to perform community policing, law enforcement and counter-insurgency duties independent of external assistance, other than in extreme circumstances, and must be loyal to the Host Nation and accountable to and trusted by the communities it serves.

**Army mentoring**

To coach, teach and mentor army units, provide the conduit for liaison and command and control (C2) and when required, support the operational planning and employment of the army unit to which it is assigned in order to support the development of a self-sufficient, competent and professional army capable of maintaining national security and ensuring territorial integrity.

Figure 4: The role of police and military mentoring and training teams in Afghanistan

**Short- vs. long-term planning and the division of labour**

There is a tendency when conducting SSS in a non-permissive environment to blur the division of labour between the main elements of the new security forces – the police and the army. Often regular police units are seen performing tasks which traditionally would be for the army to solve, and with the regular police not trained for these duties, local perceptions of the police will be undermined. Local police forces have a crucial role in strengthening relations between the host nation and the local population. If the police stationed in the rural areas and local villages are not trained and educated for this role – i.e. community policing – the balance that should be achieved between the initial stabilisation phase (SSS) and the transformation towards consolidation of the initial progress (SSR) can be undermined. In this continuum, the availability of local police trained for community policing and not as light infantry is crucial to build the all-important relations with the local population. On the other hand, police units trained for a more active stabilising role in close cooperation with the army should also be made available. This might, for instance, be paramilitary units such as gendarmes who are trained and equipped to work in the grey area of the stabilisation environment and who can take an active part in the more challenging tasks. These units will be the robust police units without the ‘community component’, but supplemented by trained community police where the situation allows these to be active.

In this environment, it is important not to emphasize short-term tactical stabilisation at the expense of the long-term strategic focus, as this will undermine the initial gains. Both short-term and long-term capacities must be developed simultaneously. Therefore, training programmes and strategies for refocusing the security forces from initial SSS activities to more traditional duties should be ready early in the programme. This means that additional training such as traffic, criminal investigation and community policing for the former robust police units should be planned and implemented so as to be constantly ahead of developments on the ground. This also means that the division of labour between the army and the police should be clear so that police units that are not trained for the task do not become an extended arm of the army when conducting complex combat operations. Such an approach will most likely hamper the whole programme, and especially the local population’s perception of the role of the new security forces.

As a last element, too strong a tactical focus on stabilisation effects has a tendency to down-prioritise the supporting structures of the new security forces. Here especially elements such as support units, logistics and maintenance (combat support and combat service support) should be a part of the strategy from the beginning if long-term sustainability, local lead and transition are the ultimate goals.

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## **Recruitment**

Recruitment in a non-permissive environment is challenging, and there does not seem to be an ideal type of model that fits all environments. Overall it can be said that recruitment in a non-permissive environment has to be evidence-based with an in-depth analysis of the conflict dynamics and social transformations that have occurred during the conflict. In the extreme case, the initial requirements for recruitment in the SSS phase might not be in accordance with the requirements of the SSR. This means that solutions that are designed to create a minimum level of security in a given area during the SSS phase are not always the same solutions that should be implemented when the situation becomes more stable and sustainability is the objective. For example, robust police units are not always the best units to perform traditional policing duties after stabilisation has been achieved. Similarly, local militias involved in stabilisation activities will have to be disarmed and demobilised (or incorporated into the official structures) simultaneously with the introduction of regular police into the area. Of course these kinds of transformations will have to be a built-in part of the programme from early on so that all actors – formal as well as informal – know what the long-term goal is.

The key challenge is that large parts of the local population in the given country will to some extent (willingly or not) be part of the conflict in respect of geography, ethnicity and political culture. In many societies that are prone to or are undergoing internal conflict, families will try to balance their own interests and survival by having different members of the family or clan enrolled in the formal, informal and insurgent formations. These conditions challenge the desire to limit insurgent infiltration and infiltration from local powerbrokers into the new security forces. One mechanism for countering this is by developing a programme for local vetting whereby local leaders, government officials and international actors participate in the recruitment process. These vetting structures attached to the different recruitment centres will have to be adapted to the local setting from place to place in the given country. The key element here is to allow time for this kind of system to work and thereby prevent infiltration.

When planning the recruitment strategy, considerations of ethnic balance should have a high priority. Most experience shows that building ethnically divided military units can undermine the local perception of these units and determine whether they are perceived as legitimate or not. On the other hand, local police units will often have to reflect the local ethnic environment if they are to communicate with and be accepted by that community. However, both recruiting strategies require a large number of external mentors to avoid these new forces becoming a part of local rivalries or acting to repress certain ethnic groups.

## **Assessing progress (qualitative and quantitative) prior to transition**

### **Long-term and holistic planning**

Assessing progress in a non-permissive environment is extremely complex. When assessing the progress of a specific element, it is hard to exclude or isolate external variables or prevent them interfering with the result. This means that it is hard to know whether the assessed effect is the result of an intentional action made as part of the programme or whether it is caused by external circumstances beyond one's control. Consequently, it becomes hard to know where to adjust for enhanced programme progress. The non-permissive environment will probably not allow complete isolation of external factors when conducting assessments, which is why it is important to be aware of them in designing a programme for assessing progress.

Assessments can be undertaken qualitatively, quantitatively or as a mixture of both. In any given context, the point of departure should be an overall plan which lists the end state and the benchmarks leading to this so that the assessment of the given object reflects the overall objective of the strategy. This is pivotal if the assessment is to lead the progress towards local lead and transition, and not just assessing for the sake of assessing. Again, the assessment criteria must be conflict-specific. This means that the history of the given country and the nature of the conflict must be built into the criteria, among other things to avoid the assessment being built on a desired outcome for the western security forces that is often unattainable in a context of local conflict.

The plan for assessing progress must take into account both the specific elements of the SSS strategy and transversal elements of the overall SSR programme and the sectors involved therein – a horizontal cross-sector plan – as well as include benchmarks which cover assessing political progress – a vertically focused plan. The horizontal focus is important so as to ensure that one sector of the programme does not develop in the wrong direction, which can undermine the other sectors, or that development in one sector does not progress too slowly. For example, if a military operation in a given area becomes dependent on community policing units, but these units are not available, the military operation should probably not have been conducted in the first place.

The vertical focus of the plan is to guarantee that well-functioning new security forces will be subject to political control, and not subject to local power-brokers or external forces. The non-permissive environment will accelerate the surge to develop tactically oriented units to create a stable environment. However, if the political development does not match tactical progress, the political level of the host nation – ministries and parliament – will not be capable of leading the security sector, eventually undermining the SSR programme. This means that, if assessments are

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to lead the building and development of the security sector with the ultimate goal of transition, it is a precondition that functional political-level institutions will have been developed at the same pace as the tactical level and that transition will not take place until these institutions are fully in place.

### **Qualitative and quantitative assessment**

Assessing progress in a non-permissive environment is, as already noted, extremely complex, making the qualitative and quantitative divide a blurred one. What does emerge is a combination of the two ways of assessing progress that complement each other. It is important to use both these ways of assessment in order to generate a more comprehensive understanding of the environment at hand. Overall, quantitative assessment relies on measurable data, i.e. statistical-type data, whereas qualitative assessment relies on verbal and narrative feedback that showcases opinion and perceptions.

When conducting an assessment of progress prior to transition, it is important to gain a good, in-depth understanding of the surrounding environment in which national security forces must be built. In this respect, it is crucial for an SSS and the subsequent SSR programme to know and understand the local perceptions of the new security forces that are being built, and to be at the forefront of the development of this perception to be able to adapt the programme constantly. The local perception of the new security forces in a non-permissive environment is crucial for the success of the programme. If the local population does not perceive the new security forces as legitimate, these new forces may undermine the larger nation-building project that the programme is often a part of. As David Galula writes, “...strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population...”.<sup>20</sup>

The qualitative assessment criteria should be used as a guideline in combination with the quantitative ones in the process towards transition. Here, as one element, these criteria play a role when measuring whether the local population feels confident with the new security forces, and whether they trust them sufficiently as their new legitimate provider of security. At the end of the day, the public perception is crucial for success. An example of a list of questions that could be posed to the local population is listed below (see Figure 5). What is important to realise is that this survey is both qualitative and quantitative at the same time: while it assesses the perceptions of the local population, it simultaneously also assesses how widespread different perceptions are – i.e. favourable or negative views – of the local security forces. In this regard, it should be emphasised that all conflicts are unique and that assessment criteria are therefore context-specific. Qualitative assessments should be used on a regular basis, e.g., every three months in all areas where new

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(20) Galula, David (1964): *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Praeger Security International, London, United Kingdom, p. 55.

security forces are being deployed. As a suggestion, locally hired people or a local firm should conduct the surveys.

Governance
Who do you turn to within your community to resolve conflicts?
How satisfied are you with the efforts of the government to improve the quality of life for people like yourself?
In your opinion, which court is more likely to prosecute a criminal quickly and fairly?
Which institution or individual is the most powerful authority in your community?
Who are you more inclined to believe, the government or the insurgents?
In your opinion, how well is the government doing its job in securing the country?
How well does the governor of this area do his job in securing the province?
Security
Can you safely go where you want?
Do you think people feel that the roads are safe to use?
What two issues are most often the sources of conflict in your community?
Who provides security to your community?
How safe do you feel in your community at present? Please use a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means 'very safe' and 5 means 'very unsafe'.
Do you feel security in your community is improving or getting worse? Please use a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means 'improving a lot' and 5 means 'getting a lot worse'.
What do you feel should be done to improve security in your community?
To whom would you report information about insurgent activity?
Are there security problems where you live?
In the last month, do you think the security situation in your town has improved?
Who brings the most security to your area?
Who brings the most insecurity to your area?
National Police
Do you have a favourable opinion of the District Chief of Police or the national police in general?
If you experienced a crime, who would you report it to?
How often do you see the police in your area, and how do you perceive them: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) The police uphold the law</li> <li>2) The police are capable and professional</li> <li>3) The police protect the locals</li> <li>4) The police treat the locals with respect</li> <li>5) The police are corrupt</li> </ol>
Have you heard of or seen the police in your area doing anything improper?
Speaking of the police, do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about them: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Helpful to the population?</li> <li>2) Are fair?</li> <li>3) Are well-equipped?</li> <li>4) Are well-trained?</li> <li>5) Make me proud?</li> <li>6) Look/dress professionally?</li> <li>7) Behave professionally?</li> </ol>

Has the performance of the police in your district improved or worsened in the last 6 months?
Do you believe the following persons misuse their power? Do you think they misuse their power most of the time, sometimes or never: 1) District Police Chief? 2) District Deputy Chief of Police? 3) Local police checkpoint commanders? 4) Individual patrolmen in general?
<b>National Army</b>
Do you have a favourable or unfavourable opinion of the army?
How often do you see the army in your area, and how do you perceive them: 1) The army upholds the law 2) The army is capable and professional 3) The army protects the locals 4) The army treats the locals with respect 5) The army is corrupt
Have you heard of or seen the army in your area doing anything improper?
Speaking of the army, do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about them: 1) Helpful to the population? 2) Is fair? 3) Is well equipped? 4) Is well trained? 5) Makes me proud? 6) Looks/Dresses professionally? 7) Behaves professionally?
Has the performance of the army in your district improved or worsened in the last 6 months?
Do you believe the following persons misuse their power? Do you think they misuse their power most of the time, sometimes or never: 1) Local army brigade commander? 2) Local army battalion commander? 3) Local army checkpoint commanders? 4) Individual soldiers in general?

Figure 5: Example of assessment survey on the perception of the local

Tied to the assessment of the local population's perceptions of the national security forces is the status and development of the security forces themselves. If local perceptions of the national security forces is either positive or negative, it will ultimately have something to do with the overall status and development of the units. Assessing the status and development of national security forces can be done through a "capability level" system, in which individual criteria or benchmarks are built into the different levels of capabilities (1-4), thereby establishing a basis for evaluation (see Figure 6). Capability levels can be of use to lead the way when assessing programme success and determining new priorities, but these assessments have to be supplemented by further in-depth assessment and understanding of the

development. A more quantitative assessment gives a good understanding of, for example, police units and their status regarding equipment, training and manning levels. It can guide the planners regarding where to allocate more resources and which units have reached a certain level. Importance must also be paid to acknowledge smaller adjustments within a specific unit, meaning that changing key staff officers within a unit can change the operational capacity level from 1 to 4 or from 4 to 1 overnight. Also, the surroundings – for example, the civilian population and their perception of the units – need to be taken into consideration.

<p><b>Police:</b></p> <p><b>Capability Level 4: Training level</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unit formed</li> <li>- Significant external assistance on all levels</li> <li>- Not capable of conducting basic law and order operations, management or leadership tasks</li> <li>- Manning and equipping is below 50%</li> </ul> <p><b>Capability Level 3: Initial Operational Capability</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Capable of conducting some basic law and order operations, management or leadership tasks</li> <li>- Regular external assistance and leadership support</li> <li>- Manning and equipping is between 50 and 70%</li> </ul> <p><b>Capability Level 2: Partial Operational Capability</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Can conduct basic law and order operations, management or leadership tasks</li> <li>- Occasional assistance form external advisors or Police Mentor Teams</li> <li>- Manning and equipping is between 70 and 85%</li> </ul> <p><b>Capability Level 1: Full Operational Capability</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Capable of independently conducting basic law and order operations, management or leadership tasks</li> <li>- External assistance only for specific operations</li> <li>- Some external assistance focusing on professionalism and higher standard education</li> <li>- Manning and equipping is above 85%</li> </ul>	<p><b>Army:</b></p> <p><b>Capability Level 4: Training level</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unit formed</li> <li>- Significant external mentor and training support</li> <li>- Not capable of conducting operational missions</li> <li>- Manning and equipping is below 50%</li> </ul> <p><b>Capability Level 3: Initial Operational Capability</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Somehow capable of conduction operations at company level</li> <li>- External mentor and training support and guidance</li> <li>- Capable of individual specialist skills</li> <li>- Manning and equipping is between 50 and 70%</li> </ul> <p><b>Capability Level 2: Partial Operational Capability</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Battalion capable of planning and executing operations</li> <li>- External mentor and training support and guidance</li> <li>- Capable of sustaining operations</li> <li>- Manning and equipping is between 70 and 85%</li> </ul> <p><b>Capability Level 1: Full Operational Capability</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Battalion is fully capable of planning, executing and sustaining operations</li> <li>- No mentor and training operational support</li> <li>- Some external support may be required from operation to operation</li> <li>- Manning and equipping is above 85%</li> </ul>
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Figure 6: Example of capability level matrix

Both types of assessments – qualitative and quantitative – should be conducted periodically, e.g. every three months. Assessments of the local perceptions of the

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national security forces should be conducted whenever new national security forces are deployed. In doing this, factors such as local power dynamics, ethnic composition, government reach, tribal structures etc. have to be taken into account because these elements can interfere with the results and the level of generalisation. Because of the character of the environment, a certain level of uncertainty must be expected of the results, which is why the successive surveys should always be used in combination to show general developments rather than snapshots of development. This is also why quantitative assessment is necessary to complete the picture: regular assessments on the various security units will provide a holistic picture on the status of each unit and its development, which can then be analysed together with local perceptions of the population regarding the national security forces. As a suggestion, assessment of the status and development of security units should be conducted by a team of people specifically trained for the job and deployed and controlled from centrally placed headquarters.

## **Transition of responsibility to the host nation**

### **A long-term view**

When talking about transition, it is important to understand that it is an ongoing process and not something that occurs on a specific date. Transition will not come in a linear manner but incrementally as part of the implementation of a programme. Therefore it is an element that should be built into the overall strategy and not one that reflects the political environment in different countries. Transition needs to be an incorporated part of the overall SSR and nation-building project from early on and should build on benchmarks, not on time limits. The ultimate transfer of control from external actors to the host nation will, of course, often be a formal one. This does not, however, imply that the role of the external actors has ceased. On the contrary, there will often be a crucial role for the external actors to fill years after the official transition has taken place. This means that partnering, mentoring and monitoring on all levels (vertically) will probably still be needed and that the level of external assistance (political, civilian, economic and military) will have to be maintained for a substantial period of time following the official transition to enable the host nation to 'stand on its own feet'. Some would argue that a complete transition probably takes a generation.

Transition should be the optimal focal point for all the initial SSS phases and implementation of the SSR programme. Often it is possible to incorporate transition into the initial benchmarks that are to lead towards the end state. As described earlier, this should be synchronised horizontally between the different elements of SSR. The complexity of 'three block' warfare illustrates the incremental nature of the transition: often within a specific country, many different stages of programmes will be undertaken, some more advanced than others. This will differ from region to region within the country and even from one end of a city to the other. Recent

experiences from e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan and DR Congo clearly illustrate this point, where security forces in some regions have advanced more rapidly than others, or when the tactical-level professional performance does not match the ability to conduct oversight by an immature political strategic level. When the latter is the case, increased external civilian assistance may be needed subsequent to tactical-level transition in order to guarantee political oversight and a well-functioning host-nation institutional level to plug into.

Therefore, SSS and ultimately SSR transition in a non-permissive environment cannot be seen as a closed phase in which a complete transition of, for example, the security forces can take place. Transition is a long-term goal, and a “stove pipes” approach can hamper and undermine other elements of the reform programme, which is why the transition of one SSR element has to be part of an integrated mission strategy – a single mission strategy with sub-level benchmarks in support of the overall project. This will also enable considerations of cross-sector interdependencies to be built into a subsequent transition process.

Subject	Focus	Actors
Planning and implementation		
Lead and command and control	The lead actor should have the resources to implement adopted decisions and build on transparent structures. Minimise bilateral engagements and establish clear command and control structures	International Community / International Organisation/ Coalition of the willing/ Host Nation
Starting structure and strategy	Clear mandate and strategy, with a long-term focus and clear overall benchmarks. Evidence-based decision on whether to build from scratch or on existing structures	Lead Actor, Host Nation and International Community
Political control and national ownership	A plan for national ownership and lead should be developed early on, together with local institutional and technocratic capacity building	Lead Actor and Host Nation
Size of the structures and funding	Evidence-based analysis should determine the size of the security sector, and flexible trust funds should be established to carry the substantial economic burden	Lead Actor, Host Nation and International Community
Training, monitoring and mentoring	Allocate large numbers of specialised trainers and mentors early in the programme. Develop common training programmes for all security forces to go through, supplemented by locally adapted specialised training	Lead Actor, International Community and Host Nation
Short- vs. long-term planning and the division of labour	A clear division of labour between the core security forces is crucial when balancing the short-term stabilisation goals with long-term sustainability	Lead Actor and Host Nation

Recruitment	Clear vetting structures and strong considerations concerning how to gain ethnic balance in the new forces should be developed from the beginning	Lead Actor and Host Nation
Assessing progress		
Long-term and holistic planning	Assessments should be part of an overall strategy listing the benchmarks to be the basis for evaluation. Also, assessments should be conducted on both short- and long-term criteria and across the combined programme, both horizontally and vertically	Lead Actor and Host Nation
Qualitative and quantitative	Use both qualitative and quantitative assessment methods when evaluating programme progress and build this assessment primarily on the local population's perceptions of the new security forces	Lead Actor and Host Nation
Transition of responsibility		
A long-term view	Transition should be viewed as a long-term process that develops incrementally as a part of programme implementation. It should be synchronised with other SSS and SSR elements and with the host-nation strategic-level political and institutional build-up	Lead Actor, International Community and Host Nation

Figure 7: Matrix of SSS considerations in a non-permissive environment